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American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and
Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs
Brannon P. Denning* & Michael D. Ramsey**
In American Insurance Association v. Garamendi,1 the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA), which required insurance
companies doing business in California to disclose all policies they or their affiliates sold in Europe
between 1920 and 1945. According to the Court, the state’s law unconstitutionally interfered with
the foreign affairs power of the national government. The decision was easily overlooked in a Term
of landmark cases addressing affirmative action and sexual privacy.2 What coverage the case did
receive emphasized its federalism aspects, and excited little reaction because the result seemed
intuitively appropriate: the Court overturned a state law that, in the words of one account, “amounted
to unconstitutional meddling in foreign affairs by a state.”3
We argue here, however, that Garamendi is more important and problematic from
the perspective of separation of powers. We argue that the decision improperly expands presidential
control over foreign affairs, not only at the expense of the states, but more importantly at the
expense of Congress and the Senate. The Garamendi Court invented a novel constitutional power
of “executive preemption” – that is, an independent presidential power to override state laws that
interfere with executive branch foreign policy. Previously, displacement of state laws implicating
foreign affairs could be done principally by Congress and the Senate through the preemptive power

*

Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law at Samford University.
Professor of Law, University of San Diego Law School. For their insights the authors especially
thank Curtis A. Bradley, Christopher Bryant, Jack L. Goldsmith, Julian G. Ku, John O. McGinnis, Saikrishna B.
Prakash, Lisa P. Ramsey, Michael B. Rappaport, Glenn H. Reynolds, Ted Ruger, Larry Simon, Paul B. Stephan,
Peter J. Spiro, Edward Swaine, Carlos Vazquez, Bryan Wildenthal and Ingrid Wuerth. Professor Ramsey advised
the California Department of Insurance in the litigation of the Garamendi case, and benefitted from the perspectives
of Frank Kaplan, Andrew Stroud, Jesse Contreras, Ryan Hedges and Leslie Tick. The opinions expressed are the
authors’ own, and in particular do not reflect the views of the California Department of Insurance.
1
123 S. Ct. 2374 (2003).
2
The Court announced Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct.
2325 (2003) on the same day as Garamendi, and Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), three days later. News
coverage of the Court’s term predictably emphasized those cases.
3
Mark Sherman, Court Strikes Calif. Law on Nazi-era Claims, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 24, 2003, at A10
(“ Siding with the Bush administration and insurers, the court ruled 5-4 that the law amounted to unconstitutional
meddling in foreign affairs by a state.”). See also Jessie Mangaliman, Court Voids State Law Aiding Nazi Victims,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 24, 2003, at 14 (writing that the “court, in effect said California . . . exceeded its
authority by seeking to address a foreign-policy issue meant for the federal government”);
Holocaust Insurance Law Negated, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at B1 (writing that the Bush Administration’s
argument that the state law interfered with the ability to conduct foreign affairs as “critical” to the Court’s decision);
but see Charles Lane, Court Rejects Law Aiding Survivors of Holocaust, WASH. POST, June 24, 2003, at A11
(discussing implications for executive power).
**
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of Article VI of the Constitution.4 In unusual cases state laws might be displaced by the judiciary,5
or by the President pursuant to executive agreements with foreign nations.6 But until Garamendi,
no one had thought that a mere executive branch policy, unsupported by the formal or even tacit
approval of any other branch, could have the effect of preemptive law.7
As a result, one need not be a defender of foreign policy federalism8 nor a critic of
executive foreign affairs powers9 to have grave reservations about the decision’s implications for
separation of powers, federalism and constitutional theory. It is uncontroversial that ordinarily state
laws and policies must give way to the foreign affairs objectives of the national government: indeed,
establishing that proposition was one of the Constitution’s principal advances over the Article of
Confederation that preceded it. The critical question, though, is how these overriding federal goals
are developed and identified. We argue that the Garamendi decision has at least three separate and
substantial ill-effects upon this process.
First, the Garamendi decision conveys to the President the power to decide which
state laws affecting foreign affairs survive and which do not. This executive preemption
concentrates foreign affairs power in the President in a way not countenanced by the Constitution’s
text nor contemplated by its Framers, who emphasized the importance of separating executive power
from legislative power. Previously, if the executive branch wished to pursue a foreign policy with
which a state law interfered, the usual course was for the President to seek the support of Congress
(or the Senate via a treaty) to override the competing state law through Article VI of the Constitution.
This procedure assured that state laws would not stand as obstacles to federal foreign policy (as they

4

U.S. CONST. Art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land. . . .”). See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (statutory
preemption); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (statutory preemption); El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng, 525
U.S. 155 (1999) (treaty preemption).
5
Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (displacing state law under dormant
foreign commerce clause doctrine); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (displacing state law under dormant
foreign affairs doctrine).
6
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
7
See Barclays Bank plc v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 512 U.S. 298, 329-30 (1994) (rejecting,
in the context of the dormant foreign commerce clause doctrine, the contention that a mere executive policy could
cause the Court to invalidate a state law).
8
We have previously disagreed over the scope of the states’ constitutional authority in foreign affairs.
See Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy
Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341 (1999) (defending a foreign affairs role for the states); Brannon P.
Denning & Jack H. McCall , Jr., The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Sanctions Against Foreign Countries:
Affairs of States, States’ Affairs or a Sorry State of Affairs?, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 307 (1999) (arguing that
many state foreign policy activities are unconstitutional).
9
One of us has previously defended a relatively broad account of the President’s foreign affairs
powers. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE
L.J. 231 (2001).
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had, to the nation’s great detriment, under the Article of Confederation);10 but it also assured that
federal foreign policy would be developed cooperatively, as the policy of the whole of the federal
government, and not merely as the policy of the executive branch. Under the post-Garamendi
system, the President has no incentive to pursue a cooperative approach to foreign policy, and
Congress must assemble a veto-proof majority to intervene.
Second, the Court in Garamendi relied in part upon two executive agreements that
seemed in some tension with California’s law, although the Court made clear that the preemption
it found exceeded anything accomplished by the executive agreements alone.11 Nonetheless, the
Court’s opinion contains broad and unreflective language endorsing executive agreements – which,
prior to the Garamendi decision, had always been described in cautious and guarded language
reflecting such agreements’ uncertain constitutional status. By abandoning its earlier caution and
apparently giving executive agreements unconstrained preemptive effect, Garamendi threatens the
constitutional role of the Senate. So long as the constitutional status of executive agreements was
uncertain, the President was circumspect about their use. The Court’s apparent unqualified
endorsement of them may hasten the decline of the treaty.
Third, the decision’s dilution of separation of powers in foreign affairs undermines
structural protections the Constitution affords to the states. It centralizes preemptive power in a
single branch, and one which is institutionally more disposed to value international objectives over
local ones. And in an era of globalization, it is increasingly likely that foreign policy objectives will
trench upon areas of traditional state interests. Whatever one thinks of judicial protections of
federalism interests, in the past the difficult balance between local interests and international ones
received its evaluation in Congress (or the Senate) – the so-called “political safeguards of
federalism.”12 But Garamendi, despite gestures toward the idea of traditional state interests, appears
to say that even in such traditional areas state law must give way to presidential foreign policy
objectives in the case of a direct conflict.
The Court did not discuss, nor indeed even seem aware of, the novelty of executive
preemption or its implications, which highlights the degree that the link between federalism and
separation of powers in foreign affairs remains unacknowledged. The Court’s failure to engage the
separation of powers implications of the case also underscores the extent to which the Court’s
methodology, which we describe as a casual constitutional common law, allows the Court to reach
intuitively comfortable results without seriously grappling with the important structural issues that
underlie them.
Part I of this Article discusses the factual setting of the Holocaust-era insurance
claims that formed the background of the case. Part II outlines the constitutional law of federal-state
10

On the tension between state laws and federal foreign policy under the Articles, see FREDERICK
MARKS, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1973); Michael D.
Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 379 (2000).
11
Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. at 2388.
12
See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.REV. 1321
(2001).
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relations in foreign affairs as it stood before the Garamendi decision. Part III describes the Supreme
Court’s decision, and points out its discontinuity with prior decisions. In Part IV we turn to the
troubling structural implications of Garamendi, which we regard as occurring primarily in the field
of separation of powers. As outlined above, we conclude that the Court ended up far from the text,
structure and history of the Constitution. In Part V we address the decision’s implications for
federalism, particular the dangers of concentrating preemptive power over traditional state functions
in the federal executive branch.
Part VI relates the Garamendi case to wider theoretical debates of modern foreign
affairs law. One of the deeper divides lies between those who would ground foreign affairs law in
the text, structure and history of the Constitution, and, on the other hand, those who see foreign
affairs law (even more than domestic constitutional law) as an exercise in “common law
constitutionalism” that owes more to doctrinal and practical evolution than to the textual starting
point.13 We argue that the Garamendi decision should satisfy neither camp. As outlined in Parts IV
and V, it cannot rest comfortably upon constitutional text, structure and history. In contrast to other
federalism and separation of powers cases,14 the Garamendi Court paid little attention to text or
structure in analyzing the constitutional questions presented. But neither is Garamendi a true
exercise in common law doctrinal evolution, because it owes essentially nothing to prior cases or
practice, except as rhetorical cover (as elaborated in Part III). Garamendi’s near-exclusive attention
to loose interpretations of prior case law and its lack of sensitivity to text, history, and structure,
suggest to us a danger in “common law constitutional interpretation” as a preferred approach to
constitutional interpretation and adjudication in foreign affairs controversies.
In sum, we argue that the Court’s lack of attention to constitutional text, history and
structure, and its casual use of prior decisions without proper attention to their specific facts or
limitations, allowed the Court to reach an intuitively comfortable result that is wrong both as a matter
of federalism and, perhaps more importantly, as a matter of separation of powers. Centrally, the
Court’s failure to begin with constitutional first principles caused it to overlook the critical
relationship between federalism and separation of powers in foreign affairs. A robust foreign affairs
federalism promotes a cooperative approach to foreign affairs, since the President will need the
support of Congress to oust disruptive state laws; as a result, more foreign affairs decisionmaking
will be done by Congress (or the Senate). In contrast, allowing the President unilaterally to oust
states from foreign affairs, as the Court did in Garamendi, means that foreign affairs disputes may
be decided only by the President, through a concentration of executive and legislative power that is
contrary to the first principles of separation of powers. This re-allocation harms both the states and
the legislative branch of the federal government.

13

See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 677 (1996).
See, e.g., United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,
514 U.S. 779 (1996); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983).
14
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I.

The Holocaust-Era Insurance Claims
A.

California and the Claims

Millions of people throughout Europe lost lives and property during the Nazi
campaigns against civilian populations in the 1930s and 1940s. Many of these victims carried life,
casualty and other insurance policies issued by Europe’s major insurance companies, and the losses
inflicted by the Nazis in many cases would have obligated the insurance companies to pay the
beneficiaries of these policies. By the end of the twentieth century, however, relatively few
payments have been made by leading insurers with respect to Holocaust-era losses.15
Of the array of Holocaust-era claims,16 as a practical matter insurance claims posed
particular problems of proof, as they depend upon evidence of the policies in question, and
Holocaust survivors who only barely escaped with their lives could hardly be expected to have
salvaged their insurance documentation. Of course, the insurance companies might have records,
but the companies themselves had been affected by the war and its aftermath and plausibly
contended that many of their documents had been lost. Moreover, claimants came to suspect that
the companies might not be fully forthcoming in providing documents that could require the
companies to pay substantial claims.17 In any event, the reality was that the insurance claimants had
little documentation and for the most part were not able to obtain any from the insurers.18
As of the late 1990s, thousands of Holocaust survivors and beneficiaries of Holocaust
victims lived in California, and they brought the matter to the attention of the California Department
of Insurance. As a partial response, in 1998 the Department, together with insurance regulators from
other states, several European insurance companies, European regulators and nongovernmental
organizations, and the government of Israel, founded an organization called the International
Commission for Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC). The idea of ICHEIC was to invite
insurance companies to pursue a cooperative approach to resolving the claims.19 But claims
resolution continued to founder on the issue of documentation. ICHEIC was a voluntary
15

See Hearings before the United States House of Representatives Government Reform Subcommittee
on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations, September 24, 2002
(Testimony of Leslie Tick, California Department of Insurance), reprinted in Respondent’s Brief in Opposition,
American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, No. 02-722, app. D, at 23-34 [hereinafter 2001 Hearings].
16
Other Holocaust claims included, for example, allegations of slave labor and forced relocation against
German and other European companies that cooperated with the Nazis. See Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65
F.Supp.2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F.Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999).
17
These concerns were highlighted by events in an insurance claim filed in California state courts. See
Stern v. Assicurazioni Generali, S.p.A., 1999 WL 167546 (Cal. Super. Ct.) (Jan. 25, 1999). That case involved a
claim by the beneficiaries of Mor Stern, a Jewish civilian who died at Auschwitz. The Stern heirs believed he had
purchased insurance from Generali, a leading Italian insurer, but they lacked documentation. Generali claimed that
its files had been destroyed in the war and that it had no evidence of a policy. During the course of the dispute, an
anonymous Generali employed faxed the Stern heirs a copy of Mor Stern’s life insurance policy, which Generali
apparently had in its warehouse in Trieste, Italy. See Exhibit 2 to Commissioner’ Opposition Brief, Gerling Global
Reins. Co. of America v. Quackenbush, 2000 WL 777976 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
18
See 2001 Hearings, supra note 15, at 23-27.
19
See American Insurance Association v. Low, 230 F.3d. 739 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing ICHEIC).
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organization without means to compel disclosure, and without access to the insurers’ records
claimants found that ICHEIC did little to improve their position.20
This difficulty attracted the attention of the California legislature. At the behest of
state Assemblyman Wally Knox, the California legislature in 1998 passed a series of measures to
facilitate recovery on the Holocaust-era insurance claims.21 First, the legislature authorized a cause
of action permitting “any Holocaust victim, or heir or beneficiary of a Holocaust victim” residing
in California and having “a claim arising out of an insurance policy or policies purchased or in effect
in Europe before 1945 from an insurer” covered by the statute to “bring a legal action to recover on
that claim in any superior court of the state for the county in which the plaintiff or one of the
plaintiffs resides” until December 31, 2010 – in effect providing a cause of action and eliminating
the statute of limitations for the claims.22 Further, responding to the evidentiary problems, the
legislature required that all insurance companies doing business in California that had sold insurance
in Europe during the Holocaust era (or had an affiliate that did so) to provide a list of their insureds
during that period, together with relevant policy information.23 The disclosure provision, known as
the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA), became the focus of the Garamendi litigation.
As finally enacted, the HVIRA established a “central registry containing records and
information relating to insurance policies . . . of Holocaust victims, living and deceased.”24 The law
required insurers doing business in California that sold insurance policies “directly or though a
related company, to persons in Europe . . . in effect between 1920 and 1945” to report to the state
insurance commissioner the number of any such policies; “[t]he holder, beneficiary, and current
status of those policies”; and “[t]he city of origin, domicile, or address for each policyholder listed
in the policies.”25 The HVIRA also required insurers to declare that the proceeds of such policies
had been paid to the beneficiaries or their heirs, if any; that any unclaimed proceeds were donated
to charities for Holocaust survivors; that the proceeds are being distributed in accordance with a
20
See Henry Weinstein, Insurers Reject Most Claims in Holocaust Cases, LOS ANGELES TIMES, May 9,
2000, at A-3 (reporting that the ICHEIC insurers had rejected three out of four of the early cases submitted to them,
often for lack of documentation, even though the initial cases were specifically selected by the claimants as being
those with the best documentation); 2001 Hearings, supra note 15, at 25-27 (reciting problems with disclosure and
claims settlement at ICHEIC)
21
See Weinstein, supra note 20, at A-3 (describing the enactment of the legislation).
22
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 354.4(b), (c)). The provision also allowed suit against any “related
company” – basically an affiliate – of a Holocaust-era insurer, responding to the jurisdictional difficulty that many of
the companies that actually issued the policies did not do business directly in California. Id., Sec. 354.5(a)(3).
23
Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act, Cal. Ins. Code § 13800-13807 (1999). See also Cal. Code
Regs. Title 10, § 2278-2278.5 (implementing regulations). The disclosure provisions that became the HVIRA were
originally enacted in 1998 along with the other insurance-related statutes, but then-Governor Pete Wilson vetoed that
part of the 1998 enactments. After Gray Davis replaced Wilson as governor, the legislature re-passed the disclosure
provisions as the HVIRA in 1999.
24
Cal. Ins. Code § 13803.
25
Id. § 13804(a)(1)-(3). A “related company” was defined in the Act as “any parent, subsidiary,
reinsurer, successor in interest, managing general agent, or affiliate company of the insurer.” Id. § 13802(b). Many
European insurers operated in California through affiliates that purported to be largely independent of the European
operations, so in many cases California sought to regulate not the company that actually had Holocaust claims
against it, but a distant corporate relative.
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court-approved plan; or that the proceeds have not been distributed and their amount. The HVIRA
directed the Commissioner of Insurance to revoke the business license of an insurer that failed to
comply with it.26
According to its preamble, the HVIRA sought to “ensure that closure” on the question
of unpaid insurance proceeds was “swiftly brought to pass” for California’s Holocaust survivors. 27
It spoke of insurers’ “responsibility to ensure that any involvement they or their related companies
may have had with insurance policies of Holocaust victims are disclosed to the state” to ensure
“rapid resolution” of these issues for victims and their families.28 The legislature deemed the Act
“necessary to protect the claims and interests of California residents” in light of the “active
negotiations” underway through ICHEIC to “resolve all outstanding insurance claims issues,” and
sought to “encourage the development of a resolution to these issues through the international
process or through direct action by the State of California . . . .”29
B.

The United States and the Claims

While these developments proceeded in California (and in other states),30 the U.S.
government began to take an interest in Holocaust insurance claims.31 The U.S. Congress held
hearings on the matter in 1998, roughly contemporaneously with the formation of ICHEIC and the
enactment of the HVIRA. At first it seemed that the initiative would remain at the state level. That
was consistent with U.S. practice, where – despite insurance’s multi-state and indeed multinational
character – regulation had been conducted principally by the states. Congress had a long-standing
policy of endorsing state insurance regulatory activities, reflected in the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
which broadly authorized states to regulate the industry despite its interstate character.32 As the
Chair of the House committee observed to the Insurance Commissioners of California and
Washington State, when they testified before the committee on efforts at the state level:
[L]et me say that because this is an issue of international significance, there are
aspects of the American system that are not widely understood abroad, and one
26

Id. §§ 13804 (b)(1)-(4), 13806. Knowingly making false statements to the commissioner was a
misdemeanor, punishable by a civil penalty of $5,000. Id. § 13805.
27
Id. § 13801(d).
28
Id. § 13801(e).
29
Id. § 13801(f).
30
Florida, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, and Washington enacted legislation similar to the HVIRA.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 626.9543 (Cum.Supp.2003); MD. INS.CODE ANN. §§ 28-101 to 28- 110 (2002); Minn.Stat. §
60A.053 (Cum.Supp.2003); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 2701-2711 (Consol.2000); WASH. REV.CODE §§ 48.104.01048.104.903 (2003); see also ARIZ.REV.STAT. ANN. § 20-490 (West Cum.Supp.2003); TEXAS INS.CODE ANN. Art.
21.74 (2003); Mass. Senate Bill No. 843 (Jan. 1, 2003).
31
See generally STUART EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE (2003). For some of the background narrative
here, we have drawn on Brannon P. Denning, Recent Cases, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 950 (2003).
32
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012. As we discuss below, infra part I.B.2, Congress passed
the McCarran Act principally to shield state insurance regulation from constitutional attack under the dormant
commerce clause doctrine. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (describing purposes of the
McCarran Act).
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relates to the Federal nature of America, particularly in the insurance arena, [where]
the decision of the United States Congress, in effect, either to devolve or not to
assume responsibility for basic insurance regulation . . . gives the States as significant
role. And that means that as two symbolic State insurance commissioners, there’s
a great deal of authority that resides in your offices.33
The Washington state commissioner had previously testified that states were trying
to get the matter worked out cooperatively (referring in particular to ICHEIC), but that “[i]f our
requests for cooperation are not satisfied, then the states may begin to exercise [regulatory] powers.”
The California commissioner added that he was “prepared to revoke [the] certificate of authority,
which allows a company to sell insurance in California” for companies that did not provide
appropriate disclosure.34 Congress was well aware, therefore, of the developing initiatives at the
state level to compel disclosure of policy information. Several months later Congress passed the
U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998, which established a commission “to examine issues
pertaining to the disposition of Holocaust-era assets in the United States.”35 The section of the Act
relating to insurance policies stated among other things that:
In carrying out its duties under this Act, the Commission shall take note of the work
of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners [the association of state
regulators] with regard to Holocaust-era insurance issues and shall encourage the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners to prepare a report on the
Holocaust-era claims practices of all insurance companies, both foreign and
domestic, doing business in the United States at any time after January 30, 1933, that
issued any individual life, health or property-casualty insurance policy to any
individual on any list of Holocaust victims . . . .36
Congress thus seemed willing to let the states continue to work towards a solution
to the disclosure problem. But the insurance claims were soon overtaken by other events. Insurance
was only a small piece of the larger puzzle of claims based on Nazi atrocities. The largest set of
claims arose from allegations of slave labor used by companies cooperating with the Nazis, and from
banking-related matters.
The broader question of compensation for victims of the Third Reich and its
accomplices arose immediately after the end of World War II, and by century’s end it still had not
been resolved. The Cold War had caused the Western allies to defer the question of post-war
reparations because of worries that “continued reparations would cripple the new Federal Republic
of Germany economically,” so responsibility for compensating victims of the Nazis shifted to West
33

Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong. 131, 157 (Feb.
12, 1998). The Chair, in noting the states’ role in insurance regulation, was no doubt thinking principally of the
McCarran Act.
34
Id. at 134, 142. The California commissioner was likely a little premature here, because the HVIRA,
which allowed revocation of business licences, had not yet taken effect.
35
Pub. L. 105-186, 112 Stat. 611 (1998).
36
Id., § 3(a)(4)(A).
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Germany, which compensated its citizens and signed a number of international agreements settling
claims by other countries’ nationals against the German government.37 Once the reunification of
Germany occurred and a final settlement with the German government was effected, German courts
held that a previous moratorium on claims by foreign nationals against private parties had been
lifted. This ruling unleashed a torrent of litigation against insurance companies, banks,
manufacturers, and others by Holocaust survivors seeking compensation for financial losses inflicted
by the Nazi regime.38
On the diplomatic front, the U.S. executive branch sought to negotiate a settlement
with the German government to provide some measure of relief for Holocaust-era claims, hoping
to head off massive litigation that would, in all likelihood, never be concluded in time to benefit
most of the survivors.39 In October 1998, German Chancellor Schroeder invited the United States
to facilitate negotiation of a “foundation” to compensate slave labor victims. Although the German
companies ultimately won the first round of the slave labor litigation,40 additional claims (including
the insurance claims) were forthcoming, and the German companies and the German government
were willing to provide financial contribution in return for, as they put it, “legal peace.” Accordingly
negotiation proceeded despite the dismissal of the first round of slave labor litigation, and the
proposed foundation ultimately expanded to include insurance and other financial and property
claims as well.41
These efforts resulted in an agreement among the United States, Germany and a range
of German companies, signed in July, 2000. The agreement established a fund, to be administered
by a German foundation called “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future,” to which the German
government and German corporations would contribute a total of approximately 10 billion marks,
and which would compensate victims of a wide range of Nazi crimes, most prominently slave
labor.42
In return for the contributions, the German companies pressed their interest in, as the
preamble put it, an “all-embracing and enduring legal peace in this matter” which was “fundamental
to the establishment of the Foundation. . . .” The preamble further recognized “that German
business, having contributed substantially to the Foundation, should not be asked or expected to
contribute again, in court or elsewhere, for the use of forced laborers or for any wrongs asserted
37

Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. at 2380-81.
For accounts of the litigation, see Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremburg in America: Litigating the
Holocaust in United States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (2000); Burt Neuborne, Preliminary Reflections on
Aspects of Holocaust-Era Litigation in American Courts, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 795 (2002).
39
See EIZENSTAT, supra note 31 , at 205-278 (recounting the author’s experiences as chief U.S.
negotiator).
40
See Burger-Fischer, 65 F.Supp. 2d at 248 (dismissing slave labor claims on the basis of the statute of
limitations); Iwanowa, 67 F.2d at 424 (same).
41
EIZENSTAT, supra note __, at 205-278.
42
Agreement Concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future,” July 17,
2000, U.S.-Germany, 39 I.L.M. 1298 (2000) [hereinafter Foundation Agreement”]. See generally EIZENSTAT, supra
note 31, at 229-258 (recounting the author’s experiences as chief U.S. negotiator). The United States reached a
similar agreement with Austria, id. at 279-314, and an informal arrangement with Switzerland.
38
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against German companies arising form the National Socialist Era” and that “it is in the interest of
both parties to have a resolution of these issues that is non-adversarial and non-confrontational,
outside of litigation.”43
To this end, the agreement imposed three obligations upon the United States. First,
Article 1 stated that “[t]he parties agree that the Foundation . . . covers, and that it would be in their
interests for the Fondation to be the exclusive remedy and forum for the resolution of, all calims
arising from the national Socialist Era and World War II.” Second, according to Article 2:
The United States shall . . .inform its courts through a Statement of Interest . . . that
it would be in the foreign policy interests of the United States for the Foundation to
be the exclusive remedy and forum for resolving such claims asserted against
German companies . . . and that dismissal of such cases would be in its foreign policy
interest.44
Finally, Article 2 further required that “The United States, recognizing the importance
of the objective of this agreement, including all-embracing and enduring legal peace, shall, in a
timely manner, use its best efforts, in a manner it considers appropriate, to achieve these objective
with state and local governments.”45
In the effort leading up to the Foundation Agreement, the insurance claims were not
the central focus. The settlement allocated only about 300 million of its 10 billion mark budget for
insurance claims.46 Moreover, the Foundation itself had no mechanism for resolving the factual and
documentary aspects of Holocaust insurance claims, which experience in California and elsewhere
had shown to be critical. The Agreement said only that “The Federal Republic of Germany agrees
that insurance claims that come within the scope of the current claims handling procedures adopted
by the International Commission of Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (“ICHEIC”) and are made
against German insurance companies shall be processed by the companies and the German Insurance
Association on the basis of such procedures . . .” and that “[t]he Foundation legislation will provide
43

Foundation Agreement, supra note 42, preamble, para.5, 8-9.
Id., arts. 1(1), 2(1). Annex B of the Agreement set forth the language of the “statement of interest”
referred to in Section 2(2), which the United states agreed to file in any case where “a claim has been asserted
against German companies.” That “statement” provided, in its chief operative section, that “the United States
believes that all asserted claims should be pursued . . . through the Foundation instead of the courts” but went on to
say that “The United States takes no position here on the merits of the legal claims or arguments advanced by
plaintiffs or defendants. The United States does not suggest that its policy interests concerning the Foundation in
themselves provide an independent legal basis for dismissal, but will reinforce the point that U.S. policy interests
favor dismissal on any valid legal ground.” Annex B, para. 2, 7.
This language represented a watered-down version of what Germany originally sought: an agreement that
the United States government state that the agreement required the court to dismiss the action. See EIZENSTAT,
supra note 31, at 257-58 , 268-74 (describing the negotiations on this point). Eizenstat recounts that “we [the U.S.
negotiators] would not take a formal legal position barring U.S. citizens from their own courts.” Id. at 269.
45
Foundation Agreement, supra note 42, Arts. 1(1), 2(1), 2(2). The United States also agreed to “take
appropriate steps” to oppose any challenge to Germany’s sovereign immunity. Id. art. 3(4).
46
See EIZENSTAT, supra note 31, at 266-68. According to Eizenstat, the United States originally did
not understand the 10 billion mark cap on the Foundation funding to include insurance claims.
44
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that all eligibility decisions will be based on relaxed standards of proof.”47
During the negotiation of the Foundation agreement, executive branch officers
contacted state agencies, including the insurance commissioners, urging states like California to
rethink their efforts against Holocaust-related firms, and pleading that state involvement risked
derailing the entire settlement enterprise.48 The California Department of Insurance pressed ahead
under the HVIRA, directing the insurers to provide policy information by April 10, 2000, or face
suspension of their business licences.49
That threat in turn produced the suit that became the Garamendi case, filed as a
declaratory judgment action in federal court in Sacramento by the American Insurance Association
(an industry association) and three leading European insurance groups: Gerling of Germany,
Winterthur of Switzerland, and Generali of Italy. Among other claims, the plaintiffs contended that
the HVIRA represented an unconstitutional interference by the state in foreign affairs, a field
reserved to the federal government.50
II. Foreign Affairs Federalism before Garamendi
To show how the Court’s decision reconfigured foreign affairs law, we begin with
an overview of the law that preceded it. Prior to Garamendi, one could identify three general ways
courts might invalidate state laws as incompatible with the foreign affairs powers of the federal
government. In descending order of common application and acceptance, these were: (i) Article VI
preemption; (ii) exclusions arising directly from the Constitution; and (iii) non-Article VI executive
branch preemption, chiefly by executive agreement.
A. Article VI Preemption
A basic tenet of U.S. constitutional law is that federal laws and treaties displace
(preempt) state laws with which they conflict. Article VI of the Constitution provides in part: “This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land. . . .” The natural effect of making federal law supreme is that it overrides
inconsistent state law. Indeed, preemption – and particularly foreign affairs preemption – was a
central purpose of the clause, as explained in the founding era. Prior to the Constitution, under the
Articles of Confederation, the national government lacked power to displace state laws that
interfered with its treaties and foreign policy objectives, with the result that the nation could not
47

Id., art 1(4) & annex A, para.9.
See Bazyler, supra note 38, at 65-68, 127-34, 156-59.
49
2001 Hearings, supra note 15, at 28. Some insurers complied with the statute. See id. at 35-42
(statement of David S. Waldman regarding activities of MONY Life Insurance Comany).
50
See Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of America v. Quackenbush, 2000 WL 777976 (E.D. Cal.)
(June 9, 2000) (unpublished).
48
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develop a coherent national foreign policy. Article VI’s “supremacy clause” conveyed that power,
in material part to protect the federal government’s foreign affairs prerogatives.51
The inclusion of treaties, as well as statutes, within the supremacy clause shows the
extent to which the Constitution’s framers focused upon state interferences in foreign affairs under
the Articles. Perhaps the single greatest foreign affairs challenge under the Articles was that states
refused to implement and abide by treaties negotiated by the national government. In particular, key
states like Virginia and Pennsylvania refused to implement controversial provisions of the peace
treaty with Britain ending the revolutionary war, even though that settlement as a whole greatly
favored the United States. State intransigence in turn provoked Britain to drag its feet in its own
implementation of crucial clauses of the treaty. Further, states failed to follow provisions of
commercial treaties negotiated by Congress, and once it became clear to potential treaty partners that
Congress had no effective enforcement mechanism, further treatymaking became impossible.52
Of course, the Constitution could have left it to Congress, in the new system, to pass
laws implementing treaties and overriding inconsistent state law through the preemptive effect of
statutes. This would have been closest to the British system, where treaties did not override existing
laws, and instead required parliamentary implementation. But the Constitution’s drafters wanted
immediate implementation, and presumably saw no reason to allow the House to block or delay the
preemptive effect of treaties already approved by the Senate. In any event, no one objected to adding
treaties to the supremacy clause (which made sense, since the representation of the states in the
Senate presumably alleviated any federalism concerns).53
Article VI, then, set the basic relationship between the federal government and the
states: unlike under the Articles of Confederation, the states are obliged not to erect legal regimes
in conflict with federal legislative enactments – treaties and statutes. Modern doctrine goes a bit
beyond what might seem absolutely required by the clause’s plain language, in applying preemption

51

On the origins of the supremacy clause, see JACK L. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 171-77 (1996);
Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000). Madison had wanted the Constitution to give Congress a
“negative” over state legislation that it believed contrary to “the articles of Union or any treaties subsisting under the
authority of the Union.” His proposal encountered opposition on various grounds; the supremacy clause was the
resulting compromise. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand, ed., 1966 rev. ed.)
[hereinafter FARRAND, RECORDS], at 27-29. Among other things, the change limited Congress’ “veto” to matters
within Congress’ enumerated powers.
52
See MARKS, supra note 10, at 52-95; Ramsey, Myth, supra note 10, at 422-24 & nn. 161-173, and
sources cited therein. As Hamilton described the problem: “The treaties of the United States under the [Articles] are
liable to the infractions of the thirteen different legislatures. . . . The Faith, the reputation, the power of the whole
Union are thus continuously at the mercy of the prejudices, the passions and the interests of every member of which
it is composed.” THE FEDERALIST, No. 22 (Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick, ed., 1987), at 183.
53
See FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 51, at 22, 28-29 (recording no opposition to the supremacy of
treaties, and reflecting unanimous approval of the supremacy clause).
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not only in cases of direct conflict,54 but also when courts feel a state law (or treaty)55 “stands as an
obstacle” to the desired result of a federal act, even if technically the two could exist in parallel. And
in unusual cases, federal legislation may be so comprehensive as to occupy the entire “field” of
regulation, and thus (in the modern view) exclude state laws that may not seem obstacles in any
tangible sense.56
These principles are familiar in domestic constitutional law, and apply without serious
dispute to foreign affairs. In its most recent foreign affairs preemption case, the Supreme Court in
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council concluded unanimously that a federal statute prescribing
limited economic sanctions against Burma displaced a similar, though more restrictive, regulation
by Massachusetts.57 That was so even though both laws sought the same ultimate object (lessening
of repression in Burma) and one could comply with both the state law and the federal law at the same
time. It was sufficient for preemption, the Supreme Court pointed out, that Congress intended a
material but limited and flexible sanctions regime, whereas the state’s restriction was both furtherreaching and fixed.58

54

Preemption seems absolutely required by Article VI when a statute explicitly directs it, or when state
and federal law irreconcilably conflict such that it is impossible to obey both of them. Whether Congress must draft
laws in such a way to create conflict expressly, or whether courts may find conflict by implication, does not seem
directly addressed by the text.
55
In treaty preemption cases the Court has for the most part not suggested that different rules apply.
See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 143 (1938); El Al
Israel Airlines Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 175 (1999). We assume here that preemption based on statutes and
preemption based on treaties operate similarly. A threshold question is whether the treaty is “self-executing”: that is,
whether the treaty intends its provisions to have direct domestic effect. The Court has held that, notwithstanding the
unqualified language of Article VI, some treaties require domestic implementation (and hence are not preemptive of
their own effect). Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Four Doctrines of Self-Executing
Treaties, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 695 (1995). In speaking of treaty preemption, we refer only to the effect of selfexecuting treaties.
56
Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992), quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (preemption found when the state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”). The conventional account refers to
“conflict preemption,” “obstacle preemption” and “field preemption.” See BORIS I. BITTKER, BITTKER ON THE
REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 5.06 (1999 & 2003 Supp.); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1174-75 (3rd ed. 2000).
57
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). For details on Crosby, see Brannon
P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, Jr., Recent Decisions, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 750 (2000).
58
Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373-82. The court first noted the long-standing rule preempting state laws that
pose an obstacle to federal statutory objectives even in the absence of a direct conflict, and identified three ways the
state law posed such an obstacle: (1) “Congress clearly intended the federal act to provide the President with flexible
. . . authority over economic sanctions against Burma” whereas the state law did not permit any relaxation of
sanctions in response to good behavior; (2) “Congress manifestly intended to limit economic pressure against the
Burmese Government to a specific range” whereas the state law penalized activities that Congress had decided to
exempt from sanction; and (3) Congress had directed the President to speak for the nation in developing “a
comprehensive, multilateral strategy” toward Burma, whereas the state law prevented the President from having full
control over the range of economic sanctions to which Burma was exposed. Id.
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Indeed, there was not much judicial dispute on the matter. All thirteen judges who
heard the Crosby case thought the federal law preempted the state sanctions.59 At the Supreme
Court, Justice Scalia concurred separately to chide his colleagues for writing such a long opinion
delving into the federal statute’s legislative history, since, Scalia said, the statute’s preemptive effect
was perfectly obvious on its face.60
To the extent one might look for judicial debate in the area, the best one could turn
up would be a mild one: whether there should be a presumption for or against preemption in foreign
affairs related matters (however that might be defined). In domestic preemption cases, the Court
purports to apply a presumption that state laws are valid unless the federal law’s preemptive effect
is clear.61 In an early foreign affairs case, Hines v. Davidowitz, the Court suggested that this
presumption might be reversed in foreign affairs because of the federal government’s naturally
predominant role;62 in Crosby, the Court declined to consider whether a presumption might lie, since
it found the preemption clear in any event.63
In sum, one could find no serious dispute on core principles: that Article VI is the
principal way the federal government displaces state laws it thinks interfere with its foreign policy
objectives, and that federal legislative acts which intend to preempt state laws through Article VI will
almost always be successful (even if that intent can be found only by implication). It was also plain
that Article VI preemption could not be claimed in Garamendi: no statute or treaty even arguably

59

See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F. 3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999) (unanimously affirming
decision of district court invalidating Massachusetts law).
60
Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388-91 (Scalia, J., concurring). Curiously, academic commentary found the case
more difficult, with some commentators arguing that the federal statute afforded little basis for preemption. See, e.g.,
Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the One Voice Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 975 (2001);
Edward Swaine, Crosby as Foreign Relations Law, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 481 (2001); Mark Tushnet, Globalization and
Federalism in a Post-Printz World, 36 TULSA L.J. 11 (2000); Carlos Vazquez, W[h]ither Zschernig?, 46 VILL.
L.REV. 1259, 1261 (2001); see also Sanford Levinson, Compelling Collaboration with Evil? A Comment on Crosby
v. National Foreign Trade Council, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2189 (2001) (criticizing the Court’s outcome). Given the
Court’s embrace of “obstacle” preemption in domestic cases, we see no reason to view Crosby as anomalous: the
Court’s explanation of how the state law frustrated the purpose of the federal law seems wholly plausible and
consistent with domestic cases such as Gade. Notably, the Justices and academic commentators most sensitive to
federalism issues did not find Crosby objectionable. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption,
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 175; Ernest Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction and the Foreign Affairs
Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139 (2001).
61
E.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (“Federal regulation. . .
should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons – either that the
nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so
ordained.”).
62
See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (emphasizing importance of national government’s role
in foreign affairs and indicating that “In [determining preemption], it is of the utmost importance that this legislation
is in a field which affects international relations, the one aspect of our government that from the first has been most
generally conceded imperatively to demand broad national authority. Any concurrent state power that may exist is
restricted to the narrowest of limits.”).
63
Crosby, 520 U.S. at 374 n.8. See also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108-09 (2000) (declining
to apply any presumption in an area of “national and international maritime commerce”).
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conflicted with California’s HVIRA. Thus Garamendi lacked the critical factor that made its
Supreme Court predecessor, Crosby, an easy case.
B. Constitutional Exclusions
Even absent Article VI preemption, the Constitution itself might exclude states from
foreign affairs activities, without the need of preemptive federal action. Given the lack of a treaty
or statute in Garamendi, this is where the HVIRA’s challengers turned. The Constitution and the
Court’s prior cases offered three possibilities. First, the Constitution’s plain language might exclude
states from foreign affairs. Second, states might be excluded by the negative implication of clauses
granting foreign affairs power to the national government. And third, and more controversially, there
might be a structural exclusion of states from foreign affairs matters, not arising from any particular
constitutional clause. The question whether these methods might supplement Article VI preemption
became the central issue in the Garamendi case – at least at its outset.
1.

Specific Exclusions

The Constitution’s plain text excludes states from some specific foreign affairs
activities. Article I, Section 10, declares among other things that no state shall make treaties, make
other agreements without the consent of Congress, engage in war unless actually invaded, nor issue
letters of marque and reprisal. To the Framers, these exclusions were obvious and non-controversial:
for the most part they were carried over, with mild enhancements, from parallel provisions of the
Articles of Confederation.64 None of them, of course, was implicated in Garamendi. The question,
rather, was whether Article I, Section 10 was an exhaustive list. One might suppose, as some
commentators have suggested, that the very existence of a list of exclusions in the Constitution’s text
implies that the list is complete, and that others should not be created by implication.65 As of the
early twenty-first century, however, the matter could not be resolved so easily.
2.

The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine and Exclusions by
Implication

A broad spectrum of opinion – supported by substantial judicial authority – holds that
clauses granting a specific power to the federal government can by implication deny that power to
the states, even if the federal government has not acted and even if the Constitution does not exclude
64

Specifically, with respect to foreign affairs, Article I, Section 10, provides: “No state shall enter into
any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation; grant letters of Marque and Reprisal . . . . No State shall, without the Consent
of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports. . . . No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent
Danger as will not admit of delay.” Corresponding provisions (except respecting imports and exports) existed in
Articles VI and IX of the Articles of Confederation. See Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, reprinted in
JAMES BAYARD, A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 171 (1845).
65
See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1652
(1997) (the “natural inference . . . is that all foreign relations matters not excluded by Article I, Section 10 fall within
the concurrent power of the state and federal governments until preempted by federal statute or treaty.”).
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the states in so many words. The most familiar manifestation of this principle, and the most relevant
to Garamendi, is the so-called “negative” or “dormant” commerce clause doctrine, which according
to the Court excludes states from certain regulations affecting interstate commerce even absent
federal action, based upon a negative implication from Article I, Section 8’s grant to Congress of the
authority to regulate interstate commerce.66 Some Justices and academic commentators have
attacked the dormant commerce clause doctrine at its very foundations,67 but the sheer volume of
cases the Court has devoted to it seems to leave it firmly entrenched.
The doctrine, as the Court now applies it, does not exclude states from all regulations
of interstate commerce. Although at times in the nineteenth century the Court flirted with the idea
of mutually exclusive state and federal commerce powers,68 it ultimately abandoned that idea and
settled upon an intermediate approach that excluded states only from what it felt to be the most
unjustifiable regulations of interstate commerce: in general, laws that discriminate against out-ofstate commerce either on their face or in their effects, and laws whose putative local benefits are
“clearly exceeded” by their burdens on interstate commerce.69
Presumably, then, Congress’ section 8 power to regulate “Commerce with foreign
Nations” implies a similar “dormant” exclusion of the states from regulating matters of international
commerce.70 Indeed, the Court indicated in Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles in 1979 that
this “dormant” exclusion of states from foreign commerce was broader than the corresponding
exclusion of states from domestic interstate commerce, due to special federal concerns in
international commerce. Specifically, the Court held that, in addition to traditional dormant
commerce clause categories, state regulations of foreign commerce would be displaced if they
interfered with the foreign government’s ability to “speak with one voice” in foreign affairs.71
At first blush that would seem to pose serious trouble for the HVIRA, which (at least
according to the executive branch) interfered with the federal government’s ability to speak with one
voice on the settlement of Holocaust-era claims. And to be sure, Japan Line figured prominently
66

BITTKER, supra note 56, at §§ 6.01-6.06; 1 TRIBE, supra note 56, § 6-2; Donald H. Regan, The
Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091
(1986).
67
E.g., Julian Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982); Richard
Friedman, Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause out of Its Misery, 12 CARDOZO L.REV. 1745 (1991); Martin
Redish & Shane Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE
L.J. 569 (1987); Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep’t of Revenue, 496 U.S. 167, 202 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
68
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); Wilson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245
(1829); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283 (1849).
69
E.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (facial discrimination); Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (discrimination in effect); Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (undue burden).
70
The constitutional clauses are parallel: “The Congress shall have power . . . To regulate Commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST., Art. I, Sec. 8.
71
441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979). See BITTKER, supra note56, § 8.14.
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in the insurers’ opening arguments.72 But two substantial factors cautioned against too much Japan
Line-based optimism. First, the Court had retreated from its Japan Line holding in a series of cases
culminating in Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board in 1994. In Barclays, the Court upheld
California’s scheme of taxing the world-wide operations of foreign corporations doing business in
California, rejecting a Japan Line challenge. The Court pointed out that the law was neither
discriminatory nor an undue burden on foreign commerce; whatever further restrictions Japan Line
had intended did not apply because Congress appeared to endorse (or at least not to oppose) the
California tax. Congress, said the Court, is the “voice of the nation” in foreign commerce, and so
long as its “voice” is not compromised, the Court should not undertake to police state foreign
commerce regulations. While not repudiating Japan Line outright, Barclays seemed almost to
require active preemption by Congress (in effect, Article VI preemption) to displace a state law.73
Even more problematic for the insurers’ dormant commerce clause arguments,
though, was the McCarran Act, the federal law authorizing states to regulate interstate insurance
transactions.74 A leading theory of the dormant commerce clause doctrine (and presumably the
dormant foreign commerce clause doctrine) is that Congress is assumed not to endorse certain
categories of state commercial regulation. Congressional silence, then, is construed to reflect
congressional intent that these laws be displaced. Hanging the matter on congressional intent,
however, implies that Congress can manifest a contrary intent to affirmatively allow state
commercial regulations that would otherwise be excluded by the dormant commerce clause doctrine
– as the Court in fact has held.75
This was the point of the McCarran Act. In the post-New Deal period of commerce
clause expansion, the Court held for the first time that insurance was a matter of interstate
commerce.76 Although the case concerned Congress’ powers over insurance, one corollary of the
decision might have been that state insurance regulation would be exposed to dormant commerce
clause attack even in the absence of congressional regulation. To protect state insurance regulations,
Congress passed the McCarran Act, which explicitly reversed the dormant commerce clause
72

In addition to the “one-voice” argument, the insurers also argued that the HVIRA violated the
dormant commerce clause because it regulated extraterritorially, and that the McCarran Act did not protect
extraterritorial regulation. Cf. Brown-Forman Distillers Co. v. New York, 476 U.S. 573 (1986); Federal Trade
Comm’n v. Travelers’ Health Ass’n, 508 U.S. 491 (1993).
73
Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 512 U.S. 298 (1994); see also Container Corp.
of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983); Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477
U.S. 1 (1986).
74
15 U.S.C. § 1012. See supra part I.B.
75
E.g., Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). See William Cohen, Congressional
Power to Validate Unconstitutional State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387
(1983); Brannon P. Denning, Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV Cannot Replace the Dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88 MINN. L. REV. 384, 397-99 (2003); BITTKER, supra note 56, § 9.03, 9.04. This
power of congressional “redelegation” goes back to the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century, in which Congress used its positive commerce power to disable the dormant commerce
clause doctrine with respect to interstate shipments of alcohol. Previously, the dormant commerce clause doctrine
had prevented states from enforcing their liquor laws. See In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891); Clark Distilling Co. v.
W. Md. Rwy Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917); BITTKER, supra note 56, § 9.02.
76
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 544-46 (1944).
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assumption. As the Act stated, silence by Congress should not be construed as disapproval of state
regulation77 – a clear reference to the dormant commerce clause.78
The McCarran Act cast a substantial pall upon the insurers’ dormant commerce clause
claim, and thus more generally on the idea that the HVIRA might be displaced by the negative
implication of a specific clause in the Constitution. Although other negative implications
presumably exist, the dormant commerce clause is the only one that has received much judicial
development, and the only one of immediate application to the HVIRA.79 As a result, while the
dormant commerce clause doctrine was a material issue in the case, quite a bit more attention
focused on the idea of a structural exclusion of states from foreign affairs matters in general – a
matter taken up in the next subsection.
3.

Zschernig v. Miller and Structural Exclusions

Far more controversial than the dormant commerce clause doctrine is the proposition
that there is a “dormant” preemption of state activity not tied to any particular clause, but arising
(apparently) from a constitutional structure that envisions material foreign affairs decisions being
made at the federal level. As one of us has argued, “[T]he various provisions related to foreign
affairs can be read to contain a structural or ‘penumbral’ restriction on state actions affecting foreign
affairs, even in the absence of a congressional enactment.”80 That seemed, at any rate, to be the basis
for the Supreme Court’s decision in Zschernig v. Miller in 196881 – a case which appeared to be at
the center of the Garamendi arguments.
Prior cases had hinted at the idea of such an exclusion by describing foreign affairs
as exclusively a federal concern, but did not explore the matter because a decision could be founded
on more conventional propositions such as Article VI preemption or the dormant commerce clause
doctrine. For example, in Hines v. Davidowitz the Court had observed that
[t]he Federal Government, representing as it does the collective interests of [all]
states, is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs
with foreign sovereignties. . . . Our system of government is such that the interest of
the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole
nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign affairs
be left entirely free from local interference.82
77

15 U.S.C. § 1012.
The Court discussed and upheld this aspect of the McCarran Act in Benjamin, 328 U.S. at 434, and
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
79
For the suggestion, not endorsed by judicial authority, of a broad negative implication from the
treatymaking clause, see Edward Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power,
49 DUKE L.J. 1127 (2000).
80
Denning & McCall, The Constitutionality of State and Local Sanctions, supra note 8, at 337. But see
Ramsey, Power of the States in Foreign Affairs, supra note 8, at 429-432 (rejecting, at least as a matter of original
understanding, the existence of a structural limit on state foreign affairs activities).
81
389 U.S. 429 (1968).
82
Hines, 312 U.S. at 63.
78
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But this language was embedded within a paragraph that emphasized the Article VI
supremacy of statutes and treaties, and the case’s actual holding was that the state law in question
conflicted with the federal Alien Registration Act.83 Hines, like the Court’s subsequent decision in
Crosby, did not consider what would happen when a state statute affected foreign affairs but did not
conflict with a statute or treaty.84
Zschernig faced that issue directly, invalidating an Oregon statute despite the lack of
a preemptive federal act and the lack of any applicable constitutional clause. The case challenged
a state probate law allowing foreign citizens to inherit property only if their governments gave
reciprocal rights to Americans. Twenty years before Zschernig, in Clark v. Allen, the Court had
upheld a similar state statute, rejecting arguments that (i) the statute conflicted with a treaty; and (ii)
that the statute was “an extension of state power into the field of foreign affairs, which is exclusively
reserved by the Constitution to the Federal Government.”85 In rejecting the second claim, Clark
seemed to hold that when a state legislated on “local” matters, only “an overriding federal policy,
as where a treaty makes different or conflicting arrangements,” would operate to restrain the states.
Since there was “no treaty governing the right of succession to personal property,” and the state had
neither impermissibly negotiated with a foreign nation nor made a compact in violation of Article
I, Section 10, it had not “cross[ed] the forbidden line” though its law “will have some incidental or
indirect effect in foreign countries.”86
The statute challenged in Zschernig closely resembled the one upheld in Clark.
Nevertheless, the Court invalidated the Oregon law in Zschenig, while declining “the invitation to
re-examine our ruling in Clark v. Allen.”87 Justice Douglas (the author of both Clark and Zschernig)
defended the result in Clark by noting the distinct posture of the challenge in Zschernig. “It now
appears,” he wrote, that
the probate courts of various States have launched inquires into the type of
governments that obtain in particular foreign nations—whether aliens under their law
have enforceable rights, whether the so-called “rights” are merely dispensations
turning upon the whim or caprice of government officials, whether the representation
of consuls, ambassadors, and other representatives of foreign nations is credible or
made in good faith, whether there is in the actual administration in the foreign system
of law any element of confiscation.88
Such “state involvement in foreign affairs,” Douglas continued, was not approved by
Clark v. Allen. Unlike the “incidental or indirect” effects found in Clark, “the type of probate law
83

Id. at 62-64
For similar broad language coupled with narrow holdings, see Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275
(1875); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). A possible
early suggestion of a structural exclusion is Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540 (1840).
85
331 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1947).
86
Id. at 517.
87
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432.
88
Id. at 433-34.
84
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that Oregon enforces affects international relations in a persistent and subtle way.” Oregon’s law,
while “not as gross an intrusion in the federal domain” as a conflict with a statute or treaty, had “a
direct impact upon foreign relations and may well adversely affect the power of the central
government to deal with those problems” – and so was unconstitutional.89
Zschernig thus announced a rule of constitutional exclusion limiting states’
involvement in foreign affairs, much as the dormant commerce clause doctrine limits states’
regulation of interstate commerce even in the absence of congressional legislation. The key
proposition for which it appears to stand—and which makes it controversial—is that in the absence
of a treaty provision, a law, or even an executive branch policy,90 a state law may still be struck down
if it has “more than ‘some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries’” or carries “great
potential for disruption or embarrassment to” the Government’s conduct of foreign affairs.
The Court’s basis for its rule was difficult to discern from Justice Douglas’ opinion.
While the Court purported to rely on Hines v. Davidowitz, Hines involved Article VI statutory
preemption and not the “dormant” exclusion of Zschernig. “This was,” Louis Henkin commented,
“new constitutional doctrine.”91 And it was not well received by commentators. Henkin continued:
“The Court did not build sturdy underpinnings for its constitutional doctrine or face substantial
arguments against it. . . . What the Constitution says about foreign affairs . . . provides little basis for
the Court’s doctrine. . . . Nor is the Zschernig doctrine the natural inference from the expressed
grants to the federal branches or from ‘the Constitution as a whole’ . . . . Nor is there support for
Zschernig in the history of the Constitution in practice.”92 Harold Maier wrote that Douglas’s
opinion was “murky” and that only Justice Stewart’s structural analysis adequately explained the
result in the case.93 Recent scholars have expressed even sharper criticisms.94
89

Id. at 437, 440-41. Justices Stewart and Brennan would have gone further, to overrule Clark and rest
the outcome on “the basic allocation of the power between the States and the Nation,” which, according to Justice
Stewart, excluded states from matters concerning the conduct of foreign relations. Id. at 443 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). Justice Harlan disagreed with the majority’s analysis, preferring to provide “full relief sought by the
appellants” by “overruling the construction of the 1923 treaty, rather than the constitutional holding, in Clark v.
Allen . . . .” Id. at 445 (Harlan, J., concurring). Only Justice White dissented, writing that he was not persuaded
“that the Court’s construction of the 1923 treaty in Clark v. Allen . . . and of similar treaty language in earlier cases
should be overruled at this late date.” Id. at 462 (White, J., dissenting).
90
The Executive Branch had the Court that nothing in the Oregon probate laws interfered with its
conduct of foreign policy. Id. at 434. The Court replied that the “Government’s acquiescence in the ruling of Clark
v. Allen certainly does not justify extending the principle of that case . . . for [the application of Oregon’s law] has
more than ‘some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries,’ and has great potential for disruption or
embarrassment . . . .” Id. at 434-35.
91
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 163 (2nd ed. 1996).
92
Id. at 464.
93
Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 832, 836
(1989) (“Justice Stewart, in classic common law decision-making tradition, applied the general organizational
principles of U.S. federalism to the facts before him to arrive at his conclusion. Reiterating that the sole foreign
affairs voice of the nation lies in the national Government, he concluded that the [state law was] outside the realm of
state competence” because the state had trespassed on an area reserved for the federal government).
94
See, e.g., Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 65, at 1661 (“Contrary to conventional wisdom, the
federal common law of foreign relations announced by . . . Zschernig marked a sharp departure from prior law.”);
Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs, supra note 8, at 357 & n.61 (terming Zschernig “revolutionary”
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While academic commentary as a whole expressed doubt about the opinion’s
reasoning (or lack thereof), commentators divided over the correct response. In the decades
following Zschernig, that opinion’s cryptic rationale produced at least three divergent views. Some
academic commentators flatly rejected it as lacking any basis in the Constitution’s text and history.95
These commentators were comforted by the fact that Zschernig lay dormant in the courts, not clearly
forming the basis of any decision for some 30 years after it was rendered;96 no doubt they harbored
hopes that Garamendi would be the occasion to strike Zschernig off the books altogether.97
Others thought, as suggested above, that Zschernig might be defended on the basis
of constitutional structure and intent, even though the Court itself had not made much of a case.98
For those accepting at least some version of Zschernig, the question was whether to emphasize its
broad language or its specific facts. The Court had said, among other things, that state laws with
more than an incidental affect on foreign affairs were unconstitutional, without explaining what that
meant. But taking that observation as the case’s core holding suggested a fairly broad application,
depending on how one viewed “more than incidental.” Professor Maier, for example, proposed in
an influential article that courts undertake a balancing of federal and state interests and exclude states
from areas in which federal foreign affairs interests clearly predominated.99
Zschernig, though, was an unusual case on its facts, and to some this suggested that
it could be reserved to specific and fairly narrow categories of state acts. The principal problem in
Zschernig had been that courts applying the state law made intrusive and inflammatory investigations
into the good faith of foreign governments. The Court’s focus on these facts in its opinion – and its
insistence that it was not overruling its prior precedent of Clark v. Allen – indicated that the Court
might not have intended as wide-ranging an exclusion as Maier proposed. Professor Carlos
Vazquez, for example, suggested essentially confining Zschernig to its facts: state laws that
displayed overt hostility toward foreign governments would be invalid.100 One merit of this proposal
was that it would be relatively easy to apply: Maier’s balancing test, in contrast, invited courts to
make policy judgments in an area where judicial expertise was conventionally suspect.

and noting that its “constitutional basis . . . remains unexplained”).
95
See, e.g., Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 65, at 1661-62; Ramsey, Power of the States in
Foreign Affairs, supra note 8, at 429-32.
96
That desuetude led still other commentators to suggest it might lack continuing force. See HENKIN,
supra note 91, at 165 (noting courts’ lack of reliance on Zschernig and suggesting that Zschernig might be “a relic of
the Cold War”); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L.REV. 1223, 1242, 1264-66 (1999).
97
See Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1395 (1999) (suggesting that Barclays had overruled Zschernig sub silentio).
98
For defenses of some aspects of Zschernig, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, see Richard Bilder,
The Role of Cities and States in the Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'
L L. 821 (1989); Howard Fenton, The Fallacy
of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 NW. J. INT'
L L. & BUS. 563
(1993); Spiro, supra note 96; Maier, supra note 93, at 838-39; Denning & McCall, The Constitutionality of State
and Local Sanctions, supra note 8, at 337; Vazquez, W[h]ither Zschernig?, supra note 60, at 1259.
99
Maier, supra note 93, at 838-39.
100
Vazquez, W[h]ither Zschernig, supra note 60, at 1321.
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As one might expect, the battle lines in Garamendi formed largely on these grounds.
According to the insurers, the dormant commerce clause doctrine invalidated the HVIRA under
Japan Line, but in any event it fell under a broad reading of Zschernig that excluded state laws with
more than “incidental” effects on foreign affairs.101 According to California, Congress’ McCarran
Act answered the commerce clause argument by authorizing the interstate regulation of insurance
at the state level, and Zschernig should be read narrowly (much in the manner advocated by
Professor Vazquez) to exclude only insults to foreign governments.102 As the Supreme Court took
up the case, these debates appeared to be the focus of its attention.
C. Preemption by Executive Acts
There remained one substantial category of limits on state foreign affairs activities
beyond pure Article VI preemption and the “dormant” exclusions: executive agreements.103 Despite
three Supreme Court cases directly on point, executive agreements remained perhaps the least
understood of the three categories. And there was (at least) one executive agreement directly
implicated in Garamendi – though it did not fit easily into either side’s view of the case.
The modern President commonly concludes agreements with foreign nations
independently (that is, without the approval of Congress or the Senate). Some academic
commentators take violent issue with that practice as inconsistent with the treaty clause of Article
II: since treaties require approval of two-thirds of the Senate, if all agreements with foreign nations
are treaties, it would seem that the President lacks unilateral power to agree to anything on the
nation’s behalf.104 Perhaps (as others have argued) Congress also has the power to approve
international agreements105 – but that would not support the common practice of Presidents making
them alone. Nonetheless, in all three cases in which the Court has considered the matter – United
States v. Belmont, United States v. Pink, and Dames & Moore v. Regan – it had little difficulty in
approving the executive agreements in question, and various academic and historical arguments have
been made in their support.106

101

Gerling Global Reinsurance Co. v. Quackenbush, 2000 WL 777978 (E.D. Cal.) (June 9, 2000)
(unpublished), at *9-*10.
102
Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of America v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 752-53 (9th Cir. 2001).
103
We use the term “executive agreements” to mean international agreements concluded on the sole
authority of the President, as opposed to “congressional-executive agreements”, which are approved by Congress but
not by a supermajority of the Senate.
104
Raoul Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L.REV. 1, 55 (1972);
David Gray Adler, Court, Constitution and Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 19, 27-32 (David Gray Adler & Larry George, eds., 1996).
105
Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995).
106
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink; 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Dames
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). See HENKIN, supra note 91, at 219-230.
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It is a somewhat larger step to conclude that executive agreements are not only
constitutional but preemptive.107 After all, they are not mentioned in Article VI, the usual source of
preemption. (An executive agreement approved by Congress would presumably be preemptive in
the same way as a statute, but the issue here is an agreement based solely upon the President’s
power.) Nonetheless, the Court’s three cases gave preemptive effect to the agreements they
approved without elaborate discussion.
There was, of course, at least one executive agreement in the Garamendi case.108 If
the state law posed an obstacle to the implementation of an executive agreement, the Court’s
precedents suggested that this could be a basis for preemption – and the insurers did make this claim,
albeit somewhat indirectly. But several obstacles prevented an easy resolution on this ground. First,
the scope and extent of executive agreement preemption remained hazy despite the Court’s
precedents. As noted, executive agreements stand outside the traditional methods of preemption by
statute or treaty. Perhaps in recognition of this, the Court’s prior cases – and commentators’
evaluations of them – had been fairly cautious. The Pink and Belmont cases had as their subject
matter an area of unique presidential competence: recognition of a foreign government. Both
concerned an executive agreement Franklin Roosevelt concluded with the Soviet Union, as part of
Roosevelt’s recognition of the Soviet government in 1934. The Court made some mention of that
context, and it was surely plausible to argue (as a number of commentators did) that their
relationship to recognition gave the executive agreements particular constitutional force despite the
fact that they rested on presidential power alone.109 One could almost think of this as a negative
implication of the President’s power to receive ambassadors: states could not do anything that would
interfere with the President’s ability to establish diplomatic relations with another government.
The Court’s third and most important executive agreement case, Dames & Moore v.
Regan, seemed to confirm the need to read Pink and Belmont narrowly. Dames & Moore involved
a challenge to actions taken pursuant to President Carter’s executive agreement ending the Iran
hostage crisis in 1980. In upholding the President’s action, the Court proceeded extremely
cautiously, emphasizing the emergency nature of the international situation and the implicit consent
it found Congress had given to Carter’s settlement. The Court carefully avoided a blanket holding
that executive agreements were either constitutional or preemptive, cautioning that it was deciding
only the facts of the immediate case.110 Dames & Moore seemed to signal that not all executive
agreements were preemptive (else it would have been a much easier case than the Court appeared
to believe), yet without identifying their constitutional limit.
107

For elaboration of this point, plus the observation that the two issues are usually not viewed
separately, see Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133 (1998).
Leading recent academic discussions of executive agreements include Ingrid Wuerth, The Dangers of Deference:
International Claims Settlement by the President, 44 HARV. J. INT’L L. 3, 14-41 (2003); Joel R. Paul, The
Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L.REV. 671 (1998) (recounting
twentieth century history of executive agreements).
108
See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text (discussing agreements with Germany and Austria).
109
Pink, 315 U.S. at 229; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330. See HENKIN, supra note 91, at 219-229, 226-230;
Wuerth, supra note 107, at 12-13.
110
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680, 688.
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A second problem with relying too heavily on executive agreements in Garamendi
was that the principal agreement, the German Foundation Agreement, itself seemed to disclaim
preemptive effect. It did not contain any language specifically overriding inconsistent state laws,
especially not disclosure laws. Instead, it contained puzzlingly tepid language: the United States
agreed that in any case in which a claim was asserted against a German company, the United States
would submit a brief saying that it was in the “policy interests” of the United States for the
Foundation Agreement to be the exclusive remedy. But the Agreement also said that these “policy
interests” do not “in themselves provide an independent legal basis for dismissal” even with respect
to actual claims.111 That was, moreover, exactly how the United States read the agreement in its
amicus brief to the court of appeals: the U.S. brief made the statement contemplated by the
agreement, but went on to say that the insurers erred in calling the agreement preemptive of its own
force.112
A third factual difficulty stood in the way of deciding the case itself on the basis of
the executive agreements: they did not apply to all the plaintiffs. The German Foundation
Agreement affected only German companies. There was also an agreement with Austria and an
informal arrangement with Switzerland, in each case covering those government’s nationals. But
the HVIRA applied to all insurance companies doing business in California (and their affiliates), and
some of them were based in countries other than Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Generali, for
example, was an Italian company, and no agreement existed (or was even in the works) with Italy
or Italian companies. So at best the executive agreements could have supported a decision
invalidating the HVIRA as applied to some of the insurers, but not others.
While the executive agreements were not an obvious winner for the insurers, they
posed conceptual difficulties for the state. The state wanted to argue that the only categories of
exclusion were (i) Article VI preemption; (ii) the clause-based exclusions of Article I, Section 10
and negative implications of specific clauses like the dormant commerce clause doctrine; and (iii)
a narrow version of Zschernig. Executive agreements did not fit comfortably within this
constitutional universe. Even if executive agreements could not win the day (or at least the whole
day) for the insurers, the state lacked a good explanation for how they (or at least some of them)
achieved their preemptive effect.
One possibility is that executive agreements are enough like treaties to draw their
preemptive effect from Article VI, even though they are not mentioned in the Article’s text. That
111

Foundation Agreement, supra note 42, art. 2(1) & Annex B. See supra part I.B.
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in support of affirmance, Gerling Global
Reinsurnace Co. v. Kelso (9th Cir.), reprinted in Respondents’ Brief in Opposition in American Insurance Ass’n v.
Garamendi (No. 02-722), app. 44, 47-48 (noting that the “agreements do not, of their own force, extinguish any
claims that Holocaust victims or their families might assert in court against foreign insurance companies” but that
they “make clear, however, that United States policy disfavors the imposition of further obligations on companies
subject to the agreements, whether through regulation or litigation, beyond the obligations contemplated by the
agreements themselves.”); id. at 48 (“Nor does the Foundation Agreement itself preclude individuals from filing suit
on their insurance policies in court. . . . [Appellee] is mistaken . . if [it] means to suggest that the Agreement by its
terms preempts the California statute.”).
112
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claim finds support in at least one of the Court’s executive agreement cases, Belmont, where the
Court directly analogized the executive agreement to treaties made preemptive by Article VI.113 A
second possibility is that executive agreements depend to some extent upon the approval, or at least
acquiescence, of Congress, and that they draw their preemptive effect from the fact that, like statutes
but less formally, they reflect the will of Congress. Dames & Moore supports this view, for the
Court in that case emphasized Congress’ acquiescence as a key component of its decision.114
Neither possibility worried the state in Garamendi, as recognition was not involved and if anything
Congress seemed to endorse the state’s actions.
A third possibility is that executive agreements draw their preemptive power from
the President’s independent power in foreign affairs.115 This was obviously the most troubling to the
state in Garamendi, since it might suggest that other executive policies might be preemptive as well.
But the court had never explained executive agreements on this ground. And more to the point,
essentially no judicial or academic authority hinted that presidential policies could have preemptive
effect. Several lower court opinions (and perhaps one Supreme Court opinion) suggested that state
law causes of action that interfered with presidential policies might be barred, although the courts
attributed their decisions to “federal common law” rather than anything explicitly constitutional.116
Beyond this, the idea that a presidential policy could, in itself, displace a state law seemed barely to
113

See Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330 (holding that “the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of
[the federal] government” in settling claims with the Soviet Union and that “[t]he assignment and agreements in
connection therewith did not, as in the case of treaties . . . require the advice and consent of the Senate”); id. at 331
(“the external powers of the United States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies”; the
Supremacy Clause operates “in the case of all international compacts and agreements from the very fact that
complete power over international affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot be subject to any
curtailment or interference on the part of the several states”); see also Pink, 315 U.S. at 230-31 (“state law must yield
when it is inconsistent with or impairs the policy or provisions of a treaty or of an international compact or
agreement”).
114
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680. See Michael D. Ramsey, Presidential Declarations of War, 37
U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 321, 371 (2003) (suggesting that Dames & Moore could be read as a non-statutory delegation of
congressional power to the President).
115
See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (describing the President’s
power in foreign affairs as including, among other things, executive agreements). See also Pink, 315 U.S. at 229
(“The powers of the President in the conduct of foreign relations include the power, without the consent of the
Senate, to determine the public policy of the United States with respect to Russian nationalization decrees. . . . That
authority . . . includes the power to determine the policy which is to govern the question of recognition. . . . Power to
remove such obstacles to full recognition as settlement of our nationals . . . certainly is a modest implied power of
the President who is the ‘sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.’”). See also
Prakash & Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, supra note 9, at 252-56, 262-65 (providing a textual
basis for the President’s independent power in foreign affairs but denying that the power is preemptive).
116
E.g., Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Co., 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997); Pravin Banker Associates
Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850 (2d Cir. 1997). Some academic commentators suggested that these
decisions really amounted to using executive policy to override state law, and found this to be constitutionally
inappropriate. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 65, at 1637-39; Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping International
Comity, 83 IOWA L. REV. 893, 937-951 (1998). The possible Supreme Court case is Boyle v. United Technologies
Co., 487 U.S. 500 (1987), where the Court invalidated a state tort claim against a defense contractor who followed a
design submitted by the military. For varying views of Boyle, see Ramsey, Power of the States in Foreign Affairs,
supra note 8, at 395-400; Bradford Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1245, 1368-75 (1996); Vazquez, W[h]ither Zschernig?, supra note 55, at 1302-03.
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have be contemplated. It was not even mentioned in the leading foreign affairs law casebook,
published only months before the Court’s decision.117 Moreover, the Court seemed firmly opposed,
at least in commercial cases: in Barclays, the President had pointed to executive branch opposition
to California’s tax law as a reason for invalidating it; the Court took this as a claim that executive
policies could preempt state law, and rejected it in strong terms.118
The matter of executive agreements, therefore, clouded the Garamendi case but did
not squarely help either side. The insurers needed to claim something broader than executive
agreement preemption, because neither the existing law of executive agreements nor the agreements
actually at issue seemed strong enough to carry their case. The state, however, had a difficult
explanatory problem; its essential argument was that preemption of state law could only arise from
Article VI, from a negative implication of a specific clause (like the dormant commerce clause
doctrine), or from a narrow interpretation of Zschernig. Executive agreements did not fit into any
of these categories, yet at least some of them were clearly preemptive.
As a result, the parties’ arguments focused on the dormant commerce clause doctrine
and upon Zschernig, not upon preemptive effects of executive action. To be sure, the insurers
emphasized the President’s actions, especially in seeking the German settlement, and the degree to
which the state law (supposedly) interfered with them. But their principal thrust was to argue that
the matter implicated foreign affairs (as shown by the President’s involvement with foreign
governments over it), and thus that Zschernig and Japan Line invalidated the HVIRA.
D.

The HVIRA and Foreign Affairs Federalism in the Lower Courts

The decisions in the lower courts followed the sketch of the law set forth above.
While the facts were novel, in general the courts’ approach was not. At the outset, the insurers had
their way on both of the closely contested federalism issues. The district court took the broad view
of Zschernig, highlighting its broad “no more than incidental effect on foreign affairs” language.
Reciting the foreign policy objectives of the President, and the executive branch statements as to
HVIRA’s perverse effect upon negotiations, the district court thought it evident that the state law had
more than an incidental effect on foreign affairs. The court made clear that it was relying on a
constitutional exclusion of the states from foreign affairs, as suggested by Hines and related cases
and confirmed by Zschernig. On the dormant commerce clause doctrine, the district court took the
Japan Line approach (ignoring Barclays altogether) and emphasizing the imperative to “speak with

117

See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN AFFAIRS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
275-335 (2003) (discussing state power in foreign affairs under four heads: statutory preemption, treaty preemption,
“dormant” preemption – meaning Zschernig and related matters – and the federal common law of foreign affairs).
Prior to Garamendi, the only academic article of which we are aware that alluded to the idea of executive
preemption was by one of the current authors. See Ramsey, Power of the States in Foreign Affairs, supra note 8, at
390-429 (considering and rejecting, as a matter of original understanding, the idea that the President’s executive
power in foreign affairs might have a negative implication preempting inconsistent state laws).
118
Barclays, 512 U.S. at 302-03.
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one voice” in foreign affairs. The court accordingly entered a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the HVIRA in June 2000.119
The court of appeals did not differ fundamentally in its vision of foreign affairs law,
but in reversing simply adopted the opposite view of the critical cases. With respect to Zschernig,
the court followed California’s suggestion to essentially confine Zschernig to its facts: the court
emphasized that the HVIRA was not a regulation of – and certainly not an insult to – Germany or
any other European government, but rather a regulation of private European companies. Noting that
it was “rarely invoked by the courts” and that “the Supreme Court has not applied it in more than 30
years,” the court declined to take the insurers’ broad view of Zschernig. “HVIRA regulates
insurance companies that do business in California . . . . No plaintiff is a foreign government, nor
is any Plaintiff owned in whole or in part by a foreign government; they are, simply, businesses.”
Further, the HVIRA did not target a particular country, nor did it raise—according to the court—the
sensitive diplomatic concerns mentioned in the Zschernig case, specifically the risk of state actions
giving offense to a particular foreign regime.120
On the dormant commerce clause doctrine, the appeals court thought the McCarran
Act shielded the state law: “Congress has expressly delegated to the states the power to regulate
insurance, free from the constraints of the dormant Commerce Clause. . . . HVIRA is a California
insurance regulation of California insurance companies that affects foreign commerce only
indirectly.” Therefore, “the McCarran Act applies and the dormant Commerce Clause does not.”121
But in any event, while conceding that the HVIRA did “touch on” foreign commerce “indirectly,”
the court emphasized the extent to which Barclays had undercut Japan Line. The court observed
that under Barclays, Congress is the “voice” of the nation in foreign commerce, and found that
“Congress has spoken affirmatively in the area of Holocaust-era insurance policies and has
acquiesced in state laws like HVIRA” by passing the Holocaust Commission Act.122 The court
acknowledged that the HVIRA might be in some tension with the Foundation Agreement and
executive policy more generally – although it downplayed the extent of direct conflict. But it pointed
out that there was no preemptive act under Article VI, that the executive agreement itself did not
claim preemptive effect, and that neither Zschernig nor Japan Line (the principal methods of
constitutional exclusion it recognized) required reversal.123

119

See Gerling, 2000 WL 777978, at *5-*14. The court threw out the insurers’ challenge to
California’s other Holocaust-related statutes as unripe (since no one had actually filed suit under them yet).
120
Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of America v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 752-53 (9th Cir. 2001). See
Vazquez, W[h]ither Zschernig, supra note 55, at 1324 (arguing that the Court should “interpret[ ] Zschernig to bar
state laws that single out a state or group of states for unfavorable treatment.”).
121
Id. at 746.
122
Id. at 741; see the discussion of the Holocaust Act supra Part I.B.
123
The panel was unimpressed by the “letters in which executive branch officials argue that HVIRA
does conflict with the federal government’s policy concerning Holocaust-era claims,” writing that the Supreme Court
had in the past (particularly in Barclays) rejected arguments that such executive branch declarations should be
determinative. Id. at 751.
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Thus as the case headed for the Supreme Court, it appear to pose two central
questions about the scope of two key lines of cases.124 First, how broadly should one read Zschernig
(assuming Zschernig did not meet the fate its harshest academic detractors wished upon it)? And
second, did Barclays leave anything of the enhanced dormant commerce clause doctrine envisioned
by Japan Line (and if so, did the McCarran Act nonetheless protect the state law)?125 Looming
above both questions was the broader matter of whether Zschernig and Barclays could be reconciled,
or if one would have to give way – Zschernig with its direction that states stay out of foreign affairs
controversies and Barclays with its approval of a state law that infuriated most of the nation’s major
trading partners.126 These were important questions, to be sure, but not new ones: they had been
debated in academic literature on more or less these exact terms, and as discussed these were the
questions that divided the district court from the court of appeals, and the insurers from the state.
As we discuss in the next section, the outcome in the Supreme Court was, in contrast,
quite novel. The Court did not answer either of the questions seemingly posed to it, but instead
124

For the sake of simplicity, the text’s summary of the lower court proceedings is abbreviated. In its
initial opinion, the court of appeals disagreed with the district court’s reasoning, but left the preliminary injunction in
place to allow the district court to consider the insurers’ further argument that the HVIRA violated the due process
clause by taking “away the licenses of California insurers for failure to perform tasks that are literally impossible.”
240 F.3d at 753-54. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the insurers on the ground that the
HVIRA violated the requirements of procedural due process. Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of America v. Low,
186 F. Supp.2d 1099, 1113 (E.D. Cal. 2001). The Ninth Circuit again reversed. Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp.
of America v. Low, 296 F.3d 832, 835-36 (9th Cir. 2002). The court of appeals found that the district court had
“conflate[d] the analytically distinct concepts of procedural and substantive due process” because regulated parties
“generally have a right to meaningful hearing only with respect to those defenses actually allowed under a given
statute. Thus, if a particular defense is deemed irrelevant under the statute, a party has no procedural due process
right to a hearing . . . .” The question was whether the state’s denial of defenses violated substantive due process – a
question properly analyzed under the rational basis test. The court then found that the state law had a rational basis.
As a result, the insurers had no constitutional right to “raise defenses premised on their lack of control over the
required information or the illegality under foreign law of their disclosure of the information,” and the HVIRA was
not “unconstitutional on its face because it makes no provision for a hearing prior to revocation of an insurance
company’s license.” Id. at 845-49. The court of appeals also reaffirmed its conclusions on the Zschernig and Japan
Line issues.
In the ensuing discussion, we do not consider the due process aspects of the case, and express no opinion on
the appropriate outcome. Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the due process question as well as the
foreign affairs and commerce clause issues, it did not address that part of the case in its decision. We return briefly
to the due process aspects of the case in part VII infra.
125
Petitioners’ “Questions Presented” were “ Whether the HVIRA, which the United States government
has called an ‘actual interference’ with U.S. foreign policy, and which affected foreign governments have protested
as inconsistent with international agreements, violates the foreign affairs doctrine of Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S.
429 (1968)”; “Whether the HVIRA, which regulates on an extraterritorial basis in an area where the United States
must speak with one voice, violates the Foreign Commerce Clause and exceeds the scope of legitimate state
regulation under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015”; and “Whether the HVIRA, which regulates
insurance transactions that occurred overseas between foreign parties more than half a century ago, exceeds
California’s legislative jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.” See Brief for the Petitioners, American
Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi (No. 02-722), available at 2003 WL 834719, at *1. The Respondents’ formulation
was essential the same. Brief for Respondents, American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi (No. 02-722), available at
2003 WL 554499, at *1.
126
See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 65, at 1705 (finding the two cases irreconcilable).
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found a new basis for preempting the state law outside both Zschernig and the dormant commerce
clause doctrine. It was that shift, we argue, that converted Garamendi from an important case to,
potentially, a landmark one.
III.

The Supreme Court Decision: Reinventing Foreign Affairs Federalism

In American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, the Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit on foreign affairs grounds. As it did three years earlier in Crosby, the Court invoked
preemption analysis to avoid larger questions about Zschernig’s dormant foreign affairs power and
the dormant foreign commerce clause doctrine.127 But instead of Crosby’s unanimity, the Court
managed only a 5-4 majority. And it would be a mistake to conclude that, like Crosby, Garamendi
is a narrow decision. Unlike Crosby, Garamendi did not involve the routine application of
preemption analysis, despite the Court’s contrary suggestions. Rather, the language of preemption
used in Garamendi masks profound implications for separation of powers and federalism.
This Part describes the Court’s analysis in Garamendi, and shows that it did not
follow from prior law. We argue that, if taken at face value, Garamendi’s embrace of broad
executive branch lawmaking power exceeds that previously recognized by the Court’s prior,
carefully-qualified decisions, and by relying on those opinions without acknowledging their limiting
language and distinguishable facts, the Court expanded executive power without grappling with the
serious constitutional questions that such expansion raises. The sections that follow consider
whether the Court’s new rule is structurally sound, from the distinct but inextricably related
perspectives of foreign affairs federalism and separation of powers.
Our criticisms of Garamendi’s handling of the federalism and separation of powers
issues have a common element. In both areas, the Court presented its conclusions as following
ineluctably from its own precedents. However, as we demonstrate, Garamendi furnishes an
excellent example of “doctrine creep,” whereby entirely new principles of law are justified on the
basis of prior cases, while ignoring important facts or limiting language that were important –
perhaps decisive – in the previous cases. This criticism furnishes the basis for a larger theoretical
point in Part VI. Garamendi, we argue, calls into question the desirability of privileging “common
law constitutional interpretation” – in which precedent, as opposed to text, history, or structure, does
the heavy lifting of constitutional decisionmaking – as a mode of constitutional interpretation.
127

Compare Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2385 n.7 (“Our grant of certiorari . . . encompassed three of the
questions addressed by the Ninth Circuit: whether HVIRA intrudes on the federal foreign affairs power, violates the
self-executing element of the Foreign Commerce Clause, or exceeds the State’s ‘legislative jurisdiction.’ . . . Because
we hold that HVIRA is preempted under the foreign affairs doctrine, we have no reason to address the other
questions.”) (citation omitted) with Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374 n.8 (“Because our conclusion that the state Act conflicts
with federal law is sufficient to affirm the judgment below, we decline to speak to field preemption as a separate
issue . . . or to pass on the First Circuit’s rulings addressing the foreign affairs power or the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause.”). On the narrowness of the Crosby decision, see supra notes 57-63 & accompanying text;
Denning & McCall, Recent Decisions, supra note 57, at 750-57; Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption,
supra note 60, at 177-78, 215-21.
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Common law constitutional interpretation, we argue, can easily devolve into an expedient way to
legitimatize intuitive reactions to difficult cases while avoiding important constitutional questions
raised by text, history, and structure.
A.

Overview of the Garamendi Opinion

Justice Souter’s analysis for the majority began with several premises claimed to be
“beyond dispute.”128 First, “an exercise of state power that touches on foreign relations must yield
to the National Government’s policy” at some point, given the interest in uniformity that necessitated
the grant of that power to the federal government in the first place. Second, “there is executive
authority to decide what the policy should be” stemming from the President’s independent foreign
affairs authority, as grounded in history, custom, and usage.129 The President, moreover, could
exercise that authority (including the settlement of claims) through executive agreements with
foreign nations, which, unlike treaties, did not require Senate ratification.130 And like treaties, these
agreements could preempt state law expressly or by implication. The Court thus presented a simple
syllogism: national foreign policy preempted inconsistent state acts; the President has the power to
determine national foreign policy; so the President’s foreign policy preempts inconsistent state laws.
Applying these principles to the HVIRA, the Court concluded that though California
and the federal government pursued common ends, the means used by the state conflicted with
policies of the federal government. First, the Court said that “resolving Holocaust-era insurance
claims that may be held by residents of this country is a matter well within the Executive’s
responsibility for foreign affairs” since settling claims is important to the maintenance of cordial
relations among nations. Because of this important interest, “state law must give way where, as here,
there is evidence of a clear conflict between the policies” adopted by the state and the federal
government. Federal policy, “expressed unmistakably” in the agreements concluded with Germany
and Austria, “has been to encourage European governments and companies to volunteer settlement
funds in preference to litigation or coercive sanctions,” and included provisions for developing
policy disclosure procedures.131

128

950-56.

123 S. Ct. at 2386. Our description of the Court’s decision here draws on Denning, supra note 31, at

129

Id. (“While Congress holds express authority to regulate public and private dealings with nations in
its war and foreign commerce powers, in foreign affairs the President has a degree of independent authority to act.”).
130
Id. at 2386-87 (“[O]ur cases have recognized that the President has authority to make ‘executive
agreements’ with other countries requiring no ratification by the Senate or approval by Congress, this power having
been exercised since the early years of the Republic.”). The Court dismissed the objection that the settlement
involved claims against pruely private parties rather than governments. “Historically,” he wrote, “wartime claims
against even nominally private entities have become issues in international diplomacy,” adding that “[a]ccceptance
of this historical practice is supported by a good pragmatic reason for depending on executive agreements to settle
claims against foreign corporations associated with wartime experience,” viz., “untangling government policy from
private initiative during war time is often so hard that diplomatic action settling claims against private parties may
well be just as essential in the aftermath of hostilities as diplomacy to settle claims against foreign governments.” Id.
For a challenge to this conclusion see Wuerth, supra note 107, at 14-41.
131
Id. at 2390.
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Specifically, the path pursued by the federal government sought to balance competing
interests: the maintenance of “amicable relationships with current European allies”; survivors’
interests in recovery; and companies’ interests in removing the cloud of potential liability that
remained as long as claims went unresolved. Procedures for the disclosure of information
established by the United States and the Europeans, moreover, sought to secure “the companies’
ability to abide by their own countries’ domestic privacy laws limiting disclosure of policy
information.”132 California, on the other hand, chose to compel disclosure, using its power to revoke
business licenses as a lever. Despite the common goals of both California and the federal
government—“obtaining compensation for Holocaust victims”—“[t]he basic fact is that California
seeks to use an iron fist where the President has consistently chosen kid gloves.” California’s
aggressive approach, the Court said, threatened to undermine the federal government’s efforts to
encourage both voluntary disclosure and contributions to the foundations established through the
executive agreements described above.133
Even if the conflict was not as sharp as the evidence suggested, “it would have to be
resolved in the National Government’s favor, given the weakness of the State’s interest, against the
backdrop of traditional state legislative subject matter, in regulating disclosure of European
Holocaust-era insurance policies in the manner of HVIRA.” The Court pointed out that only a
fraction of the nation’s 100,000 living Holocaust survivors resided in California. “As against the
responsibility of the United States of America,” it noted, “the humanity underlying the state statute
could not give the State the benefit of any doubt in resolving the conflict with national policy.”134
In short, the Court’s analysis made the case sound like Crosby: while the state and
federal objectives were similar, one was flexible and measured, while the other adopted a hard line
to the point of overreaching. As in Crosby, there was not a direct conflict (in the sense of the two
being irreconcilable), but the one-sided nature of the state approach interfered with the balanced,
cooperative federal approach and thus stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal
objectives. As a result, the HVIRA was preempted, much as the state law in Crosby had been.
Finally, the Court rejected arguments that Congress had implicitly authorized the
HVIRA, either through the McCarran Act or the Holocaust Commission Act. In the Court’s
estimation, “Congress has not acted on the matter addressed here,” and significantly, “Congress has
done nothing to express disapproval of the President’s policy,” though federal HVIRA-like statutes
had been proposed. Absent congressional disapproval, the Court concluded, the President was free
to act in the area of foreign policy, and conflicting state laws had to yield.135
132

Id. at 2391.
Id. at 2392-2393.
134
Id.
135
The McCarran Act’s purpose, the Court wrote, “was to limit congressional preemption under the
commerce power, whether dormant or exercised,” and “a federal statute directed to implied preemption by domestic
commerce legislation cannot sensibly be construed to address preemption by executive conduct in foreign affairs.”
123 S. Ct. at 2394. As to the Holocaust Act, “[t]he Commission’s focus,” the Court found, was “limited to assets in
the possession of the Government”; references in the act encouraging the state commissioners to assist by collecting
information on foreign and domestic insurers doing business in the United States were limited “to the degree the
133
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Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia and Thomas, dissented. Absent
a clear expression of intent to displace state authority, the dissenters would have upheld the
HVIRA.136 While conceding the majority’s premises—the President may conclude executive
agreements with foreign countries that settle claims, and those agreements may displace otherwise
valid state laws or state litigation—the dissenters pointed out that here “no executive agreement
before us expressly preempts the HVIRA. Indeed no agreement so much as mentions the HVIRA’s
sole concern: public disclosure.” Even “[i]f it is uncertain whether insurance litigation may continue
given the executive agreements on which the Court relies,” Justice Ginsburg wrote, “it should be
abundantly clear that those agreements leave disclosure laws like the HVIRA untouched.”137
The dissent gave little weight to executive branch statements that the HVIRA
interfered with the policy of the national government “lest we place the considerable power of
foreign affairs preemption in the hands of individual sub-Cabinet members of the executive branch.”
Though officials no doubt accurately represented the President’s policy, “no authoritative text
accords such officials the power to invalidate state law simply by conveying the Executive’s views
on matters of federal policy. The displacement of state law . . . requires a considerably more formal
and binding federal instrument.” Justice Ginsburg would have reserved foreign affairs preemption
“for circumstances where the President, acting under statutory or constitutional authority, has spoken
clearly to the issue at hand,” and she counseled the judiciary to resist establishing national foreign
policy predicated “on no legislative or even executive text, but only on [the] inference and
implication” that state law is preempted “when the President himself has not taken a clear stand.”138
B.

Garamendi and Its Precedents
1. Crosby: The Irrelevant Precedent

The Court’s first sleight-of-hand was its invocation of the phrase “preemption” for
more than that phrase properly should bear. The Court adopted preemption as its theme, enabling
it to make bootstrapping references to the Massachusetts’ sanctions invalidated in Crosby. “The
situation created by the California legislation,” Justice Souter wrote, “calls to mind the impact of the
Massachusetts Burma law on the effective exercise of the President’s power, as recounted in the
statutory preemption case, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council.” As in Crosby, “HVIRA’s
economic compulsion to make public disclosure, of far more information about far more policies .
. . undercuts the President’s diplomatic discretion and the choice he has made exercising it.”139 The
Court then discussed how the threat of litigation and sanctions posed obstacles to the federal
information is available.” This proviso, the Court concluded, “can hardly be read to condone state sanctions
interfering with federal efforts to resolve such claims.” 123 S. Ct. at 2394. On the McCarran Act and the Holocaust
Act, see infra part III.C.
136
Id. at 2395 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting) (“Absent a clear statement aimed at disclosure requirements by
the ‘one voice’ to which courts properly defer in matters of foreign affairs, I would leave intact California’s
enactment.”).
137
Id. at 2398-2400 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
138
Id. at 2401 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See id. at 2390-91, 2392 (relying on executive statements).
139
Id. at 239.
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government’s attempt to encourage voluntary participation with the Foundation and the insurance
commissions. Though Souter admitted that Crosby could be distinguished because “the President
in this case is acting without express constitutional authority . . . we were careful to note [in Crosby]
that the President possesses considerable independent constitutional authority to act on behalf of the
United States on international issues . . . and conflict with the exercise of that authority is a
comparably good reason to find preemption of state law.”140
As one of us commented at the time, “the ultimate outcome of Crosby seems to have
hinged not on any inherent powers of the presidency or on any presumed expertise uniquely
possessed by the executive branch, but rather on the powers delegated to the president by Congress
through statute.”141 Indeed Crosby’s entire decision was premised on the notion that the President,
acting pursuant to statutory authorization, was exercising maximum power under our Constitution.
As for Crosby’s supposed discussion of the President’s “considerable independent authority,” the
Court merely cited a page of the Crosby opinion listing the President’s foreign affairs powers
enumerated in Article II and making a reference to “the capacity of the President to speak for the
Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments.”142 Of course no one doubts these powers
– but to the extent the citation suggested that Crosby discussed the President’s preemptive power
absent congressional delegation (a matter not the least at stake in Crosby), it is entirely misleading.
The Court’s invocation of Crosby, then, was pure misdirection. In Crosby, everyone
assumed that presidential authority, based upon a congressional enactment, would override
conflicting state law; the whole question was whether the state law posed a conflict.143 The reason
everyone assumed conflict would result in preemption was Article VI of the Constitution, which
declares that rule. In Garamendi, the question was whether presidential authority, not based upon
a congressional enactment, would override conflicting state law. As the Court itself said later in the
opinion, the case was a matter of “preemption by executive conduct in foreign affairs.”144 Since
Article VI – the entire basis of Crosby – says nothing on this question, Crosby was essentially
irrelevant. Invoking it only obscured the question posed in Garamendi: whether an executive branch
policy could override a state law, when Article VI did not apply.
2.

Zschernig: The Misstated Precedent

The Court’s second disingenuous move involved Zschernig v. Miller. Justice
Souter’s opinion reads as if Garamendi is an easier case than Zschernig, and follows a fortiori from
it. But comparison of the opinions shows that Garamendi not only does not follow from Zschernig
but in fact brushes it aside, creating an entirely new way of looking at the matter.

140

Id. at 2392 & n.14.
Denning & McCall, Recent Decisions, supra note 57, at 757. See also Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign
Affairs Preemption, supra note 60, at 218-220.
142
Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381.
143
See supra notes 57-63 & accompanying text.
144
123 S.Ct. at 2394.
141
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As discussed above, Garamendi seemed to present the Court with the opportunity to
clarify which of the three leading approaches to Zschernig was the correct one – and, along the way,
to either provide the constitutional grounding that Zschernig’s opinion lacked, or effectively
abandon it. Despite doubts expressed about the continuing viability of Zschernig by a range of
commentators,145 Garamendi invoked it prominently to support its decision, but clarified neither its
constitutional basis, nor its scope. Instead, Garamendi relied on Zschernig in an indirect way that
did not require the Court to defend or explain it.
Garamendi began with assertion that “valid executive agreements are fit to preempt
state law, just as treaties are . . . .”146 Citing Pink and Belmont, in which the Court held that an
executive agreement with the Soviet Union establishing diplomatic relations preempted state policies
regarding the legality of Soviet expropriation of private property, the Court continued: “if the
agreements here had expressly preempted laws like HVIRA, the issue would be straightforward.”147
As described below,148 we think this statement in itself was a serious oversimplification of existing
law. The majority, however, then conceded that, unlike the agreement in Pink and Belmont, “the
[agreements] include no preemption clause” and that petitioners’ preemption claim must “rest on
asserted interference with the foreign policy those agreements embody.”149 Thus the Court seemed
to concede that the executive agreements in themselves did not resolve the matter.
The Court then turned to Zschernig. Justice Souter simply ignored the problems
scholars have identified with Zschernig’s rule of constitutional preemption, and instead
recharacterizing Zschernig as something like a statutory preemption case. As Souter wrote, the
Court did not need to choose between “the contrasting theories of field and conflict preemption
evident in the Zschernig opinions” of Justices Douglas and Harlan, respectively, because “even on
Justice Harlan’s view, the likelihood that state legislation will produce something more than an
incidental effect in conflict with express foreign policy of the National Government would require
preemption of the state law.”150 This made it sound as if Garamendi was an easier case than
Zschernig, since the issues that troubled Harlan were not present in Garamendi. It also allowed the
Court to avoid explaining what Zschernig meant, and yet retain it as a purported basis for its opinion.
But there are several problems with this approach. First, Douglas’s Zschernig opinion
was not rooted in field preemption. Field preemption is a type of implied preemption in which either
“a federal regulatory scheme [is] ‘so pervasive’ as to imply that ‘Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it’” or the federal interest in the field is “‘so dominant’ that federal law ‘will be
145

HENKIN, supra note 91, at 165 (calling Zschernig “a unique statement and a sole application of
constitutional doctrine”); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 65, at 1705 (suggesting that Barclays implicitly
overruled Zschernig); Spiro, supra note 96, at 1242, 1264-66 (suggesting that doctrine and the end of the Cold War
have operated to sap Zschernig of its vitality); but see Vazquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, supra note 55, at 1266-78
(arguing on the basis of Crosby that Zschernig retained doctrinal force); Ramsey, Power of the States in Foreign
Affairs, supra note 8, at 358-65 (warning that announcements of Zschernig’s demise were premature).
146
123 S. Ct. at 2387 (footnote omitted).
147
Id. at 2387-88.
148
Infra part IV.E.
149
123 S.Ct. at 2388.
150
Id.
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assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.’”151 It arises, like other kinds
of preemption, from the intent of Congress. Since there was no claim in Zschernig that the state law
conflicted with any congressional enactment or even with executive policy, it is wrong to discuss
Justice Douglas’s analysis using statutory preemption terms. Zschernig made clear that Oregon’s
statute involved state officials “in foreign affairs and international relations—matters which the
Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government . . . .” Despite the bootstrapping citations to
Hines v. Davidowitz, Douglas’s opinion barred Oregon’s statute as a matter of constitutional
exclusion, not statutory preemption.152
Second, the Court misstated Harlan’s position. Justice Souter wrote that Harlan
would preempt state law if there is a “likelihood that state legislation will produce something more
than an incidental effect in conflict with express foreign policy of the National Government . . . .”153
That description implied that Harlan endorsed preemption where any federal policy existed,
regardless of the branch from which it emanated. Harlan stated, without elaboration, that “in the
absence of a conflicting federal policy or violation of the express mandates of the Constitution the
States may legislate in areas of their traditional competence even though their statutes may have an
incidental effect on foreign relations.”154 But he concurred on the ground that a treaty preempted
the Oregon law; all of the cases he cited as examples of “federal policy” preempting state law
involved statutes or treaties, and he made no reference to preemption by executive policy.155 Harlan
seemed to regard “federal policy” as being that policy expressed in either a treaty or congressional
statute, which would, by operation of the supremacy clause, preempt contrary state law. It is
unlikely that he would have endorsed the result in Garamendi – that state laws not in conflict with
any express language in a law, treaty, or executive agreement, were nevertheless preempted on the
strength of executive branch statements that the state law interfered with its conduct of foreign
affairs. In any event, plainly Harlan did not mean to decide the matter; it was not presented by
Zschernig nor established by any prior case.
Again, the rhetorical force of the discussion depends upon a misleading invocation
of statutory preemption. Justice Souter’s “synthesis” of the two Zschernig opinions did nothing to
advance his central claim that executive action alone can have preemptive effect.156 Approaching the
151

Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, supra note 60, at 206 (quoting English v. General
Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) and Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see also BITTKER,
supra note 56, at sec. 5-51 to 5-52 (1999) (“State statutes can also be preempted . . . because the federal rules are so
pervasive that they ‘occupy’ the field, leaving no room for additional or supplemental state regulations.”) (footnote
omitted).
152
389 U.S. at 436 (emphasis added); see also id. at 432 (“[T]he history and operation of this Oregon
statute makes clear that [it] is an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts
to the President and the Congress.”).
153
123 S. Ct. at 2388.
154
389 U.S. at 458-59 (Harlan, J., concurring).
155
Id. at 459 n.25 (Harlan, J., concurring).
156
Even had the Court correctly characterized Justice Douglas’s opinion, it is incoherent for the Court to
talk of “synthesizing” Douglas and Harlan’s opinions, since they embody two distinct (and irreconcilable) types of
preemption. Field preemption operates regardless of the presence of an actual, or even a potential, conflict between
federal and state statutory schemes. Conflict preemption, on the other hand, permits complementary state regulation,
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case in this way, however, allowed the Court to avoid answering the two critical questions about
Zschernig: (i) did it remain good law, despite its lack of clear constitutional foundation and lack of
judicial citation, and (ii) if so, what was its scope – the relatively broad formulation of “all but
incidental effects” adopted by the district court or the narrower “insults and hostility” version
preferred by the court of appeals? Put another way, Souter made it appear that if there had been a
contrary executive policy in Zschernig that would have solved everyone’s objections (including
Justice Harlan’s). The principal effect was to make Zschernig a precedent for executive policy
preemption, which it assuredly was not: the executive branch had expressly disclaimed any desire
to see Oregon’s statute displaced.157 Douglas for the majority was talking about a “dormant”
constitutional exclusion, and Harlan in concurrence was talking about Article VI preemption.
3. Barclays: The Missing Precedent
The conflict the Garamendi Court identified depended heavily upon statements by
the executive branch that the HVIRA represented an obstacle to the goals set out in the executive
agreements. Even with respect to the insurers covered by the Foundation Agreement, the conflict
was a bit of a stretch: though the Agreement called for resolution of claims through ICHEIC rather
than litigation, it had little enough to say about disclosure (which was needed for any sort of claims
resolution). And in any event, many of the insurers in Garamendi were not covered by the
Foundation Agreement, or any other agreement. What seemed critical was that the executive branch
saw the HVIRA as an interference (and had said so repeatedly).
But with no congressional approval for the executive agreements, and with no intent
to preempt expressed in the agreements themselves, the facts in Garamendi seem much closer to
those of Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board than to cases like Crosby.158 At least, if the
Court believed the executive policy in Garamendi was preemptive, one would think it would need
a fairly strong explanation for why the executive policy in Barclays was not preemptive
The issue in Barclays was whether California’s method for computing taxes for
multinational corporations violated the Japan Line principle that state taxation of foreign commerce
cannot inhibit the ability of the federal government to “speak with one voice” in the regulation of
international trade. Because the Court found evidence of congressional intent to permit state tax
structures like California’s, it found that California’s requirement did not violate the “one voice”
requirement of the dormant foreign commerce clause doctrine. Arguments that the method of
taxation was “unconstitutional because it was likely to provoke retaliatory action by foreign
governments,” the Court wrote, were “directed to the wrong forum.”159
as long as it does not render compliance with both impossible, or pose an “obstacle” to the stated goals of
congressional legislation. The degree to which a state statute does or does not conflict with or obstruct the federal
legislation is simply irrelevant under field preemption analysis, since the very action of Congress is said to “occupy
the field” and leave no room for states to act.
157
See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434-35.
158
512 U.S. 298 (1994).
159
Id. at 316-17, 327-28. The “one voice” formulation arose from the Court’s prior decision in Japan
Line, as explained supra notes 70-71 & accompanying text.
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Barclays specifically refused to give effect to executive branch representations that
California’s tax laws interfered with the foreign policy interests of the country. Noting that
Congress, not the President, possessed the power to regulate foreign commerce, the Court remarked
“[t]hat the executive branch proposed legislation to outlaw a state taxation practice, but encountered
an unreceptive Congress is not evidence that the practice interfered with the Nation’s ability to speak
with once voice, but is rather evidence that the preeminent speaker decided to yield the floor to
others.”160 The Court concluded that the communications from the executive branch “express[ing]
federal policy but lack[ing] the force of law cannot render unconstitutional California’s otherwise
valid, congressionally condoned, use of worldwide combined reporting.”161
This seemed directly relevant to Garamendi, which appeared similarly to turn on the
effect of executive branch communications “express[ing] federal policy but lack[ing] the force of
law.” The Garamendi majority declined to apply Barclays, explaining in a brief footnote that
Barclays involved the regulation of foreign commerce, which is vested in Congress, not the
President. But, the Court said without further discussion, “in the field of foreign policy the President
has the ‘lead role.’”162 Even if one accepts the President’s “lead role” in foreign affairs, Justice
Souter did not explain why the HVIRA was not a regulation of foreign commerce. After all,
California’s disclosure requirements applied to entities doing business in the state, and made
compliance a condition of continued licensing. In other words, the HVIRA set conditions under
which private companies did business in California, arising from state concerns about the way
insurance companies did business in the past. It is hard to see this as anything other than a
commercial regulation.163
To be sure, the HVIRA was a commercial regulation that implicated foreign affairs,
so perhaps Souter meant that Barclays could be distinguished on that ground. But California’s
taxation methods in Barclays also affected foreign affairs, as the executive branch in that case
pointed out.164 This only confirms the obvious: regulations of “commerce” can also impact “foreign
affairs.” Garamendi provided no intelligible principle to distinguish between the two categories, and
it seems obvious that they overlap.165 This strongly suggests that Souter’s distinction does not aid
160

Id. at 329.
Id. at 330.
162
123 S. Ct. at 2391 n.12.
163
Indeed, the Court in Southeastern Underwriters had previously held that regulation of insurance was
a matter of interstate commerce, and one of the central issues in the Garamendi litigation from its inception was that
the HVIRA violated the dormant commerce clause doctrine. See supra part II. In three years of litigation no one
had argued that the HVIRA was not a regulation of commerce.
164
See 512 U.S. at 329; see also Keith Highet, George Kahale III & Peter J. Spiro, International
Decision, 88 AM. J. INT'
L L. 766, 769 (1994) (discussing foreign opposition to California'
s taxing scheme).
California’s tax evidently still rankles, see Jacqueline R. Fields, The Need for a Uniform United States Separate
Accounting Policy: The After Effects of the Barclays Bank Case and How It Hinders International Business
Transactions, 2 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 75, 79-83 (2001).
165
As with Souter’s focus on traditional and non-traditional state regulations, his distinction between
commerce and foreign policy is surprising coming from a Justice who excoriated the Lopez and Morrison majorities
for “categorical formalism” in making an inquiry into the commercial or non-commercial nature of activity a central
feature of its inquiries into the scope of congressional power over interstate commerce. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at
652 (Souter, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 608-09 (Souter, J., dissenting).
161
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to distinguish Barclays, which looks even more relevant when one considers the existence of two
federal statutes suggesting that Congress consented to the passage of statutes like the HVIRA.
Barclays construed the failure of Congress explicitly to disapprove of California’s
tax as an implicit endorsement of the state’s tax structure.166 Whatever the merits of construing the
failure of congressional proposals as an endorsement of the opposite position, the Court’s conclusion
is in keeping with its employment of “clear statement rules” designed to protect federalism by
requiring Congress to be explicit when altering the allocation of responsibilities between the federal
government and the states.167 In Garamendi, as in Barclays, neither Congress nor the President had
formally disapproved of the HVIRA, except through executive policy statements of the sort Barclays
found insufficient to preempt state law. Rather than applying a similar clear statement rule, however,
Justice Souter discussed the lack of congressional disapproval of the President’s actions in signing
the executive agreements (which were not preemptive on their own terms and did not affect all of
the parties). Despite the fact that “[l]egislation along the lines of HVIRA has been introduced in
Congress,” he noted that “none of the bills has come close to making it into law.”168 Because of the
President’s “independent authority” in foreign affairs, he wrote, Congress’s silence should not be
equated with disapproval.169 Though it went unremarked, the Court seemed to suggest that clear
statement rules do not apply when the executive branch is reallocating responsibilities between
federal and state governments. In any event, none of this distinguishes Barclays, which also
implicated the President’s authority in foreign affairs. The only distinction that seems relevant to
what the Court was saying is that in Barclays legislation to override the states had been introduced
in Congress but had failed to pass, whereas in Garamendi no such legislation had even been
introduced. We cannot imagine how the second situation places the executive in a better position
in terms of congressional assent than the first, at least so long as Congress was aware of the state
activities.
C.

Congressional Authorization in Garamendi

The Court’s endorsement of extravagant preemptive intent of the executive’s policy
in Garamendi contrasts markedly with its parsimonious reading of congressional statutes that
strongly suggested Congress approved of, or at least did not oppose, the HVIRA. Two congressional
statutes—the McCarran Act and the Holocaust Commission Act—indicated congressional
acquiescence in the state’s disclosure requirement.170 Employing scanty analysis, the majority
rejected both as a source of authorization for the HVIRA.
Of course, the commercial/non-commercial distinction might serve to distinguish Zschernig from
Barclays, since Zschernig was not a commercial case. Cf. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 65, at 1705
(discussing tensions between Zschernig and Barclays). Looking at the case in this way, though, suggests that
Garamendi was more like Barclays than like Zschernig.
166
512 U.S. at 324-26.
167
See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (“[I]f Congress intends to alter the usual
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
168
123 S. Ct. at 2394.
169
Id.
170
123 S. Ct. at 2393.
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1.

The McCarran Act

The McCarran Act “redelegates” to states the ability to regulate the business of
insurance, and was intended to disable the dormant commerce clause doctrine as to those state
regulations. The Act begins with a declaration that “the continued regulation and taxation by the
several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest” and instructs that “silence on the
part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of [the
business of insurance] by the several States.”171 The operative part of the statute states without
qualification that the business of insurance “shall be subject to the laws of the several States which
relate to the regulation or taxation of such business. . . .”172
The Court simply sidestepped the Act. Assuming that the “HVIRA would qualify as
regulating the ‘business of insurance’ given its tangential relation to present-day insuring in the
State,” the Court wrote, “a federal statute directed to implied preemption by domestic commerce
legislation cannot sensibly be construed to address preemption by executive conduct in foreign
affairs.”173 There are several problems with Souter’s conclusion. First, nothing in the McCarran Act
provides judicial authority to inquire into the “real” purpose of an insurance regulation and to refuse
to apply the Act to regulations that were “tangentially related” to insurance regulation. The HVIRA
was a “regulation” of the business of insurance, which the Act says quite clearly “shall be subject
to the laws of the several States . . . .”174
Second, and more important, the Court provided no explanation for its assertion that
the Act “cannot sensibly be construed to address” preemption by the executive branch. This
comment confirms what we have suggested—that Garamendi is about executive preemption. And
of course the Act did not directly address executive preemption; prior to Garamendi it likely never
occurred to Congress that there was such a thing as executive preemption, at least as Justice Souter’s
opinion formulated it. Moreover, the text of the McCarran Act is comprehensive—it says that
congressional silence should never be construed to invalidate a state insurance law. But Souter then
argued that there had been no congressional disapproval of the executive’s action,175 so that silence
supports executive preemption of state law—in other words, doing exactly what the Act says not to
do.

171

15 U.S.C. § 1011-1012. See 123 S. Ct. at 2394 (“[T]he point of McCarran-Ferguson’s legislative
choice of leaving insurance regulation generally to the States was to limit congressional preemption under the
commerce power, whether dormant or exercised.”); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429-30 (1946);
BITTKER, supra note 56, § 9.04.
172
15 U.S.C. § 1012(a), (b). The Act also disables implied statutory preemption, requiring Congress to
clearly state an intention to regulate insurance and that “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair,
or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such
Act specifically relates to the business of insurance . . . .”
173
123 S. Ct. at 2394.
174
15 U.S. C. § 1012(a) (emphasis added).
175
123 S. Ct. at 2394.
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Finally, Justice Souter’s unhelpful divide between “foreign affairs” and “foreign
commerce” that furnished the basis for the Court’s clumsy attempt to distinguish Barclays
reappeared here. When he wrote that the McCarran Act applied to forestall preemption by “domestic
commerce legislation” as opposed to executive branch conduct in “foreign affairs,” Justice Souter
apparently thought that the Act had nothing whatever to do with foreign affairs as contrasted with
domestic commercial matters. But we are not aware that anyone has suggested that the Act does not
apply to state regulation of foreign insurance companies. As Garamendi illustrates, such
“commercial” regulations often have important foreign policy overtones. Trying to demarcate a line
of separation between the two areas is bound to fail; the Court’s own inability to explain where the
line is, even roughly, illustrates the difficulty and provides no useful yardstick for lower courts or
state policy makers to gauge the constitutionality of future state legislation.
2.

The Holocaust Commission Act

The Holocaust Commission Act created a federal commission to study and report on
the disposition of Holocaust-era assets controlled or possessed by the federal government. Section
3 of the Act instructed the commission to “take note of” the efforts of the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners, the association of state regulators, “with regard to Holocaust-era
insurance issues.” Moreover, the Act instructed the commission specifically to encourage the state
commissioners “to prepare a report on the Holocaust-related claims practices of all insurance
companies, both domestic and foreign, doing business in the United States at any time after January
30, 1933, that issued any individual life, health, or property-casualty insurance policy to any
individual on any list of Holocaust victims . . . ,” and further specified that the Commission’s report
should include—“to the degree the information is available”—the number of policies issued by
companies; the value of each policy when issued; the total number and amount of claims paid; and
the present-day value of assets of each insurance company held in the United States.176 California
claimed that this statute showed congressional awareness of the actions of the state insurance
commissioners in trying to secure information on Holocaust-era policies and, far from disapproving
of these efforts, encouraged them in order to aid the work of the federal Holocaust Commission.
The Court disagreed. Justice Souter wrote that the “Commission’s focus was limited
to assets in the possession of the Government, that if anything, the federal Act assumed it was the
National Government’s responsibility to deal with returning those assets” and that the Act’s language
limiting collection of information to that which was available “can hardly be read to condone state
sanctions interfering with federal efforts to resolve such claims.”177
That seems a hasty conclusion. When Congress passed the Act, it obviously knew
of state plans to compel disclosure: this is evident from the face of the statute, and from the fact that
the state commissioners had testified about those plans just prior to enactment of the law. The Act
instructed the Commission, then, to undertake its work against the backdrop of on-going state-level
176

Holocaust Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 105-186, 112 Stat. 611 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1621), §
3(a)(4)(A), § 3(a)(4)(A), (B).
177
123 S. Ct. at 2394.
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research into the disposition of Holocaust-era assets, including insurance policies. That the
Commission focused on assets owned or possessed by the federal government does not cut against
the argument that state efforts to compile information (and because of Souter’s reference to
“sanctions” it is important to emphasize again that disclosure is all the HVIRA mandated) were
tacitly approved.178 It is true that Congress, in 1998, did not know much about the executive’s
impending effort to settle claims, or the executive’s subsequent concerns about interference by the
states. But it seems clear that Congress had no objection to the state actions at the time, and that it
did not subsequently do anything to show a different view.
Justice Souter concluded with the observation that Congress has not acted to
disapprove of the President’s actions in entering into the executive agreements or formulating the
executive policy with which the HVIRA supposedly conflicted. “Legislation along the lines of
HVIRA has been introduced in Congress . . . but none of the bills has come close to making it into
law,” he wrote, and because of the President’s “independent authority” in foreign affairs, Congress’s
silence should not be equated with disapproval.179
Souter’s observation here is a non sequitur. While the lack of congressional
disapproval may be relevant to an inquiry into the President’s authority to enter into the executive
agreements or formulate policy in the first place, it sheds little light on the intended preemptive
effects of those agreements and policies—the question the Court purported to be addressing. Given
that the executive agreement itself never indicated that it was to have preemptive effects, and
explicitly disclaimed such effects,180 and that the HVIRA’s disclosure requirement does not address
the subject of those agreements—resolution of claims—why would Congress have thought it had
to express disapproval of anything? Further, since members of Congress presumably saw the
HVIRA as a regulation of insurance companies, they would have though Congress had spoken, in
the McCarran Act, and could not have foreseen the distinction the Court invented between “real”
insurance regulations and those whose foreign affairs implications pushed them outside the scope
of the Act.
* * *
In sum, it is difficult to believe that the Court thought the result in Garamendi was
required by its precedents, or even that it followed from a reasoned elaboration of them. Perhaps the
clearest evidence of the Court’s re-invention of foreign affairs law is that its opinion bore little
relationship to the course of argument and decision in the lower courts. In the lower courts, matters
turned upon the scope of Zschernig and its relationship to Barclays; the Court deflected both
opinions almost without analysis to seize upon a discourse of preemption that had played essentially
no role in the lower courts. That does not mean is was wrong – only that it demands justification
in some way other than reliance on precedent.
178

Pub. L. 105-186, 112 Stat. 611, § 3(a)(3). This seems particularly clear taken in conjunction with the
legislative history, recounted supra Part I.B., which shows that Congress was aware of the activities of the state
insurance commissioners, especially in California.
179
123 S. Ct. at 2394.
180
See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
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IV.

Garamendi and Separation of Powers

If Garamendi does not follow inevitably, or even comfortably, from its precedents,
it should be evaluated instead by its fit with the Constitution’s text, structure and history.
Garamendi is on its face a federalism case, and as we discuss in the next section there are reasons
to believe it erred in its assessment of the federalism values at stake. Nonetheless, we think
Garamendi is fundamentally a case about separation of powers, and that it is open to its most serious
criticisms on that ground. Accordingly, we begin with its separation of powers problems, and argue
that it cannot be defended on the basis of the Constitution’s text, structure and history.
A. Garamendi as a Case of Executive Preemption
In saying that the state law must give way to the “National Government’s policy”181
in foreign affairs, the Court really meant that the state law must give way to the foreign policy of the
executive branch. No congressional act authorized the executive policy, even implicitly. Nor did
the executive branch negotiate the Foundation Agreement as a treaty and present it to the Senate for
its advice and consent. Had either course been followed, no one would have doubted the federal
policy’s superiority over the state law. The doubt arose only because the President asserted an
independent power to oust the state law, based solely upon a policy formulated within the executive
branch. In this sense, then, the case was not about whether the state law should be preempted, but
rather about which branch of the federal government could do the preempting.182
As discussed, in the lower courts the central foreign affairs question was the scope
of the Court’s Zschernig decision, involving the so-called “dormant” foreign affairs power. The
theory of Zschernig was that certain foreign affairs-related activities are simply off-limits to states,
regardless of what the federal government might be doing. The question (so the lower courts
thought) was the breadth of that category: the district court thought that it broadly included matters
that touched upon foreign affairs in general, whereas the court of appeals read it more specifically
to involve principally state activities that insulted or showed hostility toward foreign governments.183
The Supreme Court instead disclaimed any need to identify an area of “dormant”
federal foreign affairs power, since (it said) that federal government had acted and thus made the
case one of “active” preemption.184 For this reason, the Court said that it did not decide whether the
HVIRA would be valid in isolation, and we assume for purposes of discussion that it would have
been. As a result, the case (as the Supreme Court saw it) depended upon identifying a preemptive
federal action.
181

Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. at 2386.
Thus, while the Court declared that “an exercise of state power that touches on foreign relations must
yield to the National Government’s policy,” id., its actual holding was that an exercise of state power that touches on
foreign relations must yield to the executive branch’s policy – which is a fundamentally distinct proposition.
183
Supra part II.B & D.
184
Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. at 2388.
182
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At first glance one might suppose that this preemptive federal action arose from the
executive agreements discussed above. Indeed, prior cases had said that some executive agreements
were preemptive,185 a matter we discuss at greater length below.186 But, as the Court seemed to
appreciate, there were several problems with relying on the executive agreements alone. There was,
as the dissent pointed out, the problem that the agreements themselves seemed to disclaim
preemptive effect.187 Assuming that the law of preemptive executive agreements parallels the law
of preemptive statutes, the central question should have been the intent of the agreements,188 so if
the agreements reflected a non-preemptive intent, that was a serious difficulty. But in fact, as
discussed above,189 the problems were even more intractable. The agreements with Germany and
Austria, on which the Court relied, covered claims against German and Austrian insurance
companies. Those companies did not make up all, or even most, of the insurance companies affected
by the California statute, or of the companies party to the suit. Yet the Court purported to invalidate
the HVIRA across the board, not merely as applied to insurers covered by an executive agreement.190
Therefore, the Court must have been relying on a source of preemption beyond the executive
agreements, as the Court itself conceded.191
Nor did the Court rely on an action or acquiescence of Congress. To the extent
Congress had done anything in the field, it seemed to have endorsed state activity.192 The Holocaust
Act had directed the President to collect information and give a report to Congress, but did not
appear to authorize executive settlement. Although the Court acknowledged the Holocaust Act, it
did so mainly in the context of arguing that Congress had not authorized the HVIRA.193 Little
language in the opinion supports any inference that Congress had authorized the President to act.
If the preemption did not come from Congress, and it did not come from the executive
agreements (or, obviously, a treaty), then the only possible source is the President’s power in foreign
affairs. This conclusion seems amply supported by the Court’s language. According to the Court,
the executive agreements showed a wider executive policy that Holocaust-era insurance claims
should be settled through cooperative means – specifically ICHEIC – rather than through litigation.
Relatedly, the executive’s policy was (according to the Court) to seek disclosure through cooperative
means, not through coercive measures like the HVIRA.194 These were policies produced wholly
within the executive branch. If they were preemptive (and apparently they were), that means that

185

See supra Part II.C.
Infra part IV.E.
187
See Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. at 2399 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
188
E.g., Gade, 505 U.S. at 96 (describing the “purpose” of Congress as “the ultimate touchstone” of
preemption analysis).
189
Supra Part II.C.
190
See Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. at 2379.
191
Id. at 2388.
192
Supra part III.C.
193
Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. at 2394.
194
Id. at 2390-91. On this point, the Court relied on statements by executive branch officials that
disclosure statutes like the HVIRA had the potential to hinder the settlement negotiations.
186
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executive branch policies are preemptive. Hence our characterization of Garamendi as a case of
“executive preemption.”195
B. The Novelty of Executive Preemption
We emphasize again that the Court had no real precedent for its rule of executive
preemption. The Court did not point to any prior case in which an executive branch policy, standing
alone, ousted an otherwise valid state law.196 All of the Court’s authorities – and all of the authorities
of which we are aware – involved statutory or treaty preemption, executive agreements, or dormant
preemption. Indeed, we are not aware even of any direct lower court authority for the proposition.
Moreover, the only Supreme Court case in which this sort of claim was even argued was Barclays,
in which the Court rejected the idea that executive branch statements of policy overrode state law.197
Instead, the Court relied on what it characterized as the inevitable result of two
incontestible propositions: that national foreign policy overrides conflicting state law, and that the
executive had the power to establish national policy with respect to the Holocaust settlement. Both
of these propositions appear correct (subject to some minor qualifications), but they add up to less
than the Court seemed to believe. First, national foreign policy reflected in treaties and statutes
overrides conflicting state law.198 Second, the President’s power in foreign affairs allows the
President to establish a presidential policy with respect to the Holocaust settlement.199 There is a
substantial further step required to reach the Court’s destination: does the presidential policy with
respect to the Holocaust settlement have the same preemptive effect as a policy established by a
treaty or statute? That is the question which the Court simply assumed, without any constitutional
analysis or support in prior law.
That does not mean, necessarily, that the Court was wrong on this proposition as a
general matter. We do not deny that the President has broad powers to conduct the foreign affairs
of the United States. Nor do we deny that at some point, a state’s interference with the President’s
ability to act would be unconstitutional (just as a congressional attempt to interfere with the exercise
of an independent presidential power would be unconstitutional). However, given its novelty, the
proposition needs to be examined in light of the text, history and structure of the Constitution,
because it has important implications for separation of powers.
195

As noted, the Court itself described its decision at one point as involving “preemption by executive
conduct in foreign affairs.” 123 S.Ct. at 2394.
196
We say “otherwise valid” because any contention that the HVIRA was ousted by a “dormant” power
would convert the case back into a Zschernig analysis, which was not the basis of the Court’s opinion. We do not
take any position, here or elsewhere in this article, on whether any such “dormant” power should be recognized by
the Court.
197
Supra part III.B.3. In this sense we think the dissent missed the mark in arguing that there was no
clear presidential policy because the only evidence of that policy were statements of lower-level executive branch
officials. Whether or not that was true, the fact remains that no prior case had accorded precedential effect to a
statement of policy, even if made clearly by the President.
198
U.S. CONST. Article VI.
199
See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 262-63.
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C. The Importance of Executive Preemption to Separation of Powers
In this section we argue that the question of executive preemption has enormous
implications for the separation of powers in foreign affairs. Specifically, we argue that to the extent
executive preemption is accepted as a constitutional power, it broadens the President’s ability to
conduct foreign affairs without a congressional check. Correspondingly, we argue that in the
absence of executive preemption, the existence of competing state laws will force the President to
pursue a cooperative foreign policy with Congress (or with the Senate). In other words, rejecting
executive preemption enhances checks and balances in foreign affairs; accepting it reduces them.
The question should be approached, we believe, with this implication firmly in mind.
In considering the matter, it is important to see that the executive’s Holocaust
settlement was by no means a universally applauded result. From the perspective of the insurance
claimants, it had serious difficulties, particularly if it overrode (as the Court said it did) state efforts
to compel disclosure of policy information. The essential problem, in the view of survivor groups,
was that in the insurance context the Foundation settlement and ICHEIC itself were empty remedies
without, at minimum, a disclosure regime with teeth. And whatever else the executive policy
provided, it did not provide a disclosure regime with teeth. Without disclosure, the insurers simply
denied claims on the basis of lack of documentation. It seemed that the disclosure issue – which was
largely confined to the insurance claims – had been ignored in the negotiations leading up to the
Foundation Agreement, in which insurance claims were a small minority of the total, and dealt with
only at the eleventh hour.200 One could easily believe that the insurance claims had been sacrificed
to the desire to effect a wider settlement on non-insurance claims.
As a result, a substantial number of insurance claimants remained committed at least
to forced disclosure, if not to litigation, as a supplement to the procedures established by the
executive branch.201 To this extent, at least, the insurance claimants and their allies wanted to upset
the executive settlement. The question was how they could do that. In this sense it is important to
see that the principal losers in Garamendi’s allocation of constitutional power were Congress and
the Holocaust insurance claimants themselves. We assume that the President’s executive power in
foreign affairs is sufficient to allow unilateral negotiation of the relevant executive agreements with
Germany and Austria, and generally to place the diplomatic weight of the United States behind a
negotiated resolution to disclosure and liability issues.202 The question, then, was how claimants and
their legislative allies could block the executive’s proposed settlement – or conversely, how the
President could force the insurance claimants to accept the settlement without a disclosure provision.
In a constitutional world without executive preemption the claimants likely would have been able
to force the issue to the U.S. Congress. Claimants had sufficient power in the states in which they
were concentrated – California, New York and Florida in particular – to press for laws like the
200

See EIZENSTAT, supra note 31, at 266-68.
For example, a leading survivor group participated in the case as amicus curiae supporting the state.
See Brief of Bet Tzedek Legal Services and Simon Wiesenthal Center as Amicus Curie Supporting Respondent,
American Insurance Association v. Garamendi (No. 02-722).
202
See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 262-63 (discussing textual foundations of the President’s
power to establish foreign policy).
201
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HVIRA (and broader ones facilitating litigation in state courts). Assuming these were otherwise
constitutional, the executive branch seemed likely correct that these had the potential to upset the
settlement – indeed, we are assuming, in this part of our discussion, that this is exactly what they
were designed to do, at least to the extent of pressing for a more demanding disclosure regime.203
Without a power of executive preemption, the President would have had two possible
remedies: he could have negotiated the Foundation Agreement and related undertakings as treaties,
or he could have asked Congress to pass a law preempting the state legislation. Either move would
have faced difficulties. In addition to their power at the state level, the claimants had substantial
allies in Congress.204 That is not to say that they commanded a majority in Congress – whether they
did was never determined, given the outcome in Garamendi. But they had sufficient support that
the President would have been undertaking a legislative battle. In any event, the claimants and the
President would have faced off in Congress, with the winner being the one that could command
majority support. The President’s ability to compel the claimants to accept an unsatisfactory
settlement would have been greatly constrained, and the ultimate decision likely would have rested
with a majority of Congress.
Now note the effect of executive preemption. If the President has a unilateral power
to overturn state law, the need to secure the cooperation of Congress disappears. Rather, the
President has a greatly expanded power to force his version of the settlement upon the claimants, and
the claimants’ ability to resist is correspondingly reduced. Once the claimants lose the ability to
appeal to independent power centers at the local level, they lose access to any meaningful
independent forum to oppose presidential policy. True, Congress could pass a law overturning the
President’s settlement. But since the President presumably would veto it, the claimants would now
need sufficient votes to override the veto, rather than merely a majority. Further, the burden of
overcoming legislative inertia shifts from the President to the claimants. In short, an enormous
presumption is established in favor of the President’s solution.
As a result, the President’s ability to pursue a unilateral foreign policy agenda is
enhanced, and Congress’ role in deciding foreign policy priorities is diminished, by the constitutional
innovation of executive preemption. Had Garamendi come out the other way, Congress would have
been in the position of ratifying (or declining to ratify) the executive settlement. Another way to put
this is to say that the states perform a vital role in enhancing checks and balances at the federal level.
203

We assume here that the Court was correct in assessing the executive policy. As discussed infra note
257, we think that is not as clear as the Court indicated: in fact, the executive seemed to be avoiding a firm position
on whether the settlement agreements precluded supplemental remedies, a point noted in the dissent. Moreover, it is
worth re-emphasizing that the executive branch policy displaced state disclosure laws even as applied to companies
that were not part of the settlements.
204
See 2001 Hearings, supra note 15, at 31-34 (statement of Representative Waxman). The hearings
involved H.R. 2693, a bill that amounted to a federal version of the HVIRA, which Waxman described as
“address[ing] one of the most difficult problems faced by Holocaust survivors and their families when they seek
restitution from insurance companies that have refused to pay claims held by victims of Nazi persecution: How to
identify the insurance company that issued the policy.” Id. at 31. See also Brief of Rep. Henry A. Waxman and 51
Other Members of Congress as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi (No. 02-722).
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Without executive preemption, the states form independent power centers that require the
cooperation of the branches of the federal level to overcome them. Parties opposed to a presidential
policy (such as the claimants in Garamendi) thus need only to get the ear of state governments – an
easier proposition – in order to demand coordination on the federal level. Of course, the unified
policy of the federal branches will triumph – that is the point of the supremacy clause – but it must
be a unified, not unilateral, policy. In contrast, if the states are removed as independent power
centers, there is no need for cooperation at the federal level in Garamendi-type cases, because the
President can overcome opposition to executive policy by unilateral force alone. Under this model,
all of the policymaking takes place in the executive branch, with Congress reduced to the difficult
position of assembling a blocking supermajority. This, in short, in what was at stake in Garamendi.
D. The Constitutional Case against Executive Preemption
Having identified the importance of the issue, we now turn to the constitutional case
against executive preemption, viewed from a separation of powers perspective. As set forth below,
we think the Constitution’s text, structure and history favors the balanced approach to foreign policy
formulation much more than it favors unchecked presidential power.
First, the Constitution’s text speaks directly to the allocation of the preemptive power
among the branches of the federal government. The supremacy clause of Article VI states that the
Constitution itself, treaties, and federal statutes have preemptive effect.205 This is most readily
thought to protect states: state law can be displaced only by the procedures that underlie the creation
of each of these sources of law.206 But it is also an allocation of power among the federal branches.
Federal courts have the power of preemption when interpreting the Constitution; the President plus
two-thirds of the Senate has the power of preemption in undertaking treaties; and the President plus
a majority of Congress, or two-thirds of Congress acting alone, has the power of preemption when
enacting statutes. Absent from this scheme is any suggestion that the President acting alone has the
power of preemption. By setting forth specific allocations of preemptive power, the Constitution
contains a strong negative implication that it does not contain additional allocations of preemptive
power sub silentio.
As we have argued above, the allocation of preemptive power has important
consequences for which branch controls the decisionmaking on issues such as the Holocaust
insurance settlement. Since the states opposed at least part of the settlement, effecting a settlement
contrary to the wishes of the insurance claimants required an exercise of the preemptive power, so
whichever branch had the preemptive power would be the decisionmaker. As a result, the fact that
the Constitution’s text specifically allocates preemptive power in one direction and not the other
seems to be a direct statement as to which branch should and should not be the decisionmaker in
such cases. This illustrates how the supremacy clause is an element of checks and balances among
the various branches of the federal government, not merely an allocation of power between the
205

U.S. CONST. Art. VI.
See generally Clark, Separation of Powers as a Protection of Federalism, supra note 12, at 1439.
For further discussion of this point in the context of the Garamendi case, see infra part V.E.
206
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federal government and the states. Creating an executive preemption power allocates federal power
differently from the way explicitly contained in the Constitution’s text, a matter that should not be
done lightly.
Second, the Framers’ understanding of separation of powers theory underlies the
textual allocation. The preemptive power is, fundamentally, a legislative power. In Garamendi, it
was the power to determine whether the claimants would be compelled to accept the President’s
settlement. Before the President exercised the preemptive power, the claimants’ remedies were
governed by state law; afterward, they were governed by the President’s settlement. Preemption
effected a shift in the law governing the claims.207
That preemption is a legislative power is confirmed by the nature of Article VI, which
makes certain acts preemptive by deeming them the “supreme Law of the Land.” As Louise
Weinberg has noted, the supremacy clause functions as a conflicts-of-law provision, privileging the
law of the Constitution, federal treaties and statutes over the law of the states.208 The supremacy
clause, then, presupposes a conflict of law that requires resolution, and that preemption is the result
of a conflict of law. To say that an executive branch policy is preemptive is to give it the force of
supreme law.
Saying that an executive policy can have the force of supreme law is not only counter
to the negative implication of Article VI, but counter to the most basic propositions of eighteenth
century separation of powers theory. At its most fundamental level, separation of powers meant that
executive power is separated from the legislative power. From John Locke forward, that is how the
doctrine was understood in English and European political theory, and how it was applied in
America. As Montsequieu wrote: “When the legislative and executive power are united in the same
person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty.”209 That principle was confirmed
in the early state constitutions: in Virginia, “The legislative, executive and judiciary department shall
be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other”; in
Massachusetts, “the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers.”210
As a result, the Framers’ placement of the preemptive power in the hands of Congress
followed directly from the basic principles of separation of powers. Preemption resulted from
207

The same point can be made from the perspective of the insurers: before the President exercised the
preemptive power, the insurers had a legal obligation to disclose the policies (or cease doing business in California).
After preemption, the insurers had the legal right to continue doing business without disclosure.
208
See Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: “Actual Conflicts,” 70 TEX. L. REV.
1743, 1748-50 (1992).
209
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 151 (1748) (Prometheus ed. 2002). See M.J.C. VILE,
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 91-106 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing Montesquieu’s vision of
separation of powers). As Vile puts it, Montesquieu thought “the executive officer ought to have a share in the
legislative power by a veto over legislation, but he ought not to have the power to enter positively into the making of
legislation.”). Id. at 103. On the history of separation of powers in English thought, see WILLIAM B. GWYN, THE
MEANING OF SEPARATION OF POWERS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1965).
210
VA. CONST., para 1 (1776); MASS. CONST., Art. XXX (1780).
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making one law supreme over another; the creation of supreme law was a legislative power, and so
preemption entailed a legislative act. Indeed, the unusual part of the supremacy clause was the
preemptive status it gave treaties. Treatymaking under the British system was characterized as an
executive power, and the Senate was conceived by at least some at the time as a quasi-executive
body. Treaties had not been supreme law under either the British system or under the Articles; to
some it seemed a violation of separation of powers principles to give lawmaking authority to
anything less than the whole of the legislature.211 Although these reservations were overcome, they
indicate the extent the constitutional generation identified preemption with lawmaking.
Third, this is the lesson of the Steel Seizure case, the Court’s leading modern decision
on the separation of executive and legislative power. As is well known, in that case President
Truman on his own initiative ordered the seizure of steel mills in the United States on the verge of
a lockout, to ensure that the supply of steel for the Korean War was not interrupted. The Court
invalidated this move as executive lawmaking: Justice Black said for the Court that the executive
was altering the legal rights of the mill owners, and that was a legislative act to which the executive
had no constitutional warrant.212 As he wrote: “In the framework of our Constitution, the
President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of
laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad.”213 This account of the Steel Seizure case
is quite familiar, and confirms in the broad sense the constitutional separation of executive and
lawmaking authority.214
It is less commonly recognized, however, that the Steel Seizure case posed a question
of executive preemption. The mill owners’ claim to a property right, which the President attempted
to divest, was a right under state law. The reason the President’s action was lawmaking was that it
would change the state-law right. In other words, in the first instance the case was a question of
federalism: did the President’s policy (to keep the mills operating) trump the state property law
(allowing the mill owners to close the mills if they wished)?215 But Justice Black rightly saw the case
211

On the status of treaties as executive acts in Founding-era discourse, see Prakash & Ramsey, supra
note 9, at 289-94. On Founding-era objections to treaties’ status as law of the land without the approval of Congress,
see John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution and the Original Understanding, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999). See also THE FEDERALIST, supra note 52, No. 75, at 425 (Hamilton) (responding to
claims that the President would improperly exercise legislative power by treaty).
212
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-90 (1952).
213
Id. at 587. The Court continued: “The President’s order does not direct that a congressional policy
be executed in a manner prescribed by the President – it directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner
prescribed by the President.” Id. at 588.
214
See Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373
(2002). See also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that the “Executive . . . has no
legislative power” and the order at issue constituted an “exercise of authority without law.”); id. at 630 (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (calling Truman’s order “an exercise of legislative power” and hence unconstitutional).
215
See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 1393, 1396-1400 (discussing the federalism
aspects of Youngstown). Professor Clark makes the point that the separation of powers aspects of Youngstown
protected the states by making preemption more difficult – a point we discuss in Part V infra. Our point here takes
an opposite though complementary perspective – Congress’ role in foreign affairs is protected by preserving the
states as independent power centers. As a result, federalism reinforces separation of powers, as separation of powers
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principally as one of separation of powers: that is, which branch of the federal government had the
power to preempt the state property law. According to Black, that power was a legislative power,
squarely in the hands of the Congress. Presidential policy did not trump state law, because to say
otherwise would be to make the President a lawmaker.216
In this sense the Steel Seizure case is closely analogous to Garamendi. As in
Garamendi, President Truman sought to implement executive policy, but to make it effective he
needed to displace state law. If the Court had permitted executive preemption, that would have
allowed Truman to set policy unilaterally, with the mill owners’ only recourse to seek a veto-proof
vote in Congress. Thus the decision whether to seize the mills largely would have been taken out
of the hands of Congress and placed in the hands of the President. When the Court declined to find
executive preemption, the existence of the competing state policy required Truman to have the
support of a majority of Congress to override the state. But Truman could not get a majority (he had
asked for the power earlier, without success),217 and so Congress had the last word. The preservation
of the state as an independent power source that could stand up to presidential policy protected the
checks and balances at the federal level. Without the competing state policy, there would have been
no meaningful check upon Truman’s decision to subordinate the mill owners’ rights to the national
imperative of ensuring a steady supply of steel. Allowing the state to frustrate executive policy
served the important function of making sure that Truman’s policy had the approval of the
lawmakers, and was not a unilateral formulation.
Of course, one might not doubt that the foregoing propositions hold in domestic
matters, but argue that foreign affairs is different. We conceive that this is exactly what the Court
was saying in Garamendi. Presumably the Court did not believe that executive branch policy in
domestic matters would override state law – a proposition that would have run counter to the Steel
Seizure case and basic separation of powers theory. The Court relied heavily on the President’s
unique powers in foreign affairs as the basis of the preemption.218 The Court must have been saying
that the executive foreign affairs power makes the President a lawmaker in foreign affairs, despite
the fact that the President cannot be a lawmaker in other areas.219
The question, then, is whether anything supports the idea of a foreign affairs
exception to the broader rule against executive lawmaking. Nothing in the Constitution’s text
indicates such an exception, perhaps leaving aside military matters and questions of recognition,
where the President has a textually explicit role. The Garamendi Court invoked, without
elaboration, the President’s supposed broad power in foreign affairs, which does not have an obvious
reinforces federalism.
216
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587-88.
217
Id. at 586.
218
Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. at 2380.
219
There is at least some suggestion of this foreign-affairs-is-different attitude in the concurring
opinions in the Steel Seizure case. Justices Jackson and Frankfurter in particular offered some reservations about
Black’s simple, bright-line conclusions. This likely had to do with the fact that the Steel Seizure case had foreign
affairs implications. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 598 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 265-72 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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basis in text. It seems most easily located in the President’s “executive Power” of Article II, Section
1 – but that formulation invokes the traditional understanding of executive power, which did not
include foreign affairs lawmaking.220 As one of us has demonstrated elsewhere, the historical
understanding of executive power in the eighteenth century did not include lawmaking power in
foreign affairs (save in narrow areas not applicable here). In particular, the eighteenth century British
monarch did not have a domestic rulemaking power in support of foreign affairs objectives – even
foreign affairs objectives specified in treaties.221 It is hard to imagine that the Framers constituted
their President with greater powers than the British monarch, especially on the question of displacing
state law.
But if the “foreign affairs exception” to separation of powers cannot be located in
constitutional text, it is equally difficult to ground in longstanding practice. The Court appealed to
custom and usage in identifying the President’s “independent authority to act” in foreign affairs. 222
While we do not dispute the a tradition of independent presidential acts in some aspects of foreign
affairs, there is no longstanding practice of the President acting independently to displace state laws,
even ones that touch upon foreign affairs. As we have discussed, the preemption by executive policy
found in Garamendi was essentially unprecedented.
Moreover, at least one part of the Constitution’s text, and of traditional constitutional
discourse, stands squarely against the idea of executive lawmaking in foreign affairs: the inclusion
of treaties in the supremacy clause. One can hardly imagine a better example of executive policy in
foreign affairs than a policy reflected in a treaty. Surely the executive policy on which the Court
relied in Garamendi would have been at least as strong had it been incorporated into a treaty, signed
by the U.S. President and the European nations whose companies were involved, and stating that any
disclosures should be voluntary rather than mandated. According to the conventional understanding
of Article VI, for such a treaty to have preemptive effect, it would require approval of two-thirds of
the Senate. Executive preemption, in contrast, would seem to allow unapproved treaties to be
preemptive at the option of the President.223 That proposition is inconsistent with the way the
supremacy clause was understood at the time of the Framing and the way it is understood today. Our
system has always understood that treaties are preemptive because of the supremacy clause.224
220

Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 265-72; 340-46. Another shortcoming of the Garamendi
opinion is that it asserted a presidential power in foreign affairs without identifying its source. While we do not deny
presidential power in foreign affairs, we think it important to say where it comes from. To the extent one believes
that it comes from the traditional understanding of executive power, as reflected in Article II, Section 1, there is little
basis for saying that it includes lawmaking power in foreign affairs. Declining to clarify the source of the President’s
power allowed the Court to finesse this difficulty.
221
See id. at 252-56.
222
Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2386.
223
Presidents have sometimes unilaterally declared that they will comply with unratified treaties, or
parts of unratified treaties. This has not been thought to displace contrary state laws, but only to establish a rule for
the executive branch.
224
See Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra note 107, at 219-31 (discussing early understandings of
the supremacy clause as it related to treaties). See also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 277 (1796) (opinion of Iredell,
J.) (noting that treaties did not override state law under the Articles, but that “The extreme inconveniences felt from
such a system dictated the remedy which the Constitution has now provided, that ‘all treaties made or which shall be
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Indeed, as discussed, that was the reason the Framers added treaties to the supremacy clause: because
otherwise they would have depended upon Congress to implement treaties and thus risk repeating
the errors of the Articles, in which states routinely violated treaty obligations.225 Yet if executive
foreign policy is preemptive (as the Court claimed in Garamendi) and treaties reflect executive
foreign policy (as they surely do), then the supremacy clause is unnecessary to make them supreme
over state law (something that plainly escaped the Framers’ notice).
The suggestion that treaties are preemptive without regard to the supremacy clause
seems implausible, not merely because it has never been seriously advanced, but also because the
preemptive effect of treaties was itself a substantial innovation over previous models. Neither the
British system nor the Articles of Confederation gave domestic legislative effect to treaties; in each
case treaties were executive initiatives that required legislative implementation to become domestic
law (in one instance by parliament, in the other by state legislatures).226 The treaty clause of Article
VI was an exception to the broader principle of separation of powers that the legislative branch must
make the laws, justified by the imperative (felt strongly as a result of experience under the Articles)
of complying with treaty obligations. Moreover, as Hamilton noted, the participation of the Senate
softened the objection that treaties were executive lawmaking: at least a part of the legislative body
would have a hand in them.227 But treaties are a special case because they are addressed by a specific
constitutional clause, because they respond to a particular problem felt keenly under the Articles, and
because they do not represent unilateral presidential power. None of these points applies to
executive policy preemption. Thus the basic principle of separation of powers should remain the
rule: the legislature makes the laws, and that power includes the power to decide when to displace
state laws.
In sum, if one thinks of the question only as one of federalism, one might suppose that
the constitutional structure implies the President’s supremacy over the states in foreign affairs. But
viewed as a question of separation of powers at the national level, nothing in the Constitution’s
structure implies the superiority of the President over Congress, particularly in matters of lawmaking.
E. Garamendi, Executive Agreements, and the Treaty Power
Garamendi contains a second and related threat to the Constitution’s system of checks
and balances at the national level: its treatment of executive agreements threatens the balance
between the President and the Senate in undertaking international obligations. As discussed, much
of the Court’s discussion centered upon the U.S. agreement with Germany (and a later one with
Austria) relating to Holocaust claims. Most of this was essentially dicta, for as we have pointed out
the preemptive effect of the executive agreements could not have been the determinative factor in
made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land. . . .’ Under this Constitution,
therefore, so far as a treaty constitutionally is binding, it is also by the vigor of its own authority to be executed in
fact. It would not otherwise be the supreme law.”) (quoting Article VI); accord JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 685-86 (1833).
225
See supra Part II.A..
226
See Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra note 107, at 225-229.
227
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 52, No. 75 (Hamilton), at 425.
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the case.228 Indeed, the Court conceded as much, stating that if the executive agreements themselves
purported to override state law, the case would have been an easy one requiring much less
discussion. And the dissent seemed to agree, at least for purposes of argument, for it emphasized
that the executive agreements were (in its view) not preemptive. The combination of the two
opinions leaves the impression that preemption by the executive agreements, if supported by the
agreements’ language, would have been unremarkable.229
That is a fundamentally mistaken impression, for it discards the Court’s previously
cautious approach to executive agreements. It is true, of course, that executive agreements have long
been a mainstay of presidential diplomacy,230 and that the Court three times prior to Garamendi
rejected a direct constitutional attack on an executive agreement. But that statement, without more,
oversimplifies the Court’s prior approach, and overlooks the cautious manner the Court had
previously sought to integrate executive agreements into the constitutional scheme.
1.

The Case for (Some) Executive Agreements

To begin, the constitutional case for some executive agreement power is quite
strong. The treatymaking clause, of course, provides that the President may make treaties with the
advice and consent of the Senate232 – and by obvious negative implication indicates that the President
may not make treaties without the advise and consent of the Senate. But that is not a constitutional
argument against all forms of executive agreement unless one thinks that “treaties” are the only type
of international agreement recognized by the Constitution.233 It seems clear that this is not so. First,
the Constitution’s text itself – in Article I, Section 10 – recognizes two categories: states, it says,
may not enter into treaties, but may enter into “agreements” with foreign powers upon the consent
of Congress.234 Second, the international treatise writers of the eighteenth century, with whom the
Framers were familiar, also recognized (at least) two classes of international undertakings: “treaties”
and “other agreements.”235 This confirms that the phrasing of Article I, Section 10 is not a mistake
or an idiosyncracy, but rather reflects a common eighteenth century understanding of international
agreements. Presumably the national government can enter into both kinds of international
undertakings, and “agreements” not encompassed within the treatymaking clause would seem to fall
231

228

Supra Part II.C.
Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. at 2387 (“If the agreements here had expressly preempted laws like HVIRA,
the issue would be straightforward”); id. at 2398 (Ginsburg, dissenting).
230
See Paul, supra note 107 (recounting twentieth century history of executive agreements).
231
See Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra note 107, at 160-183 (expanding these arguments).
232
U.S. CONST. Art. II, Sec. 2.
233
See Berger, supra note 104, at 55; Adler, supra note 104, at 27-32.
234
U.S. CONST. Art. I, Sec. 10 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; . . . .
No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or
with a foreign Power”).
235
See EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk. II, sec. 152 (Joseph Chitty, ed., 1863)
(originally published 1758) (distinguishing between “treaties” on one hand and “accords, conventions [and]
compacts” on the other). See also Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra note 107, at 166-171 (discussing other
sources).
229
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within the President’s executive power in foreign affairs.236 Third, constitutional practice, dating to
fairly near the time of the Framing, included Presidents making agreements on their own authority
without the consent of the Senate, and without constitutional objection.237
Moreover, for those who count tradition and precedent alongside text and original
understanding, the case is equally strong. As noted, the practice of executive agreements began in
the late eighteenth century and continued, with increasing strength, through the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.238 It was rarely questioned in court, and when it was, it was invariably upheld.239
Nor was it substantially questioned by the other branches: the closest either Congress or the Senate
came to a serious objection was the Case Act in the 1970s, which required the executive to disclose
to Congress executive agreements made on behalf of the United States.240
So there should be no substantial objection to the Court unreflectively assuming that
some executive agreements are within the constitutional power of the President. The problem is that
the Court unreflectively assumed that this particular executive agreement was. Although most
commentators accept some executive agreements as constitutional, for several reasons there must
be limits upon them.241
There are two obvious difficulties with an unlimited presidential power of executive
agreements. First, the Constitution seems to require a limit upon the scope of executive agreements,
as a necessary consequence of the treaty clause. If everything that can be done by treaty can also be
done by executive agreement, the treatymaking clause is superfluous and the constitutional check
of the Senate, which the Framers valued highly, is of no effect.242 Second, there must be some limit
to the preemptive effect of executive agreements. Treaties, of course, are preemptive by the plain
language of Article VI. But Article VI does not mention executive agreements by name, and the
entire constitutional argument for executive agreements in the first instance depends upon them not
236

183.

Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 264; Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra note 107, at 160-
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See Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra note 107, at 173-183. The Garamendi Court erroneously
stated that the first sole executive agreement, the 1799 settlement with the Netherlands concerning the ship
Wilmington Packet, occurred during the Washington administration. John Adams was President in 1799 and his
administration concluded the Wilmington Packet agreement.
238
See WALLACE MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURE
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1941).
239
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Dames
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
240
Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. sec. 112b (1972) (“The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress
the text of any international agreement . . ., other than a treaty, to which the United States is a party as soon as
practicable after such agreement has entered into force. . . .”). The Act did not, however, contain any restrictions
upon the entry into executive agreements.
241
See HENKIN, supra note 91, at 219-230.
242
Id. at 222. On the Framers’ strong desire for a two-thirds supermajority in the Senate as a check on
treaty making, see Charles Warren, The Mississippi River and the Treaty Clause of the Constitution, 2 Geo. WASH.
L. REV. 271 (1934). We note that it is a separate question – and one we do not address here – whether executive
agreements approved by Congress can cover the same ground as treaties. Cf. Ackerman & Golove, Is NAFTA
Constitutional?, supra note 105.
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being treaties. That is not to say that no executive agreements can be preemptive (although one of
us has made that argument elsewhere),243 but it does suggest some limit on the preemptive effect of
executive agreements. Otherwise, one would be in the peculiar situation of arguing that while
treaties are preemptive only because of Article VI, executive agreements, which are a lesser form
of agreement, are preemptive even without Article VI. Yet if some other mechanism in the
Constitution makes executive agreements preemptive across the board, presumably that same
mechanism would make treaties preemptive (and thus render this aspect of Article VI superfluous).
These are sufficiently serious objections that they seem to require a careful
constitutional theory of executive agreements. The Court has never developed one, but rather – prior
to Garamendi – embraced the alternative approach of proceeding extremely cautiously and narrowly
in approving executive agreements.
2. The (Prior) Cautious Approach to Executive Agreements
As discussed above,244 the Court has considered constitutional challenges to two
executive agreements. The first challenge arose in a pair of cases, United States v. Belmont in 1937
and United States v. Pink in 1942.245 Both cases challenged the same agreement, President
Roosevelt’s agreement with the Soviet Union regarding claims settlement and other matters ancillary
to the U.S. diplomatic recognition of the Soviet government. Neither case engaged the constitutional
difficulties of executive agreements, and in some places the Court worded its decisions quite broadly.
But the Court also emphasized the specific context of the agreement, which arose in connection with
diplomatic recognition.246 As the Court pointed out, recognition is widely assumed to be an
exclusive presidential power, and one may easily conclude that the power also includes the power
to make bargains relating to recognition.
The cautious approach to executive agreements seemed doubly reaffirmed in Dames
& Moore v. Regan in 1981. That case challenged the executive agreements ending the Iran hostage
crisis, which among other things terminated private claims against the Iranian government and
transferred them to an international tribunal. In upholding the agreement, the Court was even more
careful to point out the narrowness of its holding. Indeed, the Court went out of its way to
emphasize that it was not upholding executive agreements generally. Rather, it focused on the fact
that Congress had consented to the type of executive agreement at issue in Dames & Moore.
243

Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra note 107, at 218-235.
Supra part II.c.
245
315 U.S. 203 (1942); 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
246
Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330 (“We take judicial notice of the fact that coincident with the [executive
agreement], the President recognized the Soviet Government and normal diplomatic relations were established
between the government and the government of the United States followed by an exchange of ambassadors. . . . The
recognition, establishment of diplomatic relations, the assignment, and agreements with respect thereto, were all
parts of one transaction, resulting in an international compact between the two governments. That the negotiations,
acceptance of the assignment and agreements and understandings in respect thereof were within the competence of
the President may not be doubted.”); Pink, 315 U.S. at 229-230 (“Power to remove such obstacles to full
[diplomatic] recognition as settlement of claims of our nationals . . .certainly is a modest implied power of our
President.”). See Wuerth, supra note 107, at 11-14.
244
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Congress manifested that consent (according to the Court) in two ways, both of which the Court
discussed at length. Congress had passed statutes that contemplated the exercise of unilateral
presidential power to settle claims against foreign governments by executive agreement, thereby
“indicating congressional acceptance of a broad scope for executive action in circumstances such
as those presented in this case”; and the President had exercised that power without objection
throughout constitutional history, thereby showing “a history of congressional acquiescence in the
conduct of the sort engaged in by the President.”247 “[W]e do not decide,” the Court cautioned, “that
the President possesses plenary power to settle claims, even against foreign government entities.”248
In sum, prior to Garamendi the Court had not established a general theory of
executive agreements, but rather had identified specific instances in which they might be used,
without explaining their outer boundaries. But there must be some boundaries, both because the
Constitution’s text seems to require it, and because the Court’s extreme caution in approving the
agreements it did approve shows that the Court thought it was dealing with an instrument available
only in limited circumstances. And for what it is worth, that was also the view of the modern
executive branch. The President, in ordinary practice, did not claim a universal power of executive
agreement. Rather, the State Department had developed guidelines for deciding when a matter could
be handled by executive agreement and when it required senatorial (or congressional) approval.249
Indeed, apparently the executive branch negotiators of the Holocaust settlements thought they did
not (or at least might not) have the power to make preemptive settlement agreements on their own
authority.250
3. Garamendi and Executive Agreements
All this was casually swept away in Garamendi, if one takes the Court’s statements
seriously. According to the Court, there would have been no substantial issue if the only question
had been whether an executive agreement plainly intended to be preemptive could displace
California’s law: “Generally, then, valid executive agreements are fit to preempt state laws, just as
treaties are.”251 That, though, was not at all obvious under prior law. First, there should have been
a question whether the subject matter of the agreement was properly handled by treaty rather than
executive agreement. Second, there should have been the issue whether the agreement, even if
247

453 U.S. 654, 677, 678-79 (1981). The Court further stressed that the decision rested “on the
narrowest possible grounds” and did not “attempt to lay down any general guidelines.” Id. at 600-01
248
Id. at 688.
249
U.S. State Department, Foreign Affairs Manual, Considerations for Selecting among Constitutionally
Authorized Procedures, 11 F.A.M. 721.3.
250
EIZENSTAT, supra note 31, at 257 (“There was no precedent in American history for such a legal
negotiation by the U.S. government with private companies and for intervening in this way in present and future
private lawsuits.”); Ronald Bettauer, The Role of the United States Government in Recent Holocaust Claims
Resolution, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2002) (“there was no precedent in U.S. law for the settlement of claims of
nationals against foreign private entities by executive agreement (as opposed to treaty) and thus such method could
be subject to serious challenge”).
251
Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. at 2388. For this proposition the Court cited, without elaboration, only Pink
and Belmont (notably omitting Dames & Moore at this point).
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constitutional, was preemptive. As Pink, Belmont and Dames & Moore show, these points are not
automatic, but depend (or at least depended) upon an examination of the particular context.
The casual approach could be defended if Garamendi was essentially on all fours with
one of the prior cases. But it was not. It lacked the context of recognition, emphasized in Pink and
Belmont. Perhaps the case fit within another exclusive constitutional power of the President that
conveyed a similar unilateral power, but it was hard to see what that would be.252 Further, the
evidence of congressional acquiescence, critical in Dames & Moore, was quite weak in Garamendi.
Moreover, although both Garamendi and Dames & Moore involved international claims, there was
a critical distinction: Dames & Moore involved claims against a foreign government (and its
instrumentalities) whereas Garamendi involved claims against private parties. That was important
because the indicia of congressional intent identified in Dames & Moore related to settlement of
claims against governments – neither the practice nor the applicable statutes relied on in Dames &
Moore extended to settlement of private claims. As the executive branch acknowledged, settlement
of private claims by executive agreement was “unprecedented.”253
The central problem in the Garamendi litigation was that no one directly based the
argument upon the executive agreements. Rather, the argument, and the Court’s decision, turned
upon an odd combination of the executive agreements plus the executive policy stated more broadly.
Arguments about the scope of preemptive executive agreements did not play a major role, because
the parties assumed that was not the key to the case. This may have produced the Court’s
unreflective dicta that if the only issue was whether the executive agreement could be preemptive,
the case would have been an easy one. That only appeared to be so, because that was not the issue
and thus no one contested it. As a result, the Court appeared to cast aside the restraint it had shown
in previous cases, and approve a broad role for preemptive executive agreements.
If taken seriously, that pronouncement portends an substantial shift of power from
the Senate to the executive. As discussed, prior to Garamendi the President had entered into many
executive agreements, but had been circumspect about their subject matter, and the executive branch
seemingly had doubts whether it could enter into a preemptive agreement in the Holocaust settlement
itself. Garamendi appears to invite a much broader use, and certainly indicates that the executive
branch was taking far too narrow a view of its own power.
Moreover, by not questioning the preemptive nature of executive agreements, the
Court abandoned the most promising avenue for judicial limitation on the President’s agreementmaking power. It would appear quite difficult to mount a judicial challenge to a non-self-executing
(i.e., not preemptive) executive agreement.254 The line between non-self-executing treaties and nonpreemptive executive agreements will in most cases have to be worked out between the President
and the Senate, and the President would have wide latitude to decide what should and should not be
252

Cf. Deutsch v. Turner Co., 324 F.3d 692, 711-12 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing claims settlement in war
as an aspect of war power).
253
Bettauer, supra note 250, at 4 (calling the Foundation Agreement “unprecedented”). For an
elaboration of this point see Wuerth, supra note 107, at 14-40.
254
In particular, it is hard to see how anyone would have standing to assert such a claim.
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submitted to the Senate. So long as the judiciary declines in general to make executive agreements
part of the domestic legal system, particularly in the sense of declining to give them preemptive
effect, that again forces a cooperative approach upon the President: the President must get the Senate
(or Congress) involved in order to displace state law that interferes with the executive agreement.
In short, a cautious approach to making executive agreements preemptive prevents the President
from taking too much advantage of the uncertain, and judicially non-cognizable, line between the
permissible subject matters of executive agreements and treaties.
Of course, it may be that the Court’s pronouncement on this score should not be taken
at face value. As noted, the issue was not really before the Court. Moreover, the case did involve
settlement of claims, albeit a different sort than those at issue in Dames & Moore; perhaps it means
no more than that the President can make preemptive executive agreements in the area of claims
settlement. We believe that future decisions should not read Garamendi as a blanket approval of
preemptive executive agreements in future cases, whatever the Garamendi decision appears to say.
The structural issues are simply too important to be decided in a case in which they were not
seriously argued by the parties or considered by the Court.
The larger point is that the relationship between executive agreements and state law
is as much (if not more) a question of separation of powers as it is a question of federalism. The
Court’s casual approvals of executive agreements have never fully appreciated that perspective.255
In Pink and Belmont, that was less problematic because those cases involved an independent
constitutional power of the President – recognition – which could mark out a narrow and defined
area in which the President could safely be a lawmaker. In Dames & Moore, the lawmaking by
executive agreement was less problematic because the Court relied on the approval of Congress. As
a matter of separation of powers, this fell short of a complete answer, because the issue of executive
agreements at least in part involves the Senate, as well as the Congress as a whole. But given that
the matter in Dames & Moore was essentially one of foreign commerce (the claims were principally
commercial), Congress plainly had an enumerated power over it. Whether or not the President could
enter into the international settlement without the approval of the Senate, plainly Congress could
terminate the claims and transfer them to arbitration in support of the settlement, and that was the
extent of Dames & Moore’s objection. So again the Court provided a separation of powers solution,
without exactly calling it that.
Garamendi, on the other hand, lost sight of any separation of powers limitations on
executive agreements. To the Garamendi Court, it was all about federalism, and so it seemed an
easy result to say that the federal interest overrode the state interest. The difficulty, here as
elsewhere, was that the Court did not inquire as to the appropriate procedures for establishing a
federal interest.
* * *

255

See Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra note 107, at 145-154 (elaborating this point with
particular reference to Belmont).
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Garamendi thus sows the seeds for serious inroads on separation of powers law as
it stood prior to the Court’s opinion. First, the Court endorsed the entirely novel concept that
presidential policy, unaided by explicit or implicit congressional authorization, possesses the quality
of a legislative act, at least to the extent of displacing state law. The practical result is that the
President may make policy altering the rights of individuals and preempt contrary state law
unilaterally, without the coordination and cooperation with Congress—or the Senate, in the case of
treaties—previously required. Second, the Court seemed to abandon its prior tentative approach
toward sole executive agreements, opening the way for a substitution of unilateral agreement-making
for the constraints of the treaty clause. While future decisions may prove us incorrect, it seems clear
that the President’s foreign policymaking power has grown as a result of Garamendi, that its growth
comes at the expense of Congress and the Senate, and that it has grown in a way not countenanced
by the Constitution’s text, structure and history.256
Garamendi and Federalism in Foreign Affairs

V.

We now turn to the federalism aspects of the Garamendi decision. What one thinks
of the Garamendi and foreign relations federalism depends to some extent upon what one thinks of
Zschernig and its theory of a structural exclusion of states from foreign affairs. Since we disagree
in some respects between ourselves on this matter, we necessarily state our conclusions cautiously.
Nonetheless, we can identify at least three unsatisfactory implications of the Garamendi decision that
should trouble even those who endorse some form of “dormant” foreign affairs exclusion. First, the
Court seemed to revive the previously inoperative “dormant” foreign affairs exclusion of Zschernig,
while doing nothing to clarify its scope and constitutional basis. It is not even clear, after
Garamendi, whether dormant exclusion is now broader or narrower than the Court envisioned it in
Zschernig. Second, the Court shifted much of the decisionmaking power, in terms of which state
laws should be overridden, from the judiciary to the executive, in the context of a test that is
extraordinarily malleable and difficult to apply. But that test seems to require that state laws, even
in areas of traditional state authority, must give way to executive policies where the conflict between
them is sufficiently sharp. Third, the Court’s endorsement of a broad preemptive power through
independent executive action disables the political safeguards—endorsed in other contexts by
members of the Court’s majority—that are supposed to protect state interests in the national
lawmaking process.
A.

Garamendi’s Balancing Test

We begin by describing, as best we can, the new test articulated by the majority. It
apparently balances the degree of conflict with federal policy with the interests of the states.
256

A further problem with the decision is that it essentially allowed the President to have it both ways.
By declining to enter into an explicitly preemptive executive agreement, the President managed to avoid taking a
clear stance against litigation of Holocaust claims and state regulation of the Holocaust insurers, while quietly
persuading the Court to resolve the insurers’ concerns about “legal peace.” See EIZENSTAT, supra note 31, at 205278. At the very minimum, it would seem that the Court should require a fairly forthright executive policy, so that
political accountability is placed squarely with the executive.
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However, neither prong of the new test is adequately explained or easy to apply, as evidenced by the
Court’s own breezy implementation. As a result, Garamendi imposes new substantive limits on
state’ involvement in foreign affairs that are thinly justified, difficult to articulate, and offer no
guidance to lower courts or state policymakers.
As discussed above, the Court constructed a test that it applied to the HVIRA using
a “synthesis” of Justices Douglas and Harlan’s approaches in Zschernig, as the Court characterized
them.257 As the Court put it: “If a State were simply to take a position on a matter of foreign policy
with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility, field preemption might be
the appropriate doctrine, whether the National Government had acted, and if it had, without reference
to the degree of conflict” since “the Constitution entrusts foreign policy exclusively to the National
Government.” But if a State tries to address matters within its legislative competence, “but in a way
that affects foreign relations, it might make good sense to require a conflict, of a clarity or
substantiality that would vary with the strength or the traditional importance of the state concern
asserted.”258
It is not clear what one is to make of the hedges—“if a state were,” “field preemption
might be,” “it might make good sense”—with which Justice Souter salted his “synthesis” of Douglas
and Harlan’s Zschernig opinions. But he seemed to devise an entirely new test taking into account
“the strength of the state interest, judged by standards of traditional practice” in deciding “how
serious a conflict must be shown”—or whether one need be shown at all—“before declaring the law
preempted” by executive action.259
Under Souter’s formulation, the apparent threshold question is whether the state is
“taking a position on a matter of foreign policy” without a “serious claim to be addressing a
traditional state responsibility . . . .” In such case, Souter said “field preemption” might apply—but
what he really meant was that Zschernig’s dormant foreign affairs preemption might apply, since he
also made clear that the federal government need not have acted at all (another example of
misleading use of statutory preemption terms). If the state is operating outside its traditional sphere
– whatever that may mean – its actions are preempted (excluded). This follows, wrote Souter, from
the Constitution’s “exclusiv[e]” vesting of power over “foreign policy” in the federal government.
This statement is further evidence that at least a portion of the new test proposed in Garamendi is
constitutional, not merely statutory preemption.
The key to the threshold inquiry, of course, is how “areas of . . . traditional
competence” are defined. The Court offered only that they are to be “judged by standards of
traditional practice,”260 without identifying where those standards can be found. Given Justice
Souter’s opposition to tests looking to traditional state concerns in ascertaining the scope of
257

See supra part III.A. As discussed, we think the Court mis-described Justice Harlan’s opinion as an
endorsement of executive preemption and wrongly characterized Justice Douglas’ opinion in terms of statutory
preemption language, rather than as a constitutional exclusion.
258
Id.at 2389 n.11.
259
Id. at 2389.
260
123 S.Ct. at 2389.
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congressional power under the commerce clause, it is passing strange to see him invoke that very
concept in defining the line between state and federal power in foreign affairs.261 But, leaving aside
the odd position in which this places Justice Souter, one might suppose that commerce clause cases
such as Morrison and Lopez might offer at least some guidance.
It does seem, at a minimum, that despite Garamendi’s use of statutory preemption
language, Justice Souter’s reformulation of Zschernig suggested that some state legislation could be
invalidated whether or not any branch of the federal government had acted. The Court apparently
did not invoke that rule in Garamendi, since it concluded that preemptive effects could be imputed
to an articulated executive branch policy, but it did say that state action in foreign affairs outside
traditional state areas of competence might fail even in the absence of any conflict with the
executive. The discussion was heavily qualified and relegated to a footnote. And the Court further
confused the matter by using the term “field preemption” to describe this process – which, as we
have discussed, is a complete misnomer. Nonetheless, there is substantial evidence that the Court
gave dormant foreign affairs preemption an “extended lease on life” rather than the “burial” one
subsequent commentator thought it deserved.262
As a second step, if a state is regulating in accord with its traditional responsibilities,
the Court will use a conflict preemption analysis (with federal policy defined by the executive
branch). Here Souter said that the strength and the clarity required of the conflict will vary with the
strength of the state’s interest in regulating in a way that affects or touches on foreign policy matters.
Again, while the Court used the language of preemption, it apparently intended a somewhat distinct
approach. There is no parallel in the law of statutory preemption for what the Court proposed, which
is essentially a balancing test comparing the degree of conflict with the extent of the state’s
interest.263 But at least as the Court stated it, it appears that even a state regulation solidly within its
traditional responsibilities would be ousted by an unmistakable conflict with executive foreign
policy. That, in any event, seems to be the implication of roping the analysis to statutory conflict
preemption.
B.

Preserving Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption

The first problem with the Court’s test is identifying its threshold. How demanding
is the requirement that a state regulate only in its traditional area of interest? Apparently the HVIRA
was sufficiently within that area to invoke the balancing test. Souter wrote that when federal
executive authority is exercised “state law must give way where, as here, there is evidence of a clear
261

See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 652 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing “the
Court’s choice to invoke considerations of traditional state regulation in” cases addressing the scope of congressional
power under the commerce clause); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 609-10 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(same).
262
The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 226, 235 (2003).
263
The closest counterpart is probably Harold Maier’s balancing test interpretation of Zschernig,
although Maier made his proposal in the context of a dormant exclusion analysis rather than executive preemption.
See Maier, supra note 93, at 383-39. Maier proposed balancing the state interest versus federal interest, rather than
the state interest versus the degree of conflict.
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conflict between the policies adopted by the two.”264 Instead of beginning by inquiring into the
sufficiency of California’s regulatory interest, Souter jumped directly to his conclusion that the
HVIRA represented a conflict with presidential policy. Souter seemed initially to accept (at least
arguendo) that the HVIRA reflected an area of traditional state competence, though the opinion later
expressed some skepticism on this point.265
In other cases this might be a critical and difficult call. Consider, for example,
Zschernig itself. Since the executive branch in that case expressly disclaimed a conflicting federal
policy, under the Court’s new test the only question would be whether the state was regulating in an
area of traditional competence. Arguably, it was, since it was regulating inheritance – something that
has always been done at the state level.266 Justice Harlan in Zschernig (upon whom the Court relied
as an initial matter in creating the test) apparently thought that the regulation in Zschernig concerned
a matter of traditional local interest, despite its novelty and impact on foreign affairs.267 Of course,
the state was using its regulation of inheritance to insert itself to some extent into foreign affairs.
Under the new test, did that mean that it had stepped outside its traditional competence in a way that
was constitutionally excluded, or only in a way that triggered the balancing test in the event of a
conflict? It depends substantially on the level of generality at which one assesses the state activity,
something on which the Court provided no guidance. One would have thought that the Court would
at least explain whether its new test would cause its principal precedent to come out the other way,
but no explanation was made and we find ourselves unable to reach a conclusion on the matter.
Indeed the new formulation potentially broadens Zschernig. Gone is Zschernig’s
inquiry into the “direct” or “incidental” effects of state laws on foreign relations. Under Garamendi,
regardless of the level or existence of executive action, or the effect on the government’s ability to
conduct foreign affairs, if a state legislates outside its area of traditional competence, its law will be
struck down. In Zschernig, at least, states were permitted to argue that the impact of their law was
only “indirect” or “incidental.” The new exclusion is potentially categorical. Given the dramatic
implications of falling on the wrong side of the traditional/non-traditional state competence line, one
might expect the Court to have spent some time describing how that line was to be drawn, or what
factors should drive the inquiry.
Finally, while the Court endorsed Zschernig’s constitutional holding, and perhaps
even expanded it, it did not supply the constitutional analysis that Justice Douglas’s opinion lacked,
justifying such a rule in terms of text, history, or structure. 268 The Court offered little other than
tendentious rendering of prior cases in support of its conclusions.269 At best, the Court conflated
264

123 S.Ct. at 2390.
See infra Part III.A.
266
See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947).
267
See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 458-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (referring to the Oregon statute as
legislating within the state’s “area[ ] of traditional competence.”).
268
This is not to say that one could not be made. See generally Denning & McCall, The
Constitutionality of State and Local “Sanctions”, supra note 8, at 327 (arguing that a form of dormant preemption
derived from Zschernig would have invalidated the Massachusetts law in Crosby even absent federal action).
269
The common law constitutional interpretation aspect of Garamendi is analyzed infra Part IV.
265
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statutory and constitutional preemption: citing cases like Pink, Hines, and Crosby, on the one hand,
but reviving and applying Zschernig, which was decided on constitutional preemption grounds, yet
recharacterizing it as a statutory preemption case. At least, it has compounded the error of Zschernig
by endorsing the “dormant foreign affairs” doctrine as a restraint on states without any attempt to
justify its proscription in terms of text, history, or structure; and without furnishing any useful
guidelines for state governments or for lower courts to determine what is and is not permissible.
Opinions differ over the existence and scope of any structural restriction, but however the Court
decides the issue, surely it is not too much to ask that the Court not merely announce a rule of
constitutional preemption, but rather articulate reasons for the rule that at least acknowledge the
textual, historical, and structural arguments for and against it.
C.

The Balancing Test: Problems in Application

Once past the threshold, the Court’s test encounters two serious problems, reflected
in Garamendi itself. The first is the strength of the conflict required for preemption. Justice Souter
claimed that “the consistent Presidential foreign policy has been to encourage European governments
and companies to volunteer settlement funds in preference to litigation or coercive sanctions.”
California, he contended, has chosen to provide “regulatory sanctions to compel disclosure,
supplemented by a new cause of action for Holocaust survivors if the other sanctions should fail.”270
Unfortunately for the Court, the “new cause of action” was not at issue in the case, which
encompassed only the challenge to the disclosure provisions.271 The Court’s mention of the cause
of action suggested a lack of confidence in the clarity of the conflict between the disclosure
provisions and the executive policy. But this was more misdirection: surely the Court did not mean
to suggest that if California repealed the cause of action law, the HVIRA would become
constitutional.
The Court’s trouble was that, with respect to the HVIRA’s disclosure provision
standing alone, it had only the executive branch’s say-so as evidence of a conflict. As the dissent
pointed out, the executive agreements, even read broadly, related only to ending claims litigation
in U.S. court. The policy reflected in the agreements was that claims would be settled through
ICHEIC, not through litigation. The HVIRA, considered in isolation, had no relationship to that
policy – as the state pointed out, the HVIRA reflected no policy whatsoever as to where or how
claims should be settled: it just took the understandable position that claims would be easier to settle
in an atmosphere of full disclosure.272 It was a further step to say that the executive policy was that
disclosure should not be compelled – a step taken only in relatively informal (though pointed)
executive branch communications (and, of course, in the executive branch filings in the Garamendi
case itself). Yet even faced with only informal statements, the Court was hardly in a position to
dispute with the executive over the content of executive policy: the Court had to take at face value
270

123 S. Ct. at 2390-91 (emphasis added).
See id. at 2384 n.4 (“Challenges to [the cause of action] were dismissed by the District Court for lack
of standing, a ruling that was not appealed.”).
272
It is worth repeating that there was no necessary connection between the HVIRA and the cause of
action legislation. Insurance claimants wanted the disclosure provision, even without the cause of action, so that they
could make claims through ICHEIC, the voluntary settlement organization.
271
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the executive’s claims of conflict, or else engage in an independent evaluation of the needs of U.S.
foreign policy, an enterprise in which courts tend to doubt their own ability.
The second problem with the test is assessing the state’s interest. The Court
questioned whether the HVIRA actually represented legislation in a state’s area of traditional
competence, and in any event found the state’s interest wanting when weighed against the federal
government’s responsibility for foreign policy. If the conflict was not as clear as the majority found
it, the Court wrote, still “it would have to be resolved in the National Government’s favor, given the
weakness of the State’s interest, against the backdrop of traditional state legislative subject matter”
in enacting HVIRA’s disclosure requirements.273
California justified the HVIRA as, among other things, a consumer protection
measure alerting citizens to insurance companies that have failed to pay valid claims. It also justified
the measure as informational: permitting state citizens to know which insurance companies failed
to pay valid claims of Holocaust victims should they not want to do business with such firms. The
Court dismissed California’s stated purposes, claiming that the HVIRA’s limitation of the disclosure
requirements to Holocaust-era policies “raises great doubt that the purpose of the California law is
an evaluation of corporate reliability in contemporary insuring in the State,” without explaining
why.274
Instead, the Court held that “there is no serious doubt that the state interest actually
underlying the HVIRA is concern for the several thousand Holocaust survivors said to reside in the
State.” This, it turned out, was insufficient “[a]s against the responsibility of the United States of
America,” given that “only a small fraction of [survivors reside] in California.”275 No attempt was
made, however, to justify the conclusion that, when “judged by standards of traditional practice,”
California acted outside its area of “traditional competence” in requiring insurance companies to
disclose information about payment of Holocaust-era policies.276 States have traditionally assumed
273

123 S. Ct. at 2392.
Id.
275
Id. at 2393.
276
Further, in applying its test the Court never addressed whether the analytical framework developed
for dealing with legislative preemption—express versus implied preemption, obstacle and conflict forms of implied
preemption—applied, and if it does not, what should take its place, and why. When the Court discussed the “conflict
preemption” aspect of its new test, it offered little explanation of the terms it was using and little guidance for
prospective application. Since the Foundation Agreement disclaimed preemptive intent, the Court apparently
regarded this inquiry as a species of implied preemption. But the Court did not employ the usual vocabulary used in
its implied preemption cases that involve congressional legislation. Since one could comply with both the
Foundation Agreement and the HVIRA, it was not as the Court suggested a case of “clear conflict.” The Court had
to recharacterize the disclosure requirement as a “sanction” and link it to the cause of action not at issue in the case
even to suggest that California’s regulatory scheme presented a real “obstacle” to the achievement of executive
branch goals. The Court also never made it clear whether the HVIRA represented an area of traditional state
competence, and if it did not, what criteria were used, other than to suggest that whatever California’s interest, it was
not sufficient to outweigh that of the federal government. As noted above, this does not sound like statutory
preemption analysis at all, but rather more like the tests the Court has developed for the dormant commerce clause
doctrine. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.137, 142 (1970) (evaluating whether facially neutral
commercial regulations nevertheless offend the dormant commerce clause doctrine because the burdens on interstate
274
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responsibility for protecting insurance policyholders residing within their borders—a responsibility
Congress has recognized and endorsed, as discussed above.277 The real problem, it seemed, was that
the burden California imposed on the insurers was disproportionate to the state interest involved –
the HVIRA required an enormous volume of disclosure to aid a relatively small number of claimants.
But this comparison did not seem to be part of the Court’s test, at least not overtly.278
D.

Breard and Executive Preemption of Traditional State Functions

However one might apply the balancing test in close cases, the Court’s language
seemed to assume that at some level of conflict, any state law would give way to a presidential
foreign policy. That, at least, seems to be the natural conclusion from the Court’s use of the
terminology of statutory conflict preemption, and from its discussion of the President’s preeminence
in foreign affairs.279 An explicitly preemptive presidential foreign policy, then, would overcome a
state regulation even in an area of traditional competence. Particularly in a time of increasing
globalization, this reading concentrates immense power in the executive to oversee state activities.
As an example, consider the Court’s prior decision in Breard v. Greene.280 Breard,
a Paraguayan citizen, had been sentenced to death in Virginia state courts. At his arrest, and
throughout the prosecution, he was never informed of his right to contact the Paraguayan embassy
for assistance – a right guaranteed by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, to which the
United States is a party. Breard claimed this violation entitled him to a retrial, a claim that seemed
weak under U.S. law both because it had been procedurally defaulted and because Breard had a
difficult time showing prejudice from the failure. But in a parallel proceeding, Paraguay raised the
matter before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which requested (or, depending on one’s view,
ordered) the United States to stay Breard’s execution pending its hearing of the matter. The U.S.
executive branch then requested, on the basis of the ICJ order, that Virginia stay the execution;
Virginia refused, and the Court held that it lacked legal grounds to intervene. As the Court put it:
“Last night the [U.S.] Secretary of State sent a letter to the Governor of Virginia requesting that he
stay Breard’s execution. If the Governor wishes to wait for the decision of the ICJ, that is his
prerogative. But nothing in our existing case law allows us to make that choice for him.”281
Most of Breard’s arguments (and the subsequent academic discussion) focused on the
claim that the Vienna Convention and the treaty establishing the ICJ constituted supreme law binding
Virginia under Article VI. At the time, that seemed a correct analysis, since otherwise it was

commerce “clearly exceed” the “putative local benefits”); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851)
(holding that states are prohibited from regulating where national problem required uniform solution).
277
See supra Part III.C.
278
But see infra Part VII.
279
See Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. at 2389 n. 11 (where state regulates within its traditional competence in a
way that affects foreign affairs, preemption requires “a conflict of a clarity or substantiality that would vary with the
strength or the traditional importance of the state concern asserted.”).
280
523 U.S. 371 (1998)
281
Id. at 378. See id. at 373-75 (recounting the procedural history and the ICJ proceedings).
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difficult to locate another source of law superior to Virginia’s.282 To the extent Congress had spoken
on the matter, it had in general terms endorsed the idea that state procedural bars should be honored.
The executive’s position on the matter was somewhat equivocal, and in any event – consistent with
what we have argued above – no one seemed to think that executive branch policy standing alone
could displace state law.283
Breard seems to merit some reconsideration after Garamendi, which did not mention
it. To be sure, Virginia’s death penalty law, and its refusal to recognize Breard’s claimed right to
retrial, seem sufficiently within the state’s area of traditional competence to pass Garamendi’s
threshold test. But then matters become complicated. The conflict with federal policy was difficult
to assess, since the executive did not state its policy clearly, and (naturally enough) appeared to think
that it lacked the power to order Virginia to do anything about the matter. But the executive plainly
had a policy of respecting the ICJ’s request, and Virginia plainly took the opposing position. Even
in an area of traditional state competence, that might seem sufficient to point the Garamendi test
toward the federal interest. (One might further question the strength of the state’s interest in defying
the ICJ). But in any event, it seems that under Garamendi’s test the executive could override the
state by a sufficiently clear statement of policy, creating an irreconcilable conflict. In other words,
Garamendi appears to give the President the power to do what most everyone, including the
executive, assumed he did not have the power to do in Breard: direct a state to conform its laws and
actions to executive foreign policy.284
The potential implications reach well beyond Breard. It is a commonplace that in an
increasingly interconnected world even activities that appear purely local may have international
effects. In the context of the death penalty, for example, international interest has focused not merely
upon the treatment of defendants such as Breard, but also upon the treatment by the states of their
own citizens. Indeed, if recent briefs are to be believed, this has become of matter of some
282

See 523 U.S. at 375-76 (describing Breard’s arguments). For academic discussion, see Agora:
Breard, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 666 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist
Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529 (1999); Sanja Djajic, The Effect of International Court of Justice Decisions on
Municipal Courts in the United States: Breard v. Greene, 23 HASTINGS J. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27 (1999); Erik G.
Luna & Douglas J. Sylvester, Beyond Breard, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 147 (1999).
283
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States, wrote that “our federal system imposes limits
on the federal government’s ability to interfere with the criminal justice system of the states” and acknowledged
“Virginia’s right to go forward,” while requesting that it not do so. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The
Abiding Relevance of Federalism to U.S. Foreign Relations, 92 AMER. J. INT’L L. 675, 676 (1998) (discussing and
endorsing the executive’s position). See also Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require
Compliance with ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures, 92 AMER. J. INT’L L. 683 (1998) (arguing that because
compliance with the ICJ order was a treaty-based obligation of the United States, the executive could require the
state to comply with it). But see Frederic L. Kergis, Zschernig v. Miller and the Breard Matter, 92 AMER. J. INTL L.
704, 707 (1998) (arguing on the basis of Zschernig that Virginia’s action was unconstitutional because it “not only
denigrated the role of the International Court of Justice. . . but also ignored or subordinated foreign policy concerns
expressly pointed out to him by the Secretary of State.”).
284
In sum, Garamendi seems essentially to vindicate Professor Kergis’ position with respect to Breard.
See note 283 supra. Kergis’ view, of course, was much in the minority at the time, and flatly contrary to both the
executive branch’s position and the Supreme Court’s decision in Breard.

66

Published by Digital USD, 2004

67

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 6 [2004]

diplomatic inconvenience to the United States.285 The executive has, of course, not taken a position
against state applications of the death penalty in general. But would the executive have the power
to establish preemptive policies on the implementation of state death penalties, as a matter of the
conduct of foreign affairs? This seems an unlikely result (particularly given the make-up of the
current Court), but it is hard to see how the Garamendi opinion avoids it.
E.

Executive Preemption and the “Political Safeguards” of Federalism

At a fundamental level, as we discuss elsewhere, there is a tension between our
constitutional structure and claims by the executive branch of extensive independent lawmaking
power. While the Court has recognized some executive lawmaking in past cases, it has always been
careful to limit those cases to their facts. Such limiting language is gone in Garamendi and is
replaced only with citations to those prior, circumspect cases -- not, as one might expect, to a
thorough discussion of text, structure, or history demonstrating why previous Courts and prior
commentators were wrong to take it as a given that the President does not have broad lawmaking
powers, especially those that can displace or preempt state laws.
From a federalism perspective, however, it may not be obvious that the states are
worse off under the Garamendi system than they would be under an expansive view of Zschernig.
It may be that Garamendi in practice effectively replaces judicial preemption (under Zschernig) with
executive preemption (as in Garamendi). One might conclude that, whatever doctrinal
manipulations occurred, from the perspective of the states the Court’s new approach is an
improvement over Zschernig. After all, Zschernig, read broadly, might allow a court to strike down
all sorts of state activity that it (as a non-political branch with little expertise in foreign affairs) did
not like, whereas the new approach generally envisions action by at least one political branch (the
President) before state laws would be displaced. Moreover, the states can hardly complain that
federal foreign policy overrides state law, as that is the essence of the federal system reflected in the
Constitution; disputing that proposition is tantamount to calling for a return to the Articles. To be
sure, as we have discussed in the previous section, there is a substantial separation of powers
question as to which branch of the federal government sets preemptive federal foreign policy – but
at least on its face, that is not a matter of immediate concern to the states.
The truth of these statements, though, depends on the relative scope of Zschernig
preemption and the Court’s new executive policy preemption. The dormancy of Zschernig prior to
the Garamendi case, and the lower courts’ relatively narrow reading of it both in Garamendi and in
similar cases, suggested that as a practical matter courts were not inclined to read Zschernig broadly
whatever its language might say. As we discuss below, the creation of executive policy preemption
hands a potentially powerful weapon to a branch that is much more likely to wield it aggressively.
Moreover, as previous commentators have observed, it does matter to the states which branch of the
federal government sets preemptive federal policy, because one branch (the executive) operates
285

See Brief of the European Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, McCarver v. North
Carolina, No. 00-8727 (June 8, 2001); Brief of Morton Abramowitz et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
McCarver v. North Carolina, No 00-8727 (June 8, 2001).
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under substantially fewer constraints than the others. Finally, not only does Garamendi concentrate
power in the executive branch to the detriment of the states, it also may constrain Congress’ ability
to limit executive preemption. All of these matters add up to a serious undermining of federalism
protections, even if one is inclined to think that Zschernig itself contained some valuable insights.
1.

Disabling the Structural Protections of the States

It is an article of faith among critics of substantive federalism limits on Congress that
states’ interests are adequately secured in Congress through “political safeguards” offered by either
the formal institutions of national lawmaking in which states are represented286 or in informal
institutions like political parties that take account of state interests.287 Justice Souter himself
embraced this view in his Morrison dissent, where he emphasized “[p]olitics as the moderator of the
congressional employment of the commerce power.”288
Bradford Clark has argued that political safeguards enthusiasts should, therefore,
vigorously enforce textual and structural restrictions on national lawmaking power in order to ensure
that national lawmaking will displace state law only when the Constitution’s forms and formalities
are complied with.289 In his view, the Supreme Court’s enforcement of separation of powers
principles “preserve[s] federalism by making federal law more difficult to adopt, and by assigning
lawmaking power to actors subject to the political safeguards of federalism”; federal lawmaking
outside the constitutionally-recognized avenues “does not clearly fall within the terms of the
Supremacy Clause, and thus provides a questionable basis for displacing federal law.”290
286

See JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980); Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power
Vis-à-vis the State: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Herbert Wechsler, The
Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
287
See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000). On the differences between Wechsler and Choper on the one hand, and Kramer on the
other, see Bradford R. Clark, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 80. TEX. L.
REV 327, 327-28, 333-38 (2001) [hereinafter Clark, Safeguards].
288
529 U.S. 598, at 649 (Souter, J., dissenting). See id. at 647-51 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Framers intended for state interests to be safeguarded through the political processes). Justice Breyer, too,
stressed that the Court’s role should be limited to the monitoring of process. Id. at 662-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter did not join the portion of Justice Breyer’s opinion arguing for a judicial role in enforcing process
protections. Id. at 655 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
289
See Clark, Safeguards, supra note 287, at 333 (arguing that “[a]t a minimum, courts should enforce
the political safeguards by restricting ‘the supreme Law of the Land’ to measures adopted in accordance with the
precise lawmaking procedures prescribed by the Constitution”).
290
Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 1324. The supremacy clause, he noted, recognizes as
the supreme law that displaces state law only the Constitution, laws adopted pursuant to the Constitution, and
treaties. Only “lawmaking procedures governing the adoption of the ‘Constitution,’ ‘Laws,’ and ‘Treaties’ of the
United States,” he argues, “creat[e] ‘the supreme Law of the Land.’” Id. at 1324, 1326. Further, “the procedures
established by the Constitution make adoption of such laws more difficult by requiring the participation and assent of
multiple actors subject to the political safeguards of federalism—especially the Senate.” See also id. at 1330 (“‘the
ultimate procedural safeguard may be the procedural gauntlet that any legislative proposal must run and the
concomitant difficulty of overcoming legislative inertia’”) (quoting Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance,
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While Professor Clark looked at lawmaking by all three branches of government, his
comments on executive branch lawmaking and sole executive agreements are of particular relevance
here. As in our earlier discussion, he saw a rejection of executive lawmaking in the Steel Seizure
case: the Court demanded that the federal government use the Constitution’s prescribed lawmaking
procedures if it wished to seize the steel mills.291 Relatedly, he expressed concern over the use of
executive agreements. Since executive agreements allow Presidents to avoid the difficult supremacy
procedures of Article VI, Clark questioned whether these agreements—particularly sole executive
agreements that do not involve Congress—should preempt state law.292 If congressional-executive
agreements are a source of concern because they avoid the Senate’s supermajority requirement
designed to protect state interests, sole executive agreements also avoid Article I, Section 7’s
lawmaking requirements. While “these procedures render lawmaking more difficult than
congressional inaction . . . this difficulty was meant to protect . . . state governance prerogatives.”293
On our reading, Garamendi significantly eroded the protections Professor Clark
described. First, the opinion deprives states the protections of Article VI by adding to the list of legal
sources having preemptive effects. Further, encouraging independent executive branch lawmaking
removes essential safeguards by ensuring that law can be made by a political institution not as
subject to state pressure as Congress. By uncritically extending Belmont, Pink, and Dames & Moore,
the Court essentially amended Article VI to make “executive agreements” and, apparently, executive
policy more broadly, the supreme law of the land. Not only is this inconsistent with the omission
from Article VI of the “other agreements” mentioned in Article I, Section 10, it permits displacement
of state law without subjecting legislative actors to state pressure or otherwise allowing states to
make their views known. In fact, given that the executive agreement in question did not claim
preemptive intent, and the executive branch argued for preemption only after the litigation arose,294
states would not have even been on notice that they needed to resist displacement of state law at all.
While the President does have a national constituency, and depends on popularity in key states to
Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549 (2000)).
291
The Court, he argued, “has . . . invalidated attempts by the executive branch to engage in lawmaking
outside the constitutionally prescribed process.” Even Justice Jackson’s opinion concurring with the Court’s
invalidation of President Truman’s seizure of steel mills, widely regarded as a paradigm “functional” approach to
separation of powers questions, “confirms that Justice Jackson agreed with the Court’s essential premise that the
President possesses no independent lawmaking authority.” The decision, Clark argued, preserved federalism by
preventing displacement of state law permitting possession of steel mills by confiscatory federal law enacted by
presidential fiat. “The constitutional distinction between executive and legislative power recognized by both Jackson
and the Court ensures that the federal government cannot interfere with private rights unless it employs the
lawmaking procedures established by the Constitution.” Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 1393, 1400.
292
Id. at 1439.
293
Id. at 1444 (footnote omitted). Clark was particularly troubled by the Court’s holding in Dames &
Moore that congressional acquiescence authorized the President’s assignment of pending claims to a special tribunal,
though there was no statutory authority for that power. Placing on Congress the burden of disapproving executive
action, Clark wrote, “flips the burden of inertia established by federal lawmaking procedures. The absence of
congressional disapproval ordinarily does not authorize the President to alter important legal rights, even if necessary
to implement a sole executive agreement.”Id. at 1450. He offered the tentative opinion that Dames & Moore was
“limited to its facts” and “lack[ed] significant generative force.” Id. at 1451.
294
See supra Part I.B.
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stay in power, it was, as Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 68 an “important desideratum . . . that the
executive should be independent in his continuance in office on all but the people themselves” lest
he “be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the
duration of his official consequence.”295 In other words, the presidency is an office with a national
constituency, one—by design—less likely to take account of individual states’ interests.296 While
some might argue that this is normatively desirable, there is little doubt that judicial attribution of
preemptive effect to such policy statements reduce the ability of states to have their interests taken
into account prior to having their policies displaced by federal law.
Assuming the political safeguards argument embraced in Morrison by Justice Souter
was not simply a makeweight, and that there are “safeguards” in the “political safeguards” approach,
it is surprising that the majority was indifferent to the ways in which its endorsement of executive
preemption in Garamendi eroded or disabled any protections that political institutions furnish states.
While one may differ with Professor Clark on the desirability of relying largely on political
safeguards to protect federalism,297 focusing first on the process safeguards endangered by
Garamendi should furnish common ground on which those who favor vigorous judicial review to
protect state interests and those who do not can gather to criticize the decision.
2.

New Limitations on Congress’ Ability to Protect the States?

Not only does Garamendi empower the President to displace state law unilaterally
and without the participation of Congress, its treatment of congressional acts suggests that the Court
applied to Congress what Professors Eskridge and Frickey have termed a “super-strong clear
statement rule.”298 Making it more difficult for Congress to act further insulates the President from
even an attentive Congress and imposes additional burdens on states seeking legislative protections
for its actions.
In 1992, Eskridge and Frickey identified a “super-strong” rule against curbing
executive power. In Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society, the Court found the
Commerce Department had not violated congressional statutes when it failed to certify that Japan’s
295

THE FEDERALIST, supra note 52, No. 68, at 413 (Hamilton).
Professor Powell argues that this makes the President particularly well-suited to make foreign policy.
H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 527 (1999).
297
See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism
Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2001) (concluding that “the theory of the political safeguards of federalism
remains fundamentally mistaken” and that Clark’s attempt to rehabilitate it “is rather akin to reinforcing the walls of
a sand castle as the tide turns”).
298
Clear statement rules “require a ‘clear statement’ on the face of the statute to rebut a policy
presumption that the Court has created”; a “super-strong clear statement rule” requires “a clearer, more explicit
statement from Congress in the text of the statute, without reference to the legislative history, that prior clear
statement rules have required.” William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 595 n.4, 597 (1992). A “presumption” about
different policies that the Court has made can, on the other hand, be overcome “by persuasive arguments that the
statutory text, legislative history, or purpose is inconsistent with the presumption.” Id. at 595 n4.
296
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whaling practices violated international agreements, contrary to the congressional enactments’ plain
language.299 According to Eskridge and Frickey, Japan Whaling potentially created “a super-strong
clear statement rule requiring the statutory clear statement to target the specific issue unmistakeably”
in order to “protect[] presidential discretion in foreign affairs matters.”300
After Garamendi, what Eskridge and Frickey tentatively characterized as a only a
possible transformation is arguably complete. To ensure that the McCarran Act permits California
to pass a law like HVIRA, Congress will apparently have to amend it clearly specifying that it
applies in cases with foreign affairs overtones and even in the face of contrary presidential policies.
Similarly, the Holocaust Commission Act would require an unmistakably clear statement that
Congress recognizes that states are compiling the insurance information in question and that such
collection efforts (including the use of penalties to motivate recalcitrant insurance companies) should
continue regardless of the future actions of the executive branch.
Though it was not explicit, the Court’s disregard of both statutes apparently stemmed
from its reluctance to countenance interference with what it concluded was the President’s premier
role in “foreign affairs,” which the Court did not define, but which it repeatedly contrasted with
congressional responsibilities for “foreign commerce” and “domestic commerce.”301 Japan Whaling
at least evinced concern about congressional interference with an enumerated presidential power,
the power to negotiate agreements with foreign governments.302 Likewise, as we stressed elsewhere,
Dames & Moore took pains to emphasize the limited nature of the presidential power it authorized,
disclaimed any intent to pass on the question of a general presidential power to settle claims, and
suggested that though not expressly authorized, the transfer of the claims out of U.S. courts was at
least similar to remedies Congress had prescribed in the past and to which Congress had not
objected.303 Garamendi, by contrast, claimed the potentially broad universe of “foreign affairs” or
“foreign policy” for the President. It is also a considerable stretch to even imply that a wide-ranging
independent lawmaking power with broad preemptive effect is a “traditional” presidential power,
since the Court itself denied that it was as recently as 1981. Not only does this empower the
President at the expense of Congress, it also harms federalism interests by making it difficult for
Congress to come to the states’ defense.

299

478 U.S. 221, 231-41(1986).
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 298, at 617
301
See, e.g., 123 S. Ct. at 2394 (contrasting McCarran-Ferguson Act’s concern with “implied
preemption by domestic commerce legislation” with “preemption by executive conduct in foreign affairs”); id.
(stating that Holocaust Commission Act “can hardly be read to condone state sanctions [sic] interfering with federal
efforts to resolve such claims”); see also id. at 2391 n.12 (explaining that Barclays did not apply because it dealt
with Congress’s power over foreign commerce, as opposed to “the field of foreign policy” in which the President has
“the lead role”); id. at 2392 n.14 (recharacterizing Crosby as a decision involving the President’s “independent
constitutional authority to act on behalf of the United States on international issues”).
302
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 298, at 617 (“What seemed to move the Court was the argument that
the President needed flexibility not to certify so that he could negotiate a bilateral agreement with Japan on this
matter.”).
303
See supra Part IV.E.
300

71

https://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art6

72

Denning and Ramsey:

VI. Garamendi and the Perils of Common Law Constitutional Interpretation
There is a final troubling aspect to the Garamendi decision. Despite the recent
appearance of a number of detailed and sophisticated scholarly treatments of foreign affairs
questions, the Court seemed sublimely indifferent to those studies and their conclusions. In contrast
to many of its other recent decisions involving federalism and the scope of governmental powers,304
the Court ignored the usual interpretive trinity of “text, history, and structure”305 in resolving the
issues before it. Other than a glancing reference to custom, and three citations to The Federalist,306
the Court purported to build the case for Garamendi on its past decisions. This approach, so-called
“common law constitutional interpretation,” is a common feature of foreign affairs law cases. In this
final section, we argue that Garamendi is a good illustration of its dangers; specifically, that it does
not easily restrain judicial decisionmaking, and may be worse on that score than interpretive methods
that use text, history, and structure at least as aids to doctrinal modes of interpretation. In particular,
it lends itself to use as rhetorical cover for decisions reached on other grounds.
A. The Case for Common Law Constitutional Interpretation
Though earlier scholars noted that a good deal of constitutional law is made by the
Supreme Court through the evolution of case law,307 David Strauss recently offered a detailed
defense of common law constitutional interpretation, which we summarize here, and take as a
standard statement of that mode of interpretation. Strauss argued that common law interpretation
is the best descriptive theory of contemporary constitutional interpretation as practiced by the

304

See, e.g., United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S.
779 (1996); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
Even Lopez, in which the Court synthesized over 100 years of doctrine, invoked “first principles” of constitutional
structure—enumerated powers and federalism in particular—to inform that synthesis. In addition, the dormant
commerce clause doctrine, which Henry Monaghan characterized as being “constitutional common law,” has been
defended throughout its history as a principle consistent with the intentions and expectations of the Framers and
ratifiers of the Constitution. E.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1997); H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-35 (1949).
305
See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 905 (lacking explicit textual provision on point, answer to constitutional
question depends upon “historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the
[Court’s] jurisprudence”); id. at 939 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (invoking text, history, and structure in dissent); Lopez,
514 U.S. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring) (supplementing Court’s doctrinal discussion with “a discussion of the text,
structure, and history of the Commerce Clause and an analysis of our early case law”); see also U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (relying on text, history, structure, and precedent to strike down state term
limits on federal officials).
306
See 123 S. Ct. at 2386, 2387.
307
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001); K.N. Lewellyn, The
Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974
Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
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Supreme Court,308 and further that a common law approach is normatively superior to modes of
interpretation based around the text of the Constitution or the intentions of its framers and ratifiers.309
First, Strauss argued, common law constitutional interpretation permits current
generations to escape the “dead hand” of the past by updating and translating textual provisions. The
common law method can promote the evolution of the law by encouraging analogical reasoning from
precedent that enables the law to evolve, providing a counterweight to troublesome textual
provisions or anachronistic traditions that might otherwise cause a constitutional regime to
degrade.310 Strauss argued that the common law method can ensure that the Constitution is
meaningfully “implemented” without holding the current polity hostage to traditions and textual
interpretations incommensurate with majoritarian values; and, at the same time, restrain judges who
might otherwise simply project their personal values through their judicial decisions. Indeed, he
suggested that common law constitutionalism is more democratic than other interpretive
methodologies because “the principles developed through [it] are not likely to say out of line for long
with views that are widely and durably held in the society.”311
Second, in Strauss’ account, common law constitutional interpretation constrains
judicial power by forcing change to take place within parameters of prior cases. Though the common
law method allows courts to implement the substantive guarantees of the document in a way that is
of use to both policymakers and judges by translating and updating sometimes vague textual
provisions into judicial standards, judges are not free to do as they wish. Rather, common law
308

Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 13, at 879 (“The common law
approach . . . provides a far better account of our practices” than either textualism or originalism and “best explains .
. . American constitutional law today); id. at 885 (“[O]ur written constitution has, by now, become part of an
evolutionary common law system, and the common law—rather than any model based on the interpretation of
codified law—provides the best way to understand the practices of American constitutional law.”) (footnote
omitted); id. at 887 (“Constitutional law in the United States today represents a flowering of the common law
tradition and an implicit rejection of any command theory [based on text or the intent of the Framers]”.); id. at 888
(“The common law approach captures the central features of our practices as a descriptive matter.”); id. at 904 (“In
practice, constitutional law is, mostly, common law. What matters to most constitutional debates, in and out of
courts, is the doctrine the courts have created, not the text.”) (footnote omitted); see David A. Strauss, Common Law,
Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1726 (2003) (“While arguments based on a careful
parsing of the text of the Constitution sometimes play a large role in resolving relatively unimportant issues, the text
plays essentially no role in deciding the most controversial constitutional questions . . . which are resolved on the
basis of principles derived primarily from the cases.”) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground]; but see
id. at 1719 (noting that while “[m]uch of American constitutional law consists of precedents that have evolved in a
common-law-like way, with a logic of their own” it “would be a mistake to say that American constitutional law
consists entirely of precedents and is independent of the text and the Framers”; both “continue to play a significant
role”).
309
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 13, at 888 (“[T]he common law
provides the best model for both understanding and justifying how we interpret the Constitution. The common law
approach . . . justifies our current practices, in reflective equilibrium, to anyone who considers our current practices
to be generally acceptable . . . .”); see also Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, supra note __, at 1720 (noting
that precedent can provide a common ground for discussion of issues among those with widely varying belief
systems, especially if rooted in a text commonly regarded as authoritative).
310
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 79-81 (1996).
311
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 13, at 929.
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constitutional interpretation restrains judges by forcing them to take account of prior cases
interpreting those provisions and to justify present decisions in terms of those decisions rendered in
the past.312 Strauss in fact argued that the common law approach restrains judges better than either
textualism or originalism, the principal competing interpretive paradigms: “The text of the Due
Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses, taken alone without reference to the precedents
interpreting them, could justify a thorough overhaul of the criminal justice system.”313
Strauss acknowledged two potential objections: that common law constitutional
interpretation does not sufficiently restrain judges; and that “a theory of common law constitutional
interpretation overlooks the crucial difference that common law judges can be overruled by the
legislature but judges interpreting a constitution ordinarily cannot.”314 On the first point, Strauss
responded that when a judge works within the constraints of existing precedent (as opposed to
feeling free to ignore stare decisis and reason from first principles) the judge “is significantly limited
in what she can do” whereas “a judge who acknowledges only the text of the Constitution as a limit
can . . . go to town” because of textual indeterminacy. The text functions as a limit, he writes, only
“if one assumes a background of highly developed precedent.” While conceding that “precedents
can be treated disingenuously,” he pointed out that “no system is immune from abuse” and offered
that fear of criticism can remove the temptation of judges to overreach when applying precedent.315
As for fears about the insufficient democratic checks on common law constitutional
interpretation, Strauss argued that the “principles developed through the common law
method”—examples of which he listed—“are not likely to stay out of line for long with views that
are widely and durably held in the society,” and the Court’s decisions “now rest on a broad
democratic consensus,” despite being controversial at the time initial decisions were handed down.316
As a result, he argued, the common law method actually suffers from less of a democracy-gap than
does textualism or intentionalism, since the latter methods subject present generations to the past’s
dreaded dead hand.317
Strauss’ claims, and the idea of constitutional common law more broadly, may appear
to have particular resonance in foreign affairs. Many commentators have observed that foreign
affairs adjudication frequently owes little to text, structure and history, and Strauss himself used
foreign affairs doctrines to illustrate his points. Moreover, Garamendi may seem to continue that
pattern, being (as we have argued) largely disconnected from textual, structural and historical
considerations.
In the ensuing sections we assess the idea of common law constitutionalism through
the prism of Garamendi. First, we argue that though foreign affairs law often gives the appearance
312

Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, supra note 308, at 1724 (“In a common law system,
precedents from earlier eras bind to a degree.”).
313
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 13, at 926-27.
314
Id. at 925.
315
Id. at 926.
316
Id. at 929-930.
317
Id. at 928.
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of having developed largely along the common law constitutional interpretation model, and that
Garamendi continued that appearance, it is doubtful that it truly conforms to a “common law
constitutional interpretation” methodology. It is not the case that Garamendi proceeded from
reasoned elaboration of prior decisions. Whether Strauss would consider it an exemplar of his
method is unclear. The lack of a suitable definition that would cover foreign affairs law cases,
moreover, calls into question the sufficiency of Strauss’s responses to the two objections described
above and illustrates the peril, not the promise, of adopting Strauss’s method as the primary mode
of constitutional decisionmaking.
B.

Is Foreign Affairs Law “Constitutional Common Law”?

One might suppose that foreign affairs law has developed in the Supreme Court
largely through what Philip Bobbitt called the “doctrinal modality.” As Bobbitt noted, this modality
not only involves the elaboration of judicial doctrine, but also the invocation of what might be
termed “custom and usage” by other branches to support particular judicial decisions.318 Two
examples of “principles developed essentially by common law methods” that Strauss mentioned
involve foreign affairs law: broad federal power and “expansive presidential power, particularly in
foreign affairs . . . .” Such principles, he claimed, were neither “rooted in original intent” nor have
“particularly strong textual roots” but rather evolved as “doctrine [developed] in response to the
perceived . . . needs of society.” Though once “highly controversial,” Strauss maintained that these
doctrinal principles “now rest on a broad democratic consensus.”319
A survey of the canonical foreign affairs law cases bears out at least some of Strauss’s
observations. Cases such as Belmont, Pink, Zschernig, and Dames & Moore, along with the famous
concurrences in Youngstown, though decided by different courts over a half-century, are all common
law opinions — or at least none is rooted in original intent nor anchored to particularly strong textual
provisions. None of them contained lengthy forays into original intent to support confident
statements of what the Framers intended vis-à-vis state participation in foreign affairs or about who
plays the lead role in the formation of foreign policy. The Court barely mentioned, much less closely
parsed constitutional text or structure. Justice Jackson’s opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
famously despaired of resolving disputes regarding presidential power by relying on what the text

318

PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 39-58 (1982) (discussing
the doctrinal modality). See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Constitutional “Incidents”:
Interpretation in Real Time, 70 TENN. L. REV. 281 (2003) (suggesting that close study of the acts of non-judicial
branch participants in government can furnish data for ascertaining the state of particular areas of constitutional law
in which the Supreme Court has not or will not issue authoritative decisions).
319
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 13, at 929-930. We are not sure
what Strauss means by “expansive presidential power . . . in foreign affairs.” At least one of us would raise
substantial objections to the claim that a fair portion of presidential foreign affairs power cannot be located in the
text of the Constitution. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9. By the same token, we are not sure to what extent
presidential foreign affairs power – if read broadly to include matters such as independent war power – is either the
product of judicial doctrine or rests upon substantial consensus.
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says or what the Framers intended,320 choosing to defer to practice and what Michael Reisman has
called the “operational code” by which Presidents exercise power.321
To note a few additional examples, Justice Douglas’s opinion in Zschernig did not
cite any history or constitutional text, or make a careful structural argument; it relied principally on
two cases, Clark v. Allen and Hines v. Davidowitz – one of which it distinguished.322 Belmont, which
established the proposition that the President alone may enter into binding executive agreements with
preemptive effects, also had little to say about text, structure and history, instead relying on prior
decisions in Curtiss-Wright and B. Altman & Co. v. United States.323 In what was, before
Garamendi, the Court’s last word on presidential power to settle claims, Dames & Moore v. Regan,
the Court relied almost exclusively on Curtiss-Wright and on the analytical framework developed
by Justice Jackson in his Youngstown opinion.324 In addition, the Court cited the “longstanding
practice of settling claims by executive agreement without the advice and consent of the Senate.”325
There was only the barest nod to the intent of the Framers or the text of the Constitution, but a frank
acknowledgment of the tension between “executive authority in a world that presents each day some
new challenge with which [the president] must deal and the Constitution . . . which no one disputes
embodies some sort of system of checks and balances.”326
Even Curtiss-Wright, the ur-text for foreign affairs nationalists and presidentialists,
for all of its dubious appeals to history, derived primarily from Justice Sutherland’s distinction
320

Id.

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634-35 (Jackson, J., concurring).
A judge
may be surprised at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority
applicable to concrete problems of executive power as they actually present themselves. Just what
our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, must
be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret
for Pharaoh. A century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result
but only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources on each side of any question.
They largely cancel each other. And court decisions are indecisive because of the judicial practice
of dealing with the largest questions in the most narrow way.
321

Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure
liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins
upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but
fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”). See W. Michael Reisman, War
Powers: The Operational Code of Competence, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 777 (1989) (suggesting that extra-constitutional
factors have influenced the allocation of war-making powers more than the original constitutional scheme). But see
Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1521 (2002) (outlining a theory of war powers
based on the original meaning of the Constitution’s text and roughly corresponding to the modern allocation).
322
389 U.S. at 432 (citing Hines); id. at 432-33 (distinguishing Clark v. Allen).
323
Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331; B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
324
453 U.S. 654, 661-62 (1982).
325
Id. at 679 n.8 (footnote omitted).
326
Id. at 659-60, 662. The Court tried to leaven the tension between the two in Dames & Moore by
stressing the limited nature of its decision—language ignored in Garamendi. See id. at 660 (emphasizing the
“necessity to rest the decision on the narrowest possible ground capable of deciding the case”); id. at 661 (“We
attempt to lay down no general ‘guidelines’ covering other situations not involved here, and attempt to confine the
opinion only to the very questions necessary to the decision of the case.”).
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between “internal” and “external” governmental power, which was necessary to reconcile the Court’s
limitation on congressional delegation of power to the President to serve as a domestic economic
caretaker, and the reality that the President needed latitude to conduct foreign policy in its name
since the United States had emerged as an important actor on the world scene.327
To be sure, none of these opinions relied much upon the Constitution’s text, structure
and history. We are less confident, however, that they are properly classified as constitutional
common law. By defining common law constitutional interpretation largely by what it does not rely
on – the Constitution’s text or the intention of its framers – Strauss lacked a positive account of what
it should be, other than to say that future principles are derived, in some part, from past cases. His
primary article on the subject repeatedly referred to the “common law tradition” without fully
defining it,328 other than to say that its components are “traditionalism” and “innovation,” as well as
“conventionalism.”329 A more recent article contained a few more hints – a common law system has
“elaborate doctrinal structure” – but again devoted more space to justifying it in either descriptive
or normative terms.330 For Strauss’s theory to have any purchase, as a normative matter, he would
seem to need some account of the qualities of common law constitutional interpretation, lest its open
outputs be seen merely result-oriented decisions masked by rhetorical adherence to past decisions.331
Elaborating a theory of common law decisionmaking would take us far afield indeed.
But its idealized form – “a doctrine of precedent in which a proposition descriptive of the first case
is made into a rule of law and then applied to a next similar situation”332 – seems absent in many of
the cases described above. The Court’s foreign affairs cases simply do not involve close readings
of prior cases and applications of the existing rules and doctrines to new facts. Rather, the Court’s
citation to prior cases seems more rhetorical than principled. For example, Zschernig relied
principally on Hines, and distinguished Clark v. Allen. But the Court cited Hines for the proposition
that state law conflicting with federal “foreign relations” must give way.333 The problem, of course,
327
299 U.S. at 316-20 (asserting that states never had powers to conduct foreign relations; that such
powers passed directly from Great Britain to the new United States; that those powers were not dependent upon
enumeration in the Constitution; and that the President was the preeminent actor in foreign relations). For criticism
of Sutherland’s history, see CHARLES A. LOFGREN, “GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND CHOICE”:
CONSTITUTIONAL ESSAYS ON WAR, FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND FEDERALISM 167-205 (1986); Ramsey, Myth,
supra note 10, at 395-437. See also G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign
Affairs, 85 VA. L. REV. 1 (1999) (describing the emergence of a new constitutional regime in foreign affairs centered
around Curtiss-Wright).
328
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 13, passim.
329
Id. at 891-97, 906-13. Strauss defines “conventionalism” as “a generalization of the notion that it is
more important that some things be settled than they be settled right.” Id. at 907.
330
Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, supra note 308, at 1729. See, e.g., id. (describing the
common law approach as “central to many of the most important areas of constitutional law”); id. at 1730 (arguing
that “[t]he practice of following precedent can be justified in fully functional terms” and is “unavoidable”).
331
BOBBITT, supra note 318, at 57 (“Doctrinal ideology requires that decisions be based on premises of
general applicability, otherwise they would be ad hoc or ‘legislative.’ At the same time the doctrinal method
requires that adjudications be neutral, thereby claiming the allegiance of litigants through a tacit arrangement of
reciprocity. In short, doctrinal argument is the ideology of the common law tradition of deciding appeals.”).
332
EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (1949) (1972 ed.).
333
Id. at 441.
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was that in Hines, Congress had acted; Hines was a statutory preemption case, as its opinion made
clear. Clark v. Allen, where Congress had not acted, was much more closely on point. Nevertheless,
Douglas seized upon statements in Hines about federal primacy in foreign affairs cases, and ignored
other language qualifying those statements.334
Similarly, neither of Belmont’s principal authorities had much to do with the question
that case faced. Though the agreement in Belmont was not a treaty, the Court cited Curtiss-Wright
for the proposition that “the same rule [preempting conflicting state laws] would result in the case
of all international compacts and agreements” because “complete power over international affairs
is in the national government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on
the part of the several states.”335 Whether or not that was true, Congress had endorsed the
President’s action in Curtiss-Wright, and the case had nothing to do with executive agreements or
preemption of state law. That was also true of Altman, Belmont’s other principal citation, which
involved a congressional-executive agreement.336 (As in Garamendi, it is interesting to see how
discussions of federal power in Belmont are conflated with the preemptive effects of presidential
power, unaided by congressional authorization, for which easily distinguished cases are cited.)337
It is hard to believe that the Court’s decisions in these cases arose from guidance found in the
previous opinions.
Instead, many of the cases seem less driven by doctrine than by prudence, with which
doctrinal arguments are often confused.338 Prudentialists believe that circumstances can dictate
ignoring “even the plainest constitutional limitations”: prudential judges have through their
decisions, Bobbitt argues, converted this belief into a “legitimate, legal argument, fit[ ] it into
opinions, and use[d] it as the purpose for doctrines . . . .”339 By invoking—or failing to
invoke—precedent (even precedent of dubious relevance) as a shortcut, the Court can avoid many
of the constitutional questions that we have raised here: whether there is a textual, structural, or
historical basis for a rule of constitutional preemption like that established in Zschernig, for example;
or whether making presidential executive orders with preemptive effects is consistent either with the
language of Article VI or with long-held notions of separation of powers. But it seems disingenuous
to think that precedent constrained these decisions in any way.

334

Hines, 350 U.S. at 497 (“the decision in this case does not affect the right of States to enforce their
sedition laws at times when the Federal government has not occupied the field . . . .”).
335
Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331.
336
B. Altman simply concluded that a congressionally-authorized executive agreement was a “treaty” for
purposes of a statute providing for direct appeal of certain cases to the Supreme Court. B. Altman & Co., 224 U.S. at
597 (“If not technically a treaty requiring ratification, nevertheless it was a compact authorized by the Congress of
the United States, negotiated and proclaimed under the authority of its President. We think such a compact is a
treaty under the circuit court of appeals act, and, where its construction is directly involved . . . there is a right of
review by direct appeal to this court.”). No party in the case seemed to be contesting the constitutionality of the
president’s actions.
337
See Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra note 107, at 145-154.
338
BOBBITT, supra note 318, at 60. Bobbitt defines a prudential argument as a “constitutional argument
which is actuated by the political and economic circumstances surrounding the decision.” Id. at 61.
339
Id.
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C.

Foreign Affairs Law and the Pitfalls of Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation

The role that prudence – as opposed to the pure analogical reasoning at the heart of
a common law model – often plays in foreign affairs decisions, renders us doubtful of the safeguards
that Strauss finds inherent in his theory. Garamendi illustrates the dangers of using a looselydenominated common law method to resolve constitutional questions, unaided by text, history, and
structure.
All of the cases discussed above are cited in Garamendi for their various
propositions—that Presidents have inherent powers to settle claims, that settlements can be made
through executive agreement, that those agreements preempt contrary state law. The Court seemed
uninterested in the textual, structural or historical arguments that might shed light on the questions
the case presented. Garamendi thus is, in some sense, the apotheosis of the common law method
in foreign affairs law as described by Strauss. Yet, as an example of common law constitutional
interpretation, Garamendi raises questions about this method, and especially about Strauss’s claims
that common law constitutional interpretation may restrain judges better than text- or intent-based
methods. As in prior foreign affairs cases, the Court was not constrained by, or indeed even guided
by, its precedents. In citing prior cases, the Garamendi Court elided or ignored language from those
opinions limiting their scope, and failed to meaningfully discuss differences in fact situations that
strongly suggested the earlier cases’ inapplicability to the Court’s discussion of the HVIRA; all this
suggests that something else was driving the Court’s decision.
Consider the following examples:
(A)

Though Hines v. Davidowitz expressly denied any intention to address the
constitutionality of state laws in the absence of congressional action,340 Justice
Douglas’s Zschernig opinion cited it for precisely that proposition: that even absent
congressional action, federal supremacy in foreign affairs could constitutionally
preempt state law.341 Garamendi then recharacterized Zschernig as laying down rules
of preemption relevant to the question whether the President’s policy regarding
Holocaust litigation preempted HVIRA, even though in Zschernig there was no
conflicting executive branch policy. Garamendi then cited and relied on the parallel
with Crosby, even though Crosby, like Hines, was a statutory preemption case.

(B)

Garamendi failed to distinguish Barclays persuasively, suggesting that the Court’s
decision not to apply relevant precedent is as questionable as its choice of the cases
it found to be controlling. As discussed, Barclays was the only case prior to
Garamendi where the Court had considered a claim of preemptive effect of an
executive policy standing alone (and had rejected it).342

340

312 U.S. at 62-64.
389 U.S. at 432; see supra Part III.B.
342
See supra Part I.B.

341
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(C)

In Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Court stressed the limited reach of its decision, and
disclaimed an intent to establish the broad proposition that the President can settle
its citizens’ claims by executive agreement. Garamendi did not quote, or even
acknowledge, that limiting language, while citing Dames & Moore as one of a
number of cases allegedly standing for the proposition that “our cases have
recognized that the President has authority to make ‘executive agreements’ with other
countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate or approval by Congress, this power
having been exercised since the early years of the Republic.”343

(D)

Garamendi cited Belmont and Pink as establishing the preemptive effects of
executive agreements. The Court passed over the fact that the executive agreement
in those cases expressed preemptive intent while the Foundation Agreement—which
in any event was addressed solely to the issue of litigation of Holocaust-era claims—
expressly disclaimed any such preemptive effects.344

(E)

In Youngstown and Dames & Moore, the Court focused upon finding express or even
implied statutory authority for presidential actions with domestic effects. The
Garamendi Court made no effort to find congressional approval of presidential
actions, yet cited both cases as authorizing the President’s actions.345

While Strauss’ work conceded that precedents can be treated disingenuously, he
apparently thought that would be the unusual case, without explaining why. If one takes seriously
the second part of his argument—that common law constitutional interpretation produces more
“democratic” results—it suggests a built-in incentive to continuously expand precedent to authorize
more action, to “gradual[ly] innovat[e] in the hope of improvement” through “sharp, critical
challenges” to the past while piously claiming only to apply principles developed in the past.346
It is not clear that fear of criticism is much of a deterrent to over-reading prior cases,
at least by Supreme Court justices.347 Academic criticism might not be particularly effective for the
simple reason that unless someone takes the trouble to read the cases cited by the Court, the factual
differentiations, limiting language, and qualifications are not apparent from the simple citation
offered in cases like Garamendi. Common law constitutional interpretation is gradual and
evolutionary, sometimes—like the frog in water scalded to death through imperceptible, but
cumulative increases in water temperature—perniciously so. It seems insufficient in evaluating it
to respond to the elastic nature of precedent by noting that any system can be abused. That is true,
343

123 S. Ct. at 2386-87.
See supra Paet III.B.
345
See 123 S. Ct. at 2386 (citing Youngstown for the proposition that President has large responsibility
for conduct of external affairs and that President has some independent authority to act in the absence of
congressional action); 2386-87 (citing Dames & Moore for the proposition that President can make executive
agreements, including agreements to settle claims, without congressional authority).
346
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 13, at 935.
347
Lower courts that disingenuously treat controlling precedent are subject to being overruled.
344
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but claims about what the Court’s cases authorize can lack transparency and be difficult for casual
readers (even those with a professional interest) to verify. This means that claims made by courts
employing common law constitutional interpretation may be (at least) no easier to verify than those
made by a Court regarding what the text of the Constitution say or requires, or what inferences can
be made from its structure, or even claims about what the Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution
intended.
Moreover, common law constitutional interpretation sits uneasily beside a written
Constitution whose provisions were intended to limit power, and that furnishes an explicit method
for its amendment should those provisions prove outmoded or unworkable. Interpretation and
doctrinal evolution are an inevitable part of what Richard Fallon calls constitutional
“implementation,”348 but unless one accepts a particularly strong version of judicial supremacy
essentially equating the Constitution with what the Supreme Court has said about it,349 Article VI
makes the document—not the Court’s gloss on it—supreme.350 To the extent the Court claims
legitimacy from the document, it seems difficult to embrace a methodology in which the document
itself is largely absent.
Strauss’s further claim, that his common law constitutional interpretation is more
“democratic” than other methodologies because the principles now enshrined in the Court’s
“common law Constitution” have attained broad popular support, could be seen as a backstop to the
common law method-as-restraint argument. Even if the common law method does not effectively
restrain judges, he seems to say, it does not matter because the principles adopted through common
law constitutional interpretation either reflect or soon will reflect the dominant public opinion on a
particular issue. This, too, seems a weak defense against objections that it either provides no
restraint or that common law development is a bad model for constitutional decionmaking because
of the lack of a legislative override, other than through constitutional amendment.
First, Strauss’s argument presumes the ability accurately to measure popular approval
or disapproval of particular lines of doctrine. Perhaps this is easily done when it comes to highprofile issues like abortion, free speech, or sex discrimination. Some of the other principles that
have emerged through the common law method that Strauss cites -- expansion of presidential power,
for example -- no doubt command considerably less public attention, making it more difficult to
gauge accurately whether the public at large approves or disapproves of particular doctrinal
evolutions.351 We suggest that many of the issues discussed in this article—though of profound
importance to the way the government conducts foreign affairs—would barely register even with
348

See FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 307.
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (declaring “the basic principle that the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution”); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997).
350
For this reason some constitutional scholars have suggested reliance on stare decisis is itself
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
23 (1994).
351
That is particularly true when one recognizes that the most visible manifestation of presidential
power in foreign affairs, presidential war power, has not arisen principally from judicial doctrine.
349
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constitutional law specialists, much less with the undifferentiated public on which Strauss depends
to legitimate the Court’s common law constitutional decisions.352
Moreover, there is a chicken-and-egg problem with Strauss’s defense. Are the
components of our common law Constitution now accepted without question because people actually
approve of the results, or do people register approval of the results because those results have
received the Court’s imprimatur? In 1960, Charles Black wrote of the “legitimating function” of
judicial review, which he defined as “an affirmative function vital to the government of limited
powers—the function of keeping up a satisfactorily high public feeling that the government has
obeyed the law of its own Constitution, and stands read to obey it as it may be declared by a tribunal
of independence.”353 Black argued that the Court’s exercise of judicial review to uphold
governmental action—to say that it complied with the requirements of the Constitution—was as
important as the Court’s checking function, exercised when the Court struck down legislation.354
Might the public “approval” of Court decisions Strauss cites instead signal mere
acquiescence in a decision rendered by the Court or mere acknowledgment of the Court’s primacy
in “saying what the law is”? It is difficult to imagine that had Belmont or Zschernig come out the
other way, either would have engendered a constitutional crisis. Likewise, to say that presidential
power to settle claims through executive agreements without congressional approval has attained
legitimacy through democratic consensus likely means little more than it is accepted that the Court
has said the president has that power.
Finally, the focus on democratic consensus as a litmus test for the legitimacy of
constitutional principles is in tension with written constraints meant to limit the even ability of
democratically-elected representatives to act. Strauss’s argument seems willing to assume that
improvement and progression of the law will be the order of the day, and, at least implicitly,
questions the utility or desirability of written limitations as checks on the exercise of power.
* * *
In sum, we simply deny that Strauss’ model is correct as a descriptive matter, at least
as applied to foreign affairs.355 Garamendi is powerful evidence that the Court’s prior foreign affairs
decisions do not constrain it, or indeed even meaningfully inform its subsequent decisions. In this
respect the Garamendi Court followed the pattern of previous foreign affairs decisions, which also
352

Indeed, Garamendi barely made the papers, and then most stories stressed only the fact that the
Court had struck down the state law as an interference with the federal government’s ability to conduct foreign
policy. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. The larger implications of the Court’s decision were scarcely
mention even in passing, even by the Garamendi dissenters. We suspect that a similar lack of attention
characterized, for example, Belmont, Curtiss-Wright, Hines, and Zschernig.
353
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 86 (1960).
354
See id. at 56-86; see also Alexander & Schauer, supra note 349(arguing that the necessity of settling
controversies militates in favor of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation).
355
We do not deny that it may be descriptive in other areas, such as the dormant commerce clause
doctrine. See Monaghan, supra note 307 (identifying the dormant commerce clause doctrine as an example of
constitutional common law).
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owed little to their predecessors. The common law constitutionalism that Strauss and others think
they see in foreign affairs law is the Court’s rhetorical cover, not its basis for decision. That being
so, neither of the normative merits Strauss claims for his constitutionalism are well-founded. The
common law method, as practiced by the Court, is not a constraint, nor does it provide doctrinal
stability. And his appeal to democracy seems misplaced, both because the demos likely are not
paying close attention to structural foreign affairs cases, and because, in any event, the entire point
of structural constitutional provisions is to protect the framework of our institutions – particularly
separation of powers and federalism – from the impulses of today’s majority.
As a result, the common law method should be used with caution in constitutional
law. The benefits of the method—it can provide points of departure for analogical reasoning, it can
cabin disagreement about first principles, and it can provide stability and predictability without
stagnation—should not render us insensitive to its problems. First, precedent can be manipulated
so past cases become authority for future action despite compelling differences in facts or despite
express disclaimers contained in earlier cases. Second, this manipulation can occur at a low level
of visibility. Third, the relatively narrow focus on particular cases can obscure future implications.
Fourth, the court-centered focus on doctrine can diminish the status of the Constitution as the
supreme law of the land, elevating courts above the document from which they draw their power.
Finally, defending the common law method by reference to popular acceptance of the principles it
has produced begs the question whether popular opinion would have coalesced the same way around
contrary decisions.
Not only have we argued that Court’s cases do not add up to the result reached in
Garamendi, we are also troubled by the lack of an attempt, even in passing, to harmonize the results
in Garamendi with the text, structure, and history of the Constitution. Such a focus might sensitize
the Court to the substantial structural implications of its decision. At least such a discussion might
provide some needed support to decisions, like Zschernig, whose foundations have always been open
to question. This is not to say that strong arguments could not be made supporting decisions reached
by the Court, but that on important constitutional questions like those presented in Zschernig, to
close one’s eyes to text and structure, is (at least) as much as danger to our constitutional enterprise
as would a constant resort to first principles. Especially where the important constitutional questions
are unlikely to command popular attention; where the costs of judicial error have profound
implications (as they do in foreign affairs cases); where the cases on which the Court sought to
construct its decision have been questioned; and where material exists (as it does now) to guide the
Court, it has a responsibility to bolster its bland citations of prior cases with textual, structural, and
historical analysis. Constitutional common law can all too often provide a rhetorical shield to avoid
such an undertaking.
VII.

Conclusion: Adjudication by Intuition?

The foregoing discussion suggests that the so-called constitutional common law
method, at least in the idealized form that David Strauss and others present it, simply does not
83
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describe what is actually happening at the Supreme Court in many cases. Garamendi is not an
example of analogical reasoning from prior decisions, nor indeed does it have much relationship with
prior decisions at all. To be sure, the lower court opinions in the case followed the outlines
suggested by Strauss: they took the Court’s most relevant precedents – principally Zschernig, Japan
Line and Barclays – and attempted a synthesis in light of the new facts of the case and the way those
cases had been applied in the past. But as we have argued, that is not what the Supreme Court did.
Instead, it essentially ignored Barclays (and, for that matter, Japan Line), gave an odd and inaccurate
recharacterization of the concurring opinion in Zschernig (ignoring that case’s facts and majority
opinion altogether), and created a wholly new idea of executive preemption (a new constitutional
rule so novel that it was not even squarely argued in the lower courts). To the extent the Court’s
opinion relied on prior cases, its justifications seemed decidedly post-hoc.
It also seems unlikely, though, that the Court was deliberately pursuing a proexecutive foreign affairs agenda, or indeed that it was proceeding with much attention to the
structural implications of its decision. The Court’s discussion of structural constitutional issues is
so thin that one suspects the Court did not consider the broader picture with much focus. Moreover,
all of the Justices in the majority had either joined or substantially agreed with the central holding
of Barclays, which took a deliberately anti-executive line.356 It is not just that the majority ignored
a prior Court’s precedent; it ignored one of its own precedents. So, although the Court did not
articulate a distinction with Barclays, there must have been one. Therefore (although the opinion
does not contain limiting language) we doubt that the Court actually saw itself engaged in the
sweeping extension of executive power which we have attributed to its opinion. Instead, we believe
that the case was driven not by a broader structural vision of the Constitution (nor by incremental
reasoning from prior cases) but by intuition about the facts of this particular case.
Although any suggestions about unstated judicial intuitions are necessarily
speculative, we can imagine at least two ways of looking at Garamendi that made it an intuitively
attractive case in which to find against the state. One possibility is that the Court saw the case as
driven by the particular context of executive agreements settling international claims. Of course,
there were material technical barriers to making this the legal basis of the case: the agreements did
not purport to be preemptive, the agreements did not cover all the plaintiffs, prior law had been
cautious about the permissible scope of executive agreements in general, and the Constitution does
not establish international settlement as a plenary and preemptive presidential power. Nonetheless,
all three of the Court’s prior cases upholding executive agreements had been settlements; no
executive settlement had ever been overturned for any reason, and executive settlements had a long
and essentially uncontested history.357 One might surely believe that, whatever the contours of
executive lawmaking in general, prior law had embraced lawmaking through settlement agreements
as a presidential power.

356
Barclays, 512 U.S. at 301 (majority opinion joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, Souter and
Breyer, JJ.); id. at 334 (dissenting opinion of O’Connor, J.) (agreeing with the majority that preemption should not
turn upon “statements made and briefs filed by the executive branch”).
357
See supra part IV.E; Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79.
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Further, although the Garamendi case challenged only the HVIRA, which did not
seem in great tension with the settlement, it was difficult to ignore the fact that the HVIRA was part
of set of laws that explicitly contemplated resolving Holocaust-era insurance claims by litigation in
California.358 The Court did not ignore it, stating that California had “provid[ed] sanctions to compel
disclosure and payment, supplemented by a new cause of action for Holocaust survivors if the other
sanctions should fail.”359 As a legal matter, that sentence was almost wholly misconceived: the
HVIRA did not provide sanctions for non-payment (only for non-disclosure); at most, the HVIRA
supplemented the cause of action, not the other way around, but in fact the two were almost entirely
independent, since disclosure was needed whether the remedy came through ICHEIC or through
litigation; and most importantly the cause of action statute was not before the Court. But this
reference showed that the Court was thinking of California’s actions more broadly, which were in
substantial tension with the settlement.
If one views negotiation and implementation of international settlements as a strongly
presidential powers (similar to, say, recognition), then one would likely be suspicious of state
attempts to upset a settlement. In particular, one would likely be comfortable with a “field
preemption” analysis, derived from the rules of preemptive effects of statutes, that would clear the
states out of the way altogether, without lingering over technicalities like the fact that the agreements
did not cover all of the plaintiffs or that the agreements had little to say about disclosure issues. This
would also distinguish Garamendi from Barclays (and Breard), which were not about settlements,
or anything else quintessentially executive. And it would explain the Court’s uninterest in broader
structural concerns, because a rule applying only to settlements would not raise such concerns.
A second possibility requires further explanation of an aspect of the case that we have
so far literally relegated to a footnote.360 In addition to their foreign affairs and dormant commerce
clause challenges, the insurers attacked the HVIRA on due process grounds. In main, this part of
the case centered upon three particularly overreaching aspects of the California law that made it seem
especially unfair and burdensome upon at least some of the insurers.
First, the HVIRA required the disclosure of all insurance policies issued in Europe
between 1920 and 1945361 – surely a staggering number. It was not limited to policies of Holocaust
victims, or of persons who were believed to be or claimed to be Holocaust victims; nor was it limited
to persons residing in California, or even persons residing in the United States. True, the state had
its reasons. As the state pointed out, it would be hard to compile a list limited to victims or based
on current residency. Moreover, the insurers’ good faith was sufficiently suspect that the state did
not want to leave any discretion in deciding which names to release.362 At the same time, though,
this meant that only a small fraction of the names released would have any relation to the Holocaust
policies. An even smaller number would have any relation to the United States, or to California.
358

See supra part I.A.
Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2391.
360
Note 124 supra.
361
Cal. Ins. Code sec. 13804(a)
362
See Appellant’s Opening Brief, Gerling Global Reinsurance Co. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739 (9th Cir.
2001), at 6, n.3.
359
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Second, the HVIRA required disclosure from entities that were often only very distant
corporate relatives of the companies that did business in California. Many of the companies
regulated by the state had no relation to the Holocaust other than that at some time long after it
occurred, the California-licensed company had been acquired by a company that issued Holocaustera policies. The HVIRA thus would penalize a company for the failures of a distant corporate
relative over which it likely had little control (and perhaps little relationship aside from distant
common ownership). This was not true of all the insurers affected by the HVIRA, but it was true
of enough of them that the point could be made quite sharply.363
Third, there was some material dispute whether the HVIRA’s required disclosures
violated German or other European privacy laws. But in any event, the state took the position
(confirmed by the plain language of the statute) that illegality under foreign law was not an excuse
for noncompliance with the HVIRA.364 And surely there were some legitimate privacy concerns:
most of the people whose policies were covered by the HVIRA were not Holocaust victims, and so
did not benefit from publication, yet they might have good reason to prefer that, other things being
equal, their insurance history not be broadcast to the whole world. (And it would be the whole
world, since the HVIRA contemplated putting the information on an Internet-accessible database,
not merely using it for the internal regulatory activities of the insurance commissioner.)365
The combination of these ill-attributes meant that in some cases a U.S. company
doing business in California might be punished because a distant corporate relative in Europe, over
which it had no realistic control, declined to supply it with an enormous volume of information
(most of it irrelevant to the state’s interest), perhaps in violation of European law and likely in
violation of the interests of many of its clients. It was not hard to conclude that California had gone
too far in pursuit of an entirely legitimate goal.
The insurers made various arguments, mostly founded on the due process clause, that
the state’s overreaching in these and other respects rendered the HVIRA unconstitutional. But due
process jurisprudence was not hospitable to their claims once one encountered the details. For
example, no clear rule requires that illegality under foreign law excuse non-compliance with local
regulatory requirements, and the impact upon state regulatory functions of a contrary rule as a
general matter would be daunting.366 Further, although the HVIRA’s disclosure requirements
seemed out of proportion to the state’s interest, the due process clause’s extraordinarily low standard
for validating economic regulation meant that the state had to show only the most minimal
connection between its law and its interest (which it surely could).367 And finally, while penalizing
one member of a corporate family for non-disclosure by another might seem unfair in this case, in
363

Cal. Ins. Code Sec. 13802(b) (defining “related company”); see Brief of Gerling Appellees, Gerling
Global Reinsurance Co. v. Low, 296 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2002), at 21-51 (making these points).
364
See Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Low, 186 F.Supp. 2d 1099, 1113 (E.D. Cal. 2001).
365
See Cal. Ins. Code sec. 13803. On the privacy point see Brief of the Gerling Appellees, at 35-37.
366
See Societe Nacionale Industrelle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982).
367
Gerling, 296 F.3d at 845-49.
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the ordinary case it is a common enough practice, and like the asserted excuse for foreign illegality,
a contrary rule stated broadly would cripple state regulatory functions.
There was a further serious drawback to founding a decision on the due process
clause: such a decision would be hard to limit. Most of the due process arguments had little to do
with foreign affairs, and holding for the insurers on this ground would suggest a whole charter of
potential rights available to all corporations against all state regulatory agencies. Moreover, these
rights would potentially limit the federal government as well (assuming the due process clauses of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments are parallel in this regard).
So while the due process clause seemed an unattractive ground for decision, the fact
remained that the state regulation, at least in some visions of the case, bordered on the unreasonable.
Of course, in the usual case – especially in the usual economic regulatory case – courts are reluctant
to strike down laws simply because they seem burdensome, or because the costs seem out of
proportion to the benefits. But Garamendi was not the usual case, because it also had the foreign
affairs dimension. Thus the state law seemed uniquely unreasonable, because it overreached in terms
of its treatment of the insurers and it overreached by involving the state in matters of international
concern.
In sum, we suggest that what may have moved the Court was the combination of an
unreasonable (in its view) state law combined with adverse foreign affairs affects. This would
explain why the Court said that the HVIRA was not really within the traditional regulatory area of
the state. In the abstract, it seems hard to say that the conditions under which a company (especially
an insurance company) can do business in a state lie anywhere but at the very center of the traditional
regulatory powers of the state. What was untraditional about the HVIRA was not insurance
regulation in general, nor even the HVIRA’s objective of protecting policyholders, but the peculiar
and overreaching scope of the statute in particular. This would also explain the Court’s thinking that
Barclays and Breard were different from Garamendi – in both cases, the Court likely thought that
the state’s activities were more traditional and justifiable.
We do not mean to endorse the Court’s intuition in these respects, nor to endorse this
method of judicial decisionmaking. We do think, however, that it goes further in explaining what
actually happened in Garamendi than does either a theory of constitutional adjudication based on
the trinity of text, structure and history, or a theory of common law constitutionalism.
Nor do we mean to suggest that Garamendi is, after all, a narrow opinion. We are
persuaded that the Court thought it was issuing a narrow opinion, and that this Court likely would
not give it wide application to, say, reverse the outcome in Breard. The danger is that while events
come and go, and circumstances giving rise to intuitive judgments dissipate, opinions and holdings
remain, in Justice Jackson’s “loaded weapon” metaphor,368 for future courts to use. So the danger
is not that this Court intends to revolutionize foreign affairs law, but that it has left the tools for some
future court to do so.
368

See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
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If we are correct, that suggests caution in extending Garamendi to its logical
implications. As argued in this Article, we think that is the right approach for other reasons as well.
Taken to its logical implications, Garamendi threatens to effect a material re-allocation of foreign
affairs power toward the executive branch, contrary to the plain language, structural implications and
history of the Constitution. The executive is not a lawmaker, and we should not be tempted to think
otherwise by what the Court appeared to say in Garamendi.
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